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This dissertation contains three chapters in financial economics that
theoretically and empirically examine how individuals’ investment decisions
explain aggregate behavior.
The first chapter examines how reputational herding between fund
managers depends on the fee structure, fund manager evaluation metric, mar-
ket efficiency, and density of talented fund managers. Results show there are
more equilibria involving herding between fund managers when net fund bal-
ance growth depends on reputation of talent rather than fund return. These
inefficient equilibria are removed when the ratio of the performance fee rate
to management fee rate is larger than calculated thresholds that depend on
market efficiency and the density of talented fund managers. In the absence
of performance fees, lower predictability of investment returns and a higher
density of talented fund managers increase the desire for fund managers to
deviate from efficient equilibria. The model also shows having fund managers
vi
compete against each other induces herding when net fund balance growth de-
pends on fund returns, but removes herding equilibria when net fund balance
growth depends on reputation of talent.
The second chapter determines what herding networks exist between
institutional investors and how herding depends on stock market volatility,
degree of portfolio changes, and stock size. Using quarterly holding data
from 2000-2010, I find stronger herding networks between similar types of
institutions compared to institutions in the same metropolitan area. Further-
more, the herding network between similar types of institutions exists across
metropolitan areas. Results show institutions herd more when making major
portfolio changes than when making minor portfolio changes. The difference
in herding between the two types of portfolio changes is greatest for small
cap stocks which exhibit the highest levels of herding under both types of
portfolio changes. The relationship between market volatility and herding by
institutions is also examined and found not to have a strong correlation using
quarterly holdings data.
The third chapter answers the question, “Can reasonable wind energy
plant cost reductions or efficiency improvements precipitate immediate invest-
ment in wind energy in the absence of renewable energy Production Tax Cred-
its?” I analyze a single entity considering an irreversible investment under
uncertainty in wind power energy. The investor’s decision to invest is de-
pendent on investment cost, energy production efficiency, government policy,
current price of electricity, and beliefs on future electricity prices. The results
vii
show that even with substantial cost reductions and efficiency improvements,
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Chapter 1
Performance-Based Fee Structures: A Possible
Market Stabilizer and Herding Deterrence
1.1 Introduction
After a financial crisis, people determine where to place blame. Hedge
funds have become a target for criticism because some argue their performance
fees cause fund managers to take excessive risks (see Zuckerman (2008)). In
contrast, others believe that hedge funds’ investment structure creates a more
stable financial market and should be encouraged by legislation (see Mallaby
(2010)). This chapter analyzes the impact of performance fees on reputational
herding and how herding depends on the fund manager evaluation metric,
market efficiency, and density of talented fund managers.
Performance fees are fees fund managers charge investors that are based
on a fund’s return. Currently, less than 15 percent of all funds use performance
fees (see Jaffe (2010)), but there is a growing trend towards performance-based
fee structures. Hedge fund assets under management grew from $110 billion
at the end of 1998 to roughly $2 trillion dollars in 2008 (see Eichengreen and
Mathieson (1999); Zuckerman (2008))1. The growth in performance fees is not
1Mutual funds managed about $12 trillion in 2008 (see Zuckerman (2008)).
1
solely attributed to an increase in hedge funds. Putnam Investments recently
introduced performance fees on several of its mutual funds, and other fund
companies are planning on implementing performance fees on some of their
funds (see Tarquinio (2010)). In the UK, there was a 138 percent rise in
open-ended funds with performance fees between 2008 and 2010 (see Currie
(2010)). In addition, Fidelity, Blackrock, Axa Investment Managers, Shroders,
and JPMorgan Asset management all expect the usage of performance fees
will continue to grow in the future (see Lawlor (2010)). To help prevent future
crises, it is important to better understand performance-based fee structures
and determine if policy makers should encourage or discourage their growth.
There are a number of theoretical papers that examine performance
fees. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) use option pricing theory to value a perfor-
mance fee as a call option held by the fund manager. Under a contract with
asymmetric fees, a fund manager has the incentive to take large risks because
she can earn large gains on the upside and lose little on the downside. Starks
(1987) compares symmetric and asymmetric performance fees, concluding that
symmetric fees mitigate adverse risk incentives.
Lynch and Musto (1997) also consider incentives induced by perfor-
mance fees, but focus on unobservable fund manager effort. Their results sug-
gest performance fees are better than management fees at extracting effort.
They assume hedge fund managers are more skilled on average than mutual
fund managers; therefore, performance fees are more common with hedge funds
because the benefits of extracting more effort are greater for hedge funds. Gri-
2
nold and Rudd (1987) acknowledge negative aspects of performance fees, but
conclude that performance fees closer align a fund manager’s reward to his
skill. Furthermore, they find that poor and average managers are likely to fail
faster with performance fees than they would under a traditional fee structure
with only management fees.
Empirically, fee structures are difficult to examine because it is hard to
obtain fee structure variation ceteris paribus. Due to an exogenously mandated
law by the SEC in 19712, Golec and Starks (2004) were able to inspect how
fund managers changed their portfolio risk levels after being required by law
to remove asymmetric performance fees. Although the affected fund managers
increased their risk levels after the law, Golec and Starks (2004) suggest the
risk levels would have increased more without the law.
John Maynard Keynes summarizes the motivation for herding based on
reputation considerations:
“Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail con-
ventionally than to succeed unconventionally.” Keynes (1936)
Fund manager herding has the potential to destabilize stock prices and form
asset bubbles. Therefore, it is important to understand what mechanisms deter
herding. Eichengreen and Mathieson (1999) argue that hedge funds often act
2Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, amended Section 205 (effective Decem-
ber 14, 1971) required mutual funds to remove asymmetric performance fees (see Golec and
Starks (2004)).
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as contrarians and serve as “stabilizing speculators”. If performance fees are a
reason why hedge funds are contrarians, financial markets may become more
stable if we encourage more fund managers to adopt a similar fee structure.
Herding is a popular topic in both economics and finance. Lakonishok
et al. (1992) empirically examine herding between money managers and find
minimal support for herding within individual stocks. Grinblatt et al. (1995)
find higher levels of herding due to fund managers using positive-feedback
strategies. Conversely, Sias (2004) shows strong correlation between fund man-
agers’ trades across reporting quarters that is not due to momentum strategies.
In addition, Hong et al. (2005) find that fund managers located in the same
city make similar investment trades. The existence of fund manager herding is
further supported by Shiller and Pound (1989), who conducted a survey and
find almost all institutional investors are influenced by peer communication
when making investment decisions.
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992) are two of the first the-
oretical papers that explain herding by modeling information cascades. Smith
and Sorensen (2000) and Hendricks et al. (2012) are examples of theoretical
herding papers in economics that evaluate how agents make costly decisions,
but do not directly address herding in financial markets. In finance, Froot
et al. (1992) present a model that shows investors with long horizons act effi-
ciently, but investors with short horizons may herd on the same information
that is sometimes completely unrelated to fundamentals. Although these pa-
pers address herding in a theoretical framework, Scharfstein and Stein (1990)
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is the only theoretical paper that directly models herding due to reputation
concerns. Their model examines project managers contemplating a capital
investment. “Smart” project managers are assumed to have correlated private
signals pertaining to the profitability of the investment, and a manager’s fu-
ture wages are based on the updated belief that the manager is the “smart”
type after her decision to invest or not has been made. Scharfstein and Stein
(1990) find that project managers will rationally mimic the investment deci-
sion made before them and not use useful private information when future
wages are based on reputation.
This chapter is the first to examine the effect of performance fees on
reputational herding in a theoretical framework. In addition, this chapter
examines how the desire to herd depends on the fund manager evaluation
metric, market efficiency, and density of talented investors. I adapt the basic
framework in Scharfstein and Stein (1990) to analyze eight cases under different
fee structure and fund manager evaluation metric assumptions. Results show
there are more equilibria involving herding between fund managers when net
fund balance growth depends on reputation of talent rather than fund return.
These inefficient equilibria are removed when the ratio of the performance fee
rate to management fee rate is larger than calculated thresholds that depend
on market efficiency and density of talented fund managers. In the absence
of performance fees, lower predictability of investment returns and a higher
density of talented fund managers increase the desire for fund managers to
deviate from efficient equilibria. The model also shows having fund managers
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compete against each other induces herding when net fund balance growth
depends on fund returns, but removes herding equilibria when net fund balance
growth depends on reputation of talent.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes
the model and Section 1.3 shows equilibria found in eight cases under different
fee structure and fund manager evaluation metric assumptions. Section 1.4
provides a discussion of the results from Section 1.3. Section 1.5 concludes
the chapter. Appendix A.1 summarizes the eight cases under different fee
structure and fund manager evaluation metric assumptions and Appendix A.2
contains a summary list of variables with descriptions. Details of calculations
are in Appendix A.3.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Environment
The environment in this chapter is based on the model presented in
Scharfstein and Stein (1990). Scharfstein and Stein (1990) consider the in-
vestment decisions of two project managers deciding whether to invest in a
project, whereas this chapter considers the investment decisions of two fund
managers deciding between two financial investments. This chapter extends
the one period model in Scharfstein and Stein (1990) to two periods in order to
create a trade-off between immediate profits and a good reputation for future
profits. In addition, this chapter enriches the basic framework presented in
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) by considering different fee structures and fund
6
manager evaluation metrics.
There are two time periods. The first period exists between t = 0 and
t = 1 and the second period exists between t = 1 and t = 2, where t = 0, 1, 2
denotes time. There are two possibilities for the state of the world each period.
Consider state ωG to be the “good” state and state ωB to be the “bad” state.
The state of the world is revealed at the end of each period: ω(t) = ωGt or
ω(t) = ωBt , for t = 1, 2. Argument t is used only for clarification purposes
and is suppressed when appropriate to ease notation. Each period, the state









There are two risk neutral fund managers that are indexed by m = 1, 2.
Each fund manager must make a decision at the beginning of each period to
invest using either a risky investment (Investment R) or a riskless investment
(Investment RL). Denote the investment choice made by Fund Manager m at
time t as Cm(t), for t = 0, 1. Cm(t) = Investment Rmt when Fund Manager
m chooses Investment R at time t and Cm(t) = Investment RLmt when Fund
Manager m chooses Investment RL at time t. Arguments m and t are used
only for clarification purposes and are suppressed when appropriate to ease
notation.
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The two fund managers’ investment decisions are made sequentially.
The fund manager required to make the first investment is chosen at the
beginning of each period with equal probability. Without loss of generality, let
Fund Manager 1 be the fund manager chosen to invest first in the first period.
Denote Xm(C, ω, t), as the t − 1 to t return Fund Manager m obtains
by choosing investment C when the state of the world ω is realized for t = 1, 2.
Investment RL earns the risk-free rate regardless of the state of the world:
Xm(Investment RLmt−1, ωGt , t) = X
m(Investment RLmt−1, ωBt , t)(1.2.3)
= r. (1.2.4)
The period investment return Fund Manager m earns when
Cm(t) = Investment Rmt is a random variable that depends on the state of the
world:
Xm(Investment Rmt−1, ωGt , t) = rG, (1.2.5)
Xm(Investment Rmt−1, ωBt , t) = rB. (1.2.6)
Arguments m and t are used only for clarification purposes and are suppressed
when appropriate to ease notation.
State ωG is associated with a greater period investment return than
state ωB for the risky investment:
rG > rB. (1.2.7)







· rB = r + π > r = E[Investment RL],(1.2.8)
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where π is the risk premium associated with Investment R. A no-arbitrage
condition is Investment R performs better than Investment RL in state ωG,
and Investment RL performs better that Investment R in state ωB
3:
rG > r > rB. (1.2.9)
Each fund manager observes a private signal at the beginning of each
period. Denote the private signal as Sm(t) for t = 0, 1 and m = 1, 2. Sm(t) can
take on one of two values: SmGt or S
m
Bt
. Arguments m and t are used only for
clarification purposes and are suppressed when appropriate to ease notation.
SG represents information that suggests state ωG is more likely than ωB, and
SB represents information that suggests state ωB is more likely to occur than
ωG.
In addition to observing a private signal, each fund manager is either
innately “talented” with probability θ, or “untalented” with probability 1− θ.
Denote Fund Manager m being talented as Tm and untalented as Um. The
ability of a fund manager is constant over all time periods. If a fund manager
is talented, her private signal for a given period provides useful information
about the state of the world for that period:




P(SG|ωB,T) = 1− p. (1.2.11)
3The two fund managers are not allowed to short an investment, but the condition makes
the investment decision for the two fund managers non-trivial.
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If a fund manager is untalented, her private signal is uninformative:
P(SG|ωG,U) = P(SG|ωB,U) ≡ z. (1.2.12)
Parameter p is a measure of market efficiency. A large value of p means that
talented fund managers’ private signals are informative of future price move-
ments. Samuelson (1965) shows all price fluctuations are random in efficient
markets, therefore large values of p are associated with inefficient markets.
A key characteristic of the environment is that a fund manager does not
know her own type and neither do their investors nor the other fund manager.
Therefore, the ex ante distribution of signals is the same for each type of fund
manager so that a fund manager cannot infer anything about her own ability












The left-hand side of (1.2.13) is the probability an untalented fund manager
observes SG and the right-hand side is the probability a talented fund manager
observes SG. With the given assumptions, both talented and untalented fund
managers observe SG with unconditional probability
1
2




If one fund manager is talented and the other is untalented, their sig-
nals are drawn independently by the distributions given in (1.2.10), (1.2.11),
and (1.2.12). If both fund managers are untalented, their signals are drawn
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independently by the distribution given in (1.2.12). In contrast, the inde-
pendence assumption is not used when both fund managers are talented. If
both fund managers are talented, their signals are perfectly correlated and
they receive the same signal with certainty drawn from the distribution given
in (1.2.10) and (1.2.11). The correlation assumptions are motivated by the
idea that the information untalented fund managers use to make investment
decisions can be considered noise, whereas talented fund managers commonly
know what information is useful. The strong perfect correlation assumption
between talented fund managers is used to simplify calculations.
1.2.2 Fund Manager Objectives
Each fund manager’s objective is to maximize the expected present
value of her cumulative two period profit. A fund manager’s profit is produced
by two types of fees:
1. Management Fees: A fixed percentage rate multiplied with the fund’s
net asset value,
2. Performance Fees: A fixed percentage rate multiplied with the fund’s
profit from the period before fees.
This chapter evaluates two types of fee structures:
1. The “traditional” fee structure consists of only a management fee,
2. The “performance-based” fee structure consists of both management and
performance fees.
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For simplicity, there are no high water marks or hurdle rates4. The perfor-
mance fees are also symmetric5.
Denote the management fee percentage rate for traditional fee struc-
tures as MFRT and the management fee percentage rate for performance-
based fee structures as MFRP . Because performance-based fee structures
also include performance fees, assume MFRT > MFRP 6. The performance
fee percentage rate in performance-based fee structures is denoted as PFR.
Fund Manager m has a net fund balance of NFBm(t) at time t. Assume
each manager is endowed at the beginning of the first period with:
NFBm(0) = nfb ∈ R+, for m = 1, 2. (1.2.15)
The profit raised by management fees for Fund Manager m using a traditional
fee structure is denoted as MFTm(t) for time period t − 1 to t, for t = 1, 2.
Similarly, the profit raised by management fees for Fund Manager m using a
performance-based fee structure is denoted as MFPm(t) for time period t− 1
to t, for t = 1, 2. The profit raised by performance fees for Fund Manager
4A high water mark means the manager receives performance fees only on increases in
the net asset value of the fund in excess of the highest net asset value it has previously
achieved. A hurdle rate means the fund manager does not charge a performance fee until
the fund’s annualized performance exceeds a benchmark rate.
5Most hedge fund performance fees are asymmetric, meaning that they only apply to
positive excess returns. In contrast, mutual funds by law are required to have symmetric
fees; the performance fees can either be a bonus or a penalty depending on the sign of the
excess return (see Golec and Starks (2004)).
6In practice, it is usually the case that MFRP > MFRT because hedge funds are
currently a large portion of performance-based fee structures and hedge funds are usually
more actively managed than mutual funds. This chapter compares two different fee structure
types for a given fund. Therefore, it is reasonable that the fund manager would keep the
same expected income and MFRT > MFRP .
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m using a performance-based fee structure is denoted by PFm(t,X) for time
period t − 1 to t, for t = 1, 2. All arguments are used only for clarification
purposes and suppressed when appropriate to ease notation.
MFTm(t) = MFRT ·NFBm(t− 1), (1.2.16)
MFPm(t) = MFRP ·NFBm(t− 1), (1.2.17)
PFm(t,X) = PFR ·Xm(t) ·NFBm(t− 1). (1.2.18)
The two fund managers and their investors are Bayesian updaters with
regards to the posterior probability that Fund Manager m is the talented type,
m = 1, 2. Denote θ̂m as the general notation for the posterior probability
attached to Fund Manager m being the talented type by investors. θ̂m can
take on values θ̂∗m and θ̂
∗∗
m :
• θ̂∗m as the posterior probability attached to Fund Manager m being the
talented type given Sm(0) and ω(1),
• θ̂∗∗m as the posterior probability attached to Fund Manager m being the
talented type given S1(0), S2(0), and ω(1).
The posterior probabilities calculated by the investors may differ from
the fund managers’ beliefs due to private signals not being revealed in the
equilibria. Refer to θ̂mi as the posterior probability that Fund Manager m
calculates for Fund Manager i being the talented type.
Details on how the posterior probabilities are calculated are given in
Appendix A.3.
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This chapter examines four fund manager evaluation metrics distin-
guished by the net fund balance growth assumption between periods.






where g : R → R is a linear function increasing in Xm(1), m = 1, 2. g(·) is
positive over the domain defined by Xm(1).







where g̃(0) = nfb, and g̃ : R → R is linear function increasing in Xm(1) −
X−m(1), m = 1, 2. g̃(·) is positive over the domain defined by Xm(1)−X−m(1).
3. NFBm growth depends only on θ̂m:
NFBm(1) = f(θ̂m), (1.2.21)
where f(θ) = nfb and f : (0, 1) → R is a linear function increasing in θ̂m,
m = 1, 2. f(·) is positive over the domain defined by θ̂m.
4. NFBm growth depends on the relative value of θ̂m compared to θ̂−m:
7−m refers to the fund manager who is not Fund Manager m.
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NFBm(1) = f̃(θ̂m − θ̂−m), (1.2.22)
where f̃(0) = nfb and f̃ : R→ R is a linear function increasing in θ̂m − θ̂−m,
m = 1, 2. f̃(·) is positive over the domain defined by θ̂m − θ̂−m.
The risk neutral fund managers’ preferences are represented by linear




MFTm(1) + β · E0[MFTm(2)], (1.2.23)
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the time discount factor commonly used by fund managers
m = 1, 2. A fund manager does not have any control over the first term,
MFTm(1). The second term, MFTm(2), depends on the effect Cm(0) has on
NFBm(1).
A fund manager using a performance-based fee structure has a more
complicated decision making process and objective function:
max
{Cm(0),Cm(1)}
MFPm(1) +E0[PFm(1)] +β ·E0[MFPm(2) +PFm(2)], (1.2.24)
m = 1, 2. A fund manager does not have any control over the first term,
MFPm(1). PFm(1) depends on the effect Cm(0) has on Xm(1). The second
period profit depends on the investment choice in both periods. Similarly to
a fund manager without performance fees, MFPm(2) depends on the effect
Cm(0) has on NFBm(1). A fund manager’s profit from performance fees in
the second period is a function of her investment choice in both periods, Cm(0)
and Cm(1).
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The two fee structures are examined under the four different fund man-
ager evaluation metrics in Section 1.3 and Section 1.4. Appendix A.1 summa-
rizes the eight cases.
1.2.3 Additional Return Assumptions
Conditioning only on her private signal, assume Investment R has a
higher expected return when a fund manager observes SG and Investment RL
has a higher expected return when a fund manager observes SB in the first
period:
rG · P(ωG1 |SG0) + rB · P(ωB1|SG0) > r, (1.2.25)
r > rG · P(ωG1|SB0) + rB · P(ωG1|SB0). (1.2.26)
Refer to the chosen fund manager to move first in the second period as






2 that are calculated using
the first period equilibrium strategies presented in Section 1.3.3 to Section
1.3.10, Fund Manager l maximizes E1[X l(2)|Sl(1), θ̂ll, θ̂l−1] by choosing:
• C l(1) = Investment Rl1 when Sl(1) = SlG1 ,
• C l(1) = Investment RLl1 when Sl(1) = SlB1 .
Fund Manager −l maximizes E1[X−l(2)|S1(1), S2(1), θ̂−ll , θ̂
−l
−l] by choosing:

















1.2.4 Timing of Events
Timing in the first period is as follows:
• t = 0:
1. Fund Manager 1 and Fund Manager 2 are endowed withNFB1(0) =
nfb and NFB2(0) = nfb respectively,
2. Fund Manager 1 and Fund Manager 2 observe private signals S1(0)
and S2(0) respectively,
3. Fund Manager 1 chooses C1(0) based on S1(0),
4. Fund Manager 2 chooses C2(0) based on S2(0) and C1(0).
• t = 1:
1. The state of the world for the first period, ω(1), is revealed.
2. Fund Manager 1 and Fund Manager 2 receive management fees
MFT 1(1) and MFT 2(1) respectively if they use a traditional fee
structure, and MFP 1(1) and MFP 2(1) respectively if they use a
performance-based fee structure.
3. Fund Manager 1 and Fund Manager 2 receive performance fees
PF 1(1) and PF 2(1) if they use a performance-based fee structure.
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4. Investors calculate a posterior probability for the ability type of
each fund manager, θ̂m, m = 1, 2.
Timing in the second period is as follows:
• t = 1:
1. Fund Manager 1 and Fund Manager 2 earn a net fund balance of
NFB1(1) and NFB2(1) respectively, which is determined by one
of the four NFB growth scenarios.
2. Fund Manager 1 and Fund Manager 2 receive private signals S1(1)
and S2(1) respectively.
3. Either Fund Manager 1 or Fund Manager 2 is randomly chosen with
equal probability to make the first investment. Refer to chosen fund
manager as Fund Manager l.
4. Fund Manager l chooses C l(1) based on Sl(1).
5. Fund Manager −l chooses C−l(1) based on S−l(1) and C l(1).
• t = 2:
1. The state of the world for the second period, ω(2), is revealed.
2. Fund Manager 1 and Fund Manager 2 receive management fees
MFT 1(2) and MFT 2(2) respectively if they use a traditional fee
structure, and MFP 1(2) and MFP 2(2) respectively if they use a
performance-based fee structure.
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3. Fund Manager 1 and Fund Manager 2 receive performance fees




Throughout this chapter, the term “efficient” strategy refers to a fund
manager choosing the investment that maximizes their fund’s expected return.
An efficient equilibrium is an equilibrium in which both fund managers use
efficient strategies.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria are subgame perfect Bayesian equilibria that
include the fund managers’ beliefs that are consistent with Bayes’ rule. Let
µ1(·) represent Fund Manager 1’s beliefs and µ2(·) represent Fund Manager 2’s
beliefs. The same set of Bayesian consistent beliefs are used in all equilibria.
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4(1− p)θ̂lθ̂−l + 2(1− p)θ̂l(1− θ̂−l) + 2(1− p)θ̂−l(1− θ̂l) + (1− θ̂l)(1− θ̂−l)
4θ̂lθ̂−l + 2θ̂l(1− θ̂−l) + 2θ̂−l(1− θ̂l) + 2(1− θ̂l)(1− θ̂−l)
,
(1.3.4)
where −l = 1, 2 refers to the fund manager that is chosen to pick their invest-
ment second in the second period.
µm(Tm|Sm(0), ω(1)) = θ̂∗m(Sm(0), ω(1)), m = 1, 2,
µm(Tm|S1(0), S2(0), ω(1)) = θ̂∗∗m (S−m(0), Sm(0), ω(1)), m = 1, 2,(1.3.5)
where θ̂∗m(S
m(0), ω(1)) and θ̂∗∗m (S
−m(0), Sm(0), ω(1)) are shown in Appendix
A.3.
Using calculations in Appendix A.3, the Bayesian consistent beliefs in
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the first period are:
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= 1− µm(Um|Sm(0)) = 1− µm(U−m|Sm(0))
= µm(Tm) = µm(T−m)
= 1− µm(Um) = 1− µm(U−m)
= θ, m = 1, 2, (1.3.9)
µ2(T1|S1(0) = S2(0)) = µ2(T2|S1(0) = S2(0))
= 1− µ2(U1|S1(0) = S2(0))




, m = 1, 2, (1.3.10)
µ2(T2|S1(0) 6= S2(0)) = µ2(T2|S1(0) 6= S2(0))
= 1− µ2(U1|S1(0) 6= S2(0))




, m = 1, 2. (1.3.11)
The equilibrium strategies in each period must form a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium because the model has a finite time horizon. The equilibrium
strategies in the second period are unique8. Therefore, equilibrium strategies
in the first period can be solved without regarding the equilibrium strategies
in the second period. Backwards induction is used to solve for pure strategy
perfect Bayesian equilibria.
8The equilibrium beliefs in the second period regarding fund manager talent are not
unique, but the equilibrium strategies are the same for all equilibrium beliefs.
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Section 1.3.2 presents the strategies in the second period for the eight
different cases that differ by fee structure and fund manager evaluation metric.
Section 1.3.3 through Section 1.3.10 review the strategies in the first period
and present the overall equilibria under the eight different cases. Section 1.4
summarizes the results for the eight cases and details of calculations are in
Appendix A.3.
1.3.2 Second Period for All Cases
The investment strategy in the second period is identical for all eight
cases that differ by fee structure and fund manager evaluation metric. There
are no reputation concerns under either fee structure because there are no
future periods to attract investors. Thus, a fund manager using performance
fees has the sole objective of maximizing the fund return in the second period.
The investment choice in the second period is arbitrary for a fund manager
without performance fees, but it is assumed that a fund manager indifferent
between two investments will choose the efficient investment. Therefore, the
objective for both fund managers in all eight cases is to maximize the expected
return in the second period. Let l denote the fund manager who is randomly
chosen to invest first in the second period.
Theorem 1. In the second period, Fund Manager l will choose the investment
that matches her private signal in the second period. Specifically, C l(1) =
Investment Rl1 if S
l(1) = SlG1 and C
l(1) = Investment RLl1 if S
l(1) = SlB1.
Conditioning on C l(1), Fund Manager −l will choose C−l(1) = Investment RL−l1
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if C l(1) = Investment RLl1 and S
−l(1) = S−lB1, and C
−l(1) = Investment R−l1
otherwise. The fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs are presented in
Section 1.3.1.
Proof. In the second period, Fund Manager l’s investment decision is solely
based on her private signal because she chooses first. Using the assump-
tions in Section 1.2.3, C l(1) = Investment Rl1 if S
1(1) = SlG1 and C
l(1) =
Investment RLl1 if S
l(1) = SlB1 .
Although Fund Manager −l does not directly observe Sl(1), she can
infer the private signal from C l(1) because of the one-to-one mapping from
private signals to investment choices for Fund Manager l. Consider the case
in which S−l(1) = S−lB1 and C
l(l) = Investment Rl1. Fund Manager −l will
base C−l(1) on the two-signal information set (SlG1 , S
−l
B1
). Therefore, C−l(1) =
Investment R−l1 because of the assumptions in Section 1.2.3. Similarly, C
−l(1) =




). Using the assumptions in Section 1.2.3, C−l(1) = Investment R−l1
when the information set is (SlG1 , S
−l
G1
) and C−l(1) = Investment RL−l1 when




1.3.3 Case 1: Traditional Fee Structure and NFBm Growth De-
pends Only on Xm(1)
As shown in Section 1.2.2, a fund manager’s maximization problem
using a traditional fee structure is:
max
Cm(0)
MFTm(1) + β · E0[MFTm(2)], (1.3.12)
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where β ∈ (0, 1] is the time discount factor commonly used by fund managers
m = 1, 2.






where g : R → R is a linear function increasing in Xm(1), m = 1, 2. g(·) is
positive over the domain defined by Xm(1).
It is clear from (1.3.12) and (1.3.13) that each fund manager’s sole
objective in the first period is to maximize her expected fund return.
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions in Case 1, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 1 will choose the investment that matches
her private signal in the first period. Specifically, C1(0) = Investment R10 if
S1(0) = S1G0 and C
1(0) = Investment RL10 if S
1(0) = S1B0. Conditioning
on C1(0), Fund Manager 2 will choose C2(0) = Investment RL20 if C
1(0) =
Investment RL10 and S
2(0) = S2B0, and C
2(0) = Investment R20 otherwise.
Theorem 1 shows the equilibrium strategies in the second period and Section
1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
Proof. In the first period, Fund Manager 1’s investment decision is solely based
on her private signal because she chooses first. Using probability calculations
in Appendix A.3.1 and assumptions shown in (1.2.25) and (1.2.26), it is clear
that C1(0) = Investment R10 if S
1(0) = S1G0 and C
1(0) = Investment RL10 if
S1(0) = S1B0 .
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Although Fund Manager 2 does not directly observe S1(0), she can
infer the private signal from C1(0) because of the one-to-one mapping from
private signals to investment choices for Fund Manager 1. Consider the case
in which S2(0) = S2B0 and C
1(0) = Investment R10. Fund Manager 2 will base
C2(0) on the two-signal information set (S1G0 , S
2
B0
). Calculation (A.3.11) in
Appendix A.3.2 shows the two states are equally likely to happen when condi-
tioning on the information set (S1G0 , S
2
B0
). Therefore, C2(0) = Investment R20
because of the assumption stated in (1.2.8). C2(0) in Case 1 does not depend
on the order of information arrival; Fund Manager 2 treats the information
sets (S1G0 , S
2
B0
) and (S1B0 , S
2
G0
) the same. Therefore, C2(0) = Investment R20




calculations in Appendix A.3.2, C2(0) = Investment R20 when the information
set is (S1G0 , S
2
G0





Theorem 1 completes the proof.
A larger θ means a fund manager has a better chance of being a smart
fund manager, and a larger p means the signals that smart managers receive
are more informative. Therefore, in Case 1, fund managers’ expected utility
is increasing with respect to p and θ. Because Fund Manager 2 is able to use
a two signal information set when making her decision in the first period, her
expected utility is higher than Fund Manager 1.
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1.3.4 Case 2: Performance-Based Fee Structure and NFBm Growth
Depends Only on Xm(1)
As shown in Section 1.2.2, a fund manager’s maximization problem
using a performance-based fee structure is:
max
{Cm(0),Cm(1)}
MFPm(1) +E0[PFm(1)] +β ·E0[MFPm(2) +PFm(2)], (1.3.14)
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the time discount factor commonly used by fund managers
m = 1, 2.






where g : R → R is a linear function increasing in Xm(1), m = 1, 2. g(·) is
positive over the domain defined by Xm(1).
It is clear from (1.3.14) and (1.3.15) that the sole objective of each fund
manager is to maximize their expected fund return in the first period.
Theorem 3. Under the assumptions in Case 2, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 1 will choose the investment that matches
her private signal in the first period. Specifically, C1(0) = Investment R10 if
S1(0) = S1G0 and C
1(0) = Investment RL10 if S
1(0) = S1B0. Conditioning
on C1(0), Fund Manager 2 will choose C2(0) = Investment RL20 if C
1(0) =
Investment RL10 and S
2(0) = S2B0, and C
2(0) = Investment R20 otherwise.
Theorem 1 shows the equilibrium strategies in the second period and Section
1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
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Proof. The proof for Theorem 3 is the same as the proof for Theorem 2 in
Section 1.3.3.
1.3.5 Case 3: Traditional Fee Structure and NFBm Growth De-
pends on the Relative Value of Xm(1) Compared to X−m(1)
As shown in Section 1.2.2, a fund manager’s maximization problem
using a traditional fee structure is:
max
Cm(0)
MFTm(1) + β · E0[MFTm(2)], (1.3.16)
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the time discount factor commonly used by fund managers
m = 1, 2.







where g̃(0) = nfb, and g̃ : R → R is linear function increasing in Xm(1) −
X−m(1), m = 1, 2. g̃(·) is positive over the domain defined by Xm(1)−X−m(1).
It is clear from (1.3.16) and (1.3.17) that the sole objective of each fund
manager is to maximize E[Xm(1)−X−m(1)].
Lemma 1. Under the assumptions in Case 3, Fund Manager 2 will invest
efficiently in the first period regardless of Fund Manager 1’s strategy.
Proof. Fund Manager 1 chooses her investment before observing C2(0), there-
fore Fund Manager 2’s investment decision can only affect X2(1). Fund Man-
ager 2 will maximize E[X2(1)] in order to maximize E[X2(1)−X1(1)].
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Lemma 2. Under the assumptions in Case 3 and given Fund Manager 2 will
invest efficiently, Fund Manager 1 will not invest efficiently in the first period.
Proof. Lemma 1 shows Fund Manager 2 will choose C2(0) = Investment RL20
if C1(0) = Investment RL10 and S
2(0) = S2B0 , and C
2(0) = Investment R20
otherwise.
Consider the case in which S1(0) = S1G0 . In order for Fund Manager 1
to invest efficiently, the following condition must hold:




≥ (r − rG) · P(S2G0 , ωG1|S
1
G0




+ (r − rB) · P(S2G0 , ωB1|S
1
G0




The left-hand side of condition (1.3.18) is the expected difference in
fund returns when both fund managers invest efficiently. The right-hand side
of condition (1.3.18) is the expected difference in fund returns when Fund Man-
ager 1 deviates from the efficient equilibrium. Using calculations in Appendix








≥ r · [θ + 1
2
(1− θ)2]. (1.3.19)
Given assumptions (1.2.8) and p > .5, condition (1.3.18) is always satisfied.
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Now consider the case in which S1(0) = S1B0 . In order for Fund Manager
1 to invest efficiently, the following condition must hold:
(r − rG) · P(S2G0 , ωG1|S
1
B0




+ (r − rB) · P(S2G0 , ωB1|S
1
B0








The left-hand side of condition (1.3.20) is the expected difference in
fund returns when both fund managers invest efficiently. The right-hand side
of condition (1.3.20) is the expected difference in fund returns when Fund Man-
ager 1 deviates from the efficient equilibrium. Using calculations in Appendix







Condition (1.3.21) is a direct violation of assumption (1.2.8), therefore con-
dition (1.3.20) is never satisfied and Fund Manager 1 will deviate from the
efficient investment strategy.
Lemma 3. Under the assumptions in Case 3 and given Fund Manager 2 in-
vests efficiently, Fund Manager 1 will not follow a strategy in the first period
in which she always chooses C1(0) = Investment RL10 if others assume Fund
Manager 1 observed S1(0) = S1G0 when she deviates with C
1(0) = Investment R10.
Similarly, Fund Manager 1 will not follow a strategy in the first period in which
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she always chooses C1(0) = Investment R10 if π
1−θ
θ
< r − rG(1− p)− rBp and
others assume Fund Manager 1 observed S1(0) = S1B0 when she deviates with
C1(0) = Investment RL10. On the other hand, Fund Manager 1 will follow a
strategy in the first period in which she always chooses C1(0) = Investment R10
if π 1−θ
θ
≥ r − rG(1 − p) − rBp and others assume Fund Manager 1 observed
S1(0) = S1B0 when she deviates with C
1(0) = Investment RL10.
Proof. When Fund Manager 1 ignores her signal, Fund Manager 2 learns
nothing from C1(0). Therefore, Fund Manager 2 will choose the investment
that matches her private signal in the first period. Specifically, C2(0) =
Investment R20 if S
2(0) = S2G0 and C
2(0) = Investment RL20 if S
2(0) = S2B0 .
Consider the strategy in which Fund Manager 1 always chooses C1(0) =
Investment RL10. Fund Manager 1 will follow this strategy only if the following
two conditions are satisfied:
(r − rG) · P(S2G0 , ωG1|S
1
G0




+ (r − r) · P(S2B0 , ωG1|S
1
G0




≥ (rG − rG) · P(S2G0 , ωG1|S
1
G0













(r − rG) · P(S2G0 , ωG1|S
1
B0




+ (r − r) · P(S2B0 , ωG1|S
1
B0




≥ (rG − rG) · P(S2G0 , ωG1|S
1
B0












Condition (1.3.22) is the relevant condition when S1(0) = S1G0 and con-
dition (1.3.23) is the relevant condition when S1(0) = S1B0 . Using calculations
in Appendix A.3.1, condition (1.3.22) can be reduced to:
r · [θ + 1
2
(1− θ)2]
≥ rG · [θp+
1
4




Given assumptions (1.2.8) and p > .5, condition (1.3.22) is never satisfied.
Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1, condition (1.3.23) can be reduced to:
r ≥ rG + rB. (1.3.25)
Given assumption (1.2.8), condition (1.3.23) is never satisfied. Therefore, Fund
Manager 1 will not follow a strategy in the first period in which she always
chooses C1(0) = Investment RL10 if others assume Fund Manager 1 observed
S1(0) = S1G0 when she deviates with C
1(0) = Investment R10.
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Now consider the strategy in which Fund Manager 1 always chooses
C1(0) = Investment R10. Fund Manager 1 will follow this strategy only if the
following two conditions are satisfied:
(rG − rG) · P(S2G0 , ωG1|S
1
G0




+ (rG − r) · P(S2B0 , ωG1|S
1
G0




≥ (r − rG) · P(S2G0 , ωG1 |S
1
G0




+ (r − r) · P(S2B0 , ωG1|S
1
G0




(rG − rG) · P(S2G0 , ωG1|S
1
B0




+ (rG − r) · P(S2B0 , ωG1 |S
1
B0




≥ (r − rG) · P(S2G0 , ωG1|S
1
B0




+ (r − r) · P(S2B0 , ωG1|S
1
B0




Condition (1.3.26) is the relevant condition when S1(0) = S1G0 and con-
dition (1.3.27) is the relevant condition when S1(0) = S1B0 . Using calculations




(1− θ)2 + 1
4
(1− θ2)]
+ rB · [θ(1− p) +
1
4
(1− θ)2 + 1
4
(1− θ2)]
≥ r · [θ + 1
2




Given assumptions (1.2.8) and p > .5, condition (1.3.26) is always satisfied.
Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1 and definition 1
2
· rG + 12 · rB = r + π,
condition (1.3.27) can be reduced to:
rG · [θ(1− p) +
1
4
(1− θ)2 + 1
4
(1− θ2)]
+ rB · [θp+
1
4
(1− θ)2 + 1
4
(1− θ2)]
≥ r · [θ + 1
2





≥ r − rG(1− p)− rBp. (1.3.29)
The right-hand side of condition (1.3.29) can be positive or negative depending
on the values of r, rG, rB, and p. As p approaches 0.5 in the limit from above,
r − rG(1 − p) − rBp is certainly negative because of assumption (1.2.8). If
r − rG(1 − p) − rBp ≤ 0, condition (1.3.29) is always satisfied because the
left-hand side is always positive. If r− rG(1− p)− rBp > 0, condition (1.3.29)
may or may not be satisfied depending on the values of r, rG, rB, p, and θ.
Theorem 4. Under the assumptions in Case 3, there does not exist a pure
strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium if π 1−θ
θ
< r − rG(1− p)− rBp.
Proof. Section 1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
Combining Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Lemma 3 directly leads to Theorem
4.
Theorem 5. Under the assumptions in Case 3, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 2 will invest efficiently in the first period
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and Fund Manager 1 will follow a strategy in the first period in which she
always chooses C1(0) = Investment R10 if others assume Fund Manager 1 ob-
served S1(0) = S1B0 when she deviates with C
1(0) = Investment RL10 and
π 1−θ
θ
≥ r− rG(1− p)− rBp. Theorem 1 shows the equilibrium strategies in the
second period and Section 1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent
beliefs.
Proof. Combining Lemma 1, Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Theorem 1 directly
leads to Theorem 5.
1.3.6 Case 4: Performance-Based Fee Structure and NFBm Growth
Depends on the Relative Value of Xm(1) Compared to X−m(1)
As shown in Section 1.2.2, a fund manager’s maximization problem
using a performance-based fee structure is:
max
{Cm(0),Cm(1)}
MFPm(1) +E0[PFm(1)] +β ·E0[MFPm(2) +PFm(2)], (1.3.30)
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the time discount factor commonly used by fund managers
m = 1, 2.







where g̃(0) = nfb, and g̃ : R → R is linear function increasing in Xm(1) −
X−m(1). g̃(·) is positive over the domain defined by Xm(1)−X−m(1).
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Lemma 4. Under the assumptions in Case 4, Fund Manager 2 will invest
efficiently in the first period regardless of Fund Manager 1’s strategy.
Proof. Fund Manager 1 chooses her investment before observing C2(0), there-
fore Fund Manager 2’s investment decision can only affect X2(1). Fund Man-
ager 2 will maximize E[X2(1)] in order to maximize E[X2(1) − X1(1)] and
PF 2(0).
Define new variables for Theorem 6 and Theorem 8.
• ζ ≡ 1
4
(1− θ2)(2r − rG − rB),




β[nfb− g̃(ζ)] · (3 + θ2)
]
,






























Theorem 6. Under the assumptions in Case 4, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which both fund managers invest efficiently in the first period if
φr−φG−φB > 0 and PFRMFRP ≥
β[nfb−g̃(ζ)]
φr−φG−φB
. Specifically, C1(0) = Investment R10
if S1(0) = S1G0 and C
1(0) = Investment RL10 if S
1(0) = S1B0. Conditioning
on C1(0), Fund Manager 2 will choose C2(0) = Investment RL20 if C
1(0) =
Investment RL10 and S
2(0) = S2B0, and C
2(0) = Investment R20 otherwise.
Theorem 1 shows the equilibrium strategies in the second period and Section
1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
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Proof. Lemma 4 shows Fund Manager 1 will invest efficiently regardless of
Fund Manager 1’s strategy. If there is a one-to-one mapping between S1(0)
and C1(0), Fund Manager 2 will choose C2(0) = Investment RL20 if C
1(0) =
Investment RL10 and S
2(0) = S2B0 , and C
2(0) = Investment R20 otherwise.
Consider the case in which S1(0) = S1G0 . Without performance fees,
condition (1.3.18) was shown to hold in Case 3. Case 4 differs from Case 3
by including performance fees. Performance fees are maximized by choosing
efficient investments, therefore Fund Manager 1 will still invest efficiently and
there will be a one-to-one mapping between S1(0) and C1(0) when S1(0) =
S1G0 .
Now consider the case in which S1(0) = S1B0 . Using condition (1.3.20)
and calculations in Appendix A.3.1, Fund Manager 1 will invest efficiently if






MFRP + PFR · E0[X1(2)|S1B0 ]
]
. (1.3.32)
The left-hand side of condition (1.3.32) is the expected increase in per-
formance fees gained by Fund Manager 1 by investing efficiently. The right-
hand side of condition (1.3.32) is the discounted expected profit forfeited in
the second period due to investing efficiently. Refer to Appendix A.3.4 for
details on calculating E0[X1(2)|S1B0 ]. It is clear that condition (1.3.32) will
not be satisfied if φr − φG − φB ≤ 0. If φr − φG − φB > 0, Fund Manager 1






Theorem 1 completes the proof.
Lemma 5. Under the assumptions in Case 4 and given Fund Manager 2 in-
vests efficiently, Fund Manager 1 will not follow a strategy in the first period
in which she always chooses C1(0) = Investment RL10 if others assume Fund
Manager 1 observed S1(0) = S1G0 when she deviates with C
1(0) = Investment R10.
Proof. Lemma 3 shows that Fund Manager 1 will not follow a strategy in
the first period in which she always chooses C1(0) = Investment RL10 if oth-
ers assume Fund Manager 1 observed S1(0) = S1G0 when she deviates with
C1(0) = Investment R10 under the assumptions in Case 3. Case 4 has the same
assumptions as Case 3 with the addition of performance fees which increase the
desire to invest efficiently. Therefore, Fund Manager 1 will not follow a strat-
egy in the first period in which she always chooses C1(0) = Investment RL10 if
others assume Fund Manager 1 observed S1(0) = S1G0 when she deviates with
C1(0) = Investment R10 under the assumptions in Case 4.
Define new variables for Lemma 6, Theorem 7, and Theorem 8.
• ζ̀a ≡ rG
[


































β[g̃(ζ̀a)− g̃(ζ̀b)] · (3 + θ2)
]
,































Lemma 6. Under the assumptions in Case 4 and given Fund Manager 2
invests efficiently, Fund Manager 1 will follow a strategy in the first period in








others assume Fund Manager 1 observed S1(0) = S1B0 when she deviates with
C1(0) = Investment RL10.
Proof. Lemma 3 shows that Fund Manager 1 will follow a strategy in the




rG(1−p)−rBp and others assume Fund Manager 1 observed S1(0) = S1B0 when
she deviates with C1(0) = Investment RL10 in Case 3. Case 4 has the same
assumptions as Case 3 with the addition of performance fees which increase
the desire to invest efficiently. There is a conflict between maximizing E[X1(0)]
and maximizing E[X1(0) − X2(0)] only when S1(0) = S1B0 . Using condition
1.3.27, Fund Manager 1 will not follow a strategy in the first period in which
she always chooses C1(0) = Investment R10 if others assume Fund Manager 1
observed S1(0) = S1B0 when she deviates with C
1(0) = Investment RL10 if:






MFRP + PFR · E0[X1(2)|S1B0 ]
]
. (1.3.33)
The left-hand side of condition (1.3.33) is the expected increase in per-
formance fees gained by Fund Manager 1 investing efficiently. The right-hand
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side of condition (1.3.33) is the discounted expected profit forfeited in the sec-
ond period due to investing efficiently. Refer to Appendix A.3.4 for details
on calculating E0[X1(2)|S1B0 ]. Given π
1−θ
θ
≥ r − rG(1− p)− rBp, Fund Man-
ager 1 will follow a strategy in the first period in which she always chooses
C1(0) = Investment R10 if φ̀r − φ̀G − φ̀B ≤ 0. If φ̀r − φ̀G − φ̀B > 0, Fund Man-
ager 1 will follow a strategy in the first period in which she always chooses






Theorem 7. Under the assumptions in Case 4, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 2 invests efficiently and Fund Manager 1
will follow a strategy in the first period in which she always chooses C1(0) =
Investment R10 if π
1−θ
θ





, and others assume Fund Manager 1 observed
S1(0) = S1B0 when she deviates with C
1(0) = Investment RL10. Theorem 1
shows the equilibrium strategies in the second period and Section 1.3.1 shows
the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
Proof. Combining Lemma 4, Lemma 6, and Theorem 1 leads to Theorem
7.
Theorem 8. Under the assumptions in Case 4, there does not exist a pure
strategy equilibrium in the first period if π 1−θ
θ





. If π 1−θ
θ
≥ r− rG(1− p)− rBp, there does not exist a pure








Proof. Section 1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
Combining Lemma 4, Lemma 5, and the proof for Lemma 6 leads to The-
orem 8.
1.3.7 Case 5: Traditional Fee Structure and NFBm Growth De-
pends Only on θ̂m
As shown in Section 1.2.2, a fund manager’s maximization problem
using a traditional fee structure is:
max
Cm(0)
MFTm(1) + β · E0[MFTm(2)], (1.3.34)
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the time discount factor commonly used by fund managers
m = 1, 2.
NFB growth depends only on θ̂m:
NFBm(1) = f(θ̂m), (1.3.35)
where f(θ) = nfb and f : (0, 1) → R is a linear function increasing in θ̂m,
m = 1, 2. f(·) is positive over the domain defined by θ̂m.
It is clear from (1.3.34) and (1.3.35) that in absence of a performance
fee, a fund manager’s only focus in the first period is to be considered talented
by maximizing E[θ̂m].
Lemma 7. Under the assumptions in Case 5 and given Fund Manager 1
invests efficiently, there does not exist an equilibrium in the first period in
which Fund Manager 2’s investment choice depends on her private signal.
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Proof. Lemma 7 is proved using proof by contradiction. Assume there exists
an equilibrium in which Fund Manager 2 uses S2(0) when choosing C2(0).
Although investors only observe Fund Manager 2’s investment choice, there is
a one-to-one mapping from private signals to investment choices for at least one
conditioning case when Fund Manager 2 uses her signal. For instance, consider
the efficient strategy from Section 1.3.3. Although there is not a one-to-one
mapping for Fund Manager 2’s signals to investment choices when conditioning
on C1(0) = Investment R10, there is a one-to-one mapping when conditioning
on C1(0) = Investment RL10. For any strategy such that there is not at least
one one-to-one mapping from Fund Manager 2’s signals to investment choices
when conditioning on C1(0), it is clear that Fund Manager 2 is not using her
signal.
Consider the case in which C1(0) = Investment RL10 and Fund Manager
2 and investors infer S1(0) = S1B0 . In order for Fund Manager 2 to follow a
strategy that has a one-to-one mapping from private signals to investment















≥ θ̂∗∗2 (S1B0 , S
2
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≥ θ̂∗∗2 (S1B0 , S
2
B0











Condition (1.3.36) is associated with S2(0) = S2B0 and condition (1.3.37)
is associated with S2(0) = S2G0 . The left-hand side of conditions (1.3.36) and
(1.3.37) is the expected posterior probability of being the talented type that
Fund Manager 2 obtains by following a strategy with a one-to-one mapping
from private signals to investment choices. The right-hand side of conditions
(1.3.36) and (1.3.37) is the expected posterior probability of being the talented
type that Fund Manager 2 obtains by tricking others into thinking she received
a different signal.
Using calculations in Appendix A.3.2, condition (1.3.36) is shown to
hold, but (1.3.37) is shown to be violated9. The intuition behind Fund Manager
2 deviating when C1(0) = Investment RL10 is signals are perfectly correlated
when both fund managers are talented. Therefore, by choosing a different
investment than Fund Manager 1, Fund Manager 2 rules out the possibility
that both fund managers are talented. The fact that condition (1.3.37) is never
satisfied means there does not exist an equilibrium in which Fund Manager 2
9Conditions (1.3.36) and (1.3.37) were evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1)
using steps of .001.
43
follows a strategy that has a one-to-one mapping between private signals and
investment choices when conditioning on C1(0) = Investment RL10.
Although condition (1.3.37) is never satisfied, it is useful to see how the
condition depends on p and θ. Not surprisingly, condition (1.3.37) is closer to
being satisfied as θ becomes smaller. If θ = 0, then Fund Manager 2’s posterior
probability of being smart will be zero regardless of C2(0). Condition (1.3.37)
is closer to being satisfied as p becomes larger. If p = 1, then condition (1.3.37)
would be satisfied because the posterior probability that Fund Manager 1 is
smart is zero if Fund Manager 2 does not herd and is correct about the state of
the world. Thus, Fund Manager 2 is not penalized for ruling out the possibility
that both fund managers are the smart type when p = 1.
Now suppose C1(0) = Investment R10, and therefore Fund Manager 2
and investors can infer S1(0) = S1G0 . In order for Fund Manager 2 to follow
a strategy that has a one-to-one mapping from private signals to investment
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Condition (1.3.38) is associated with S2(0) = S2B0 and condition (1.3.39)
is associated with S2(0) = S2G0 . Using calculations in Appendix A.3.2, con-
dition (1.3.39) is shown to hold, but (1.3.38) is shown to be violated10. The
fact that condition (1.3.38) is never satisfied means there does not exist an
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 2 follows a strategy that has a one-to-one
mapping between private signals and investment choices when conditioning on
C1(0) = Investment R10. Similarly to condition (1.3.37), condition (1.3.36) is
closer to being satisfied as p becomes larger and θ becomes smaller.
Given a one-to-one mapping between S1(0) and C1(0), there does not
exist a strategy for Fund Manager 2 in which she has a one-to-one mapping
between private signals and investment choices because condition (1.3.38) and
condition (1.3.37) are always violated. This implies there does not exist an
equilibrium in the first period in which Fund Manager 2’s investment choice
depends on her private signal.
10Conditions (1.3.38) and (1.3.39) were evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1)
using steps of .001.
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Lemma 8. Under the assumptions in Case 5 and given Fund Manager 1
invests efficiently, there exists an equilibrium in the first period in which Fund
Manager 2 always mimics Fund Manager 1 if others assume S2(0) = S2G0
when Fund Manager 2 deviates from the herding equilibrium with C2(0) =
Investment R20 and assume S
2(0) = S2B0 when Fund Manager 2 deviates with
C2(0) = Investment RL20.
Proof. If Fund Manager 2 mimics Fund Manager 1 and chooses C2(0) = C1(0)
regardless of S2(0), investors’ revised skill assessment for Fund Manager 2 is
simply θ̂2 = θ. There is no Bayesian updating because Fund Manager 2 ignores
S2(0) in the herding equilibrium.
Consider the case in which C1(0) = Investment RL10. In order for
Fund Manager 2 not to deviate from the herding equilibrium when C1(0) =
Investment RL10 and S
2(0) = S2B0 , the following must be true:
θ ≥ θ̂∗∗2 (S1B0 , S
2
G0











Condition (1.3.40) uses the assumption in Lemma 8 that Fund Manager 1
and investors assume S2(0) = S2G0 when C
1(0) = Investment RL10 and Fund
Manager 2 deviates from the herding equilibrium. Calculations in Appendix
A.3.2 show condition (1.3.40) is always satisfied11.
11Condition (1.3.40) was evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1) using steps of
.001.
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In order for Fund Manager 2 not to deviate from the herding equilibrium
when C1(0) = Investment RL10 and S
2(0) = S2G0 , the following must be true:
θ ≥ θ̂∗∗2 (S1B0 , S
2
G0















which is always satisfied.
Although condition (1.3.40) and condition (1.3.41) are always satisfied,
they are both satisfied to a larger degree with a larger θ. Condition (1.3.40)
is satisfied to a larger degree with a larger p, while condition (1.3.41) does not
depend on p.
Now consider the case in which C1(0) = Investment R10. In order for
Fund Manager 2 not to deviate from the herding equilibrium when S2(0) =
S2G0 , the following must be true:
θ ≥ θ̂∗∗2 (S1G0 , S
2
B0











Calculations in Appendix A.3.2 show inequality (1.3.43) is satisfied12.
12Condition (1.3.43) was evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1) using steps of
.001.
47
In order for Fund Manager 2 not to deviate from the herding equilibrium
when C1(0) = Investment R10 and S
2(0) = S2B0 , the following must be true:
θ ≥ θ̂∗∗2 (S1G0 , S
2
B0











Calculations in Appendix A.3.2 show inequality (1.3.44) is satisfied13.
Although condition (1.3.43) and condition (1.3.44) are always satisfied,
they are both satisfied to a larger degree with a larger θ. Condition (1.3.43)
is satisfied to a larger degree with a larger p, while condition (1.3.44) does not
depend on p.
Lemma 9. Under the assumptions in Case 5, Fund Manager 1 is willing to
invest efficiently in the first period if Fund Manager 2 mimics Fund Manager
1’s investment choice in the first period. Specifically, C1(0) = Investment R10
if S1(0) = S1G0, and C
1(0) = Investment RL10 if S
1(0) = S1B0.
Proof. If Fund Manager 2 mimics Fund Manager 1’s investment choice, there
is no information learned by investors observing Fund Manager 2’s investment
choice in the first period. Therefore, Fund Manager 1’s revised skill prior, θ̂∗1,
is only a function of her private signal and the realized state of the world. The
strategy for Fund Manager 1 described in Lemma 9 has a one-to-one mapping
between private signals and investment choices. Therefore, investors can infer
the private signal Fund Manager 1 observed given her investment choice.
13Condition (1.3.44) was evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1) using steps of
.001.
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In order for Fund Manager 1 to choose the investment corresponding




, ωG1)P(ωG1|SG0) + θ̂∗1(S1G0 , ωB1)P(ωB1|SG0)









, ωG1)P(ωG1|SB0) + θ̂∗1(S1B0 , ωB1)P(ωB1 |SB0)






Condition (1.3.45) is associated with S1(0) = S1G0 and condition (1.3.46)
is associated with S1(0) = S1B0 . The left-hand side of condition (1.3.45) and
condition (1.3.46) is the expected posterior probability Fund Manager 1 ob-
tains by following a strategy that allows investors to correctly infer her private
signal. The right-hand side of conditions (1.3.45) and (1.3.46) is the expected
posterior probability Fund Manager 1 obtains by trying to trick others into
thinking she received a different signal.
Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1, it is found that condition (1.3.45)
condition and (1.3.46) are always satisfied14. Therefore, Fund Manager 1’s
actions are consistent with the strategy described in Lemma 9.
Theorem 9. Under the assumptions in Case 5, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which the first period strategies are Fund Manager 1 choosing
C1(0) = Investment R10 if S
1(0) = S1G0 and choosing C
1(0) = Investment RL10
14Conditions (1.3.45) and (1.3.46) were evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1)
using steps of .001.
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if she observes S1(0) = S1B0, while Fund Manager 2 always mimics Fund Man-
ager 1’s investment choice regardless of her private signal. Theorem 1 shows
the equilibrium strategies in the second period and Section 1.3.1 shows the fund
managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
Proof. Combining Lemma 7, Lemma 8, Lemma 9, and Theorem 1 directly
leads to Theorem 9.
Lemma 10. Under the assumptions in Case 5 and given Fund Manager
1 ignores her signal and always chooses C1(0) = Investment R20 or always
chooses C1(0) = Investment RL20 in the first period, Fund Manager 2 will in-
vest efficiently in the first period. More specifically, C2(0) = Investment R20 if
S2(0) = S2G0 and C
2(0) = Investment RL20 if S
2(0) = S2B0.
Proof. Fund Manager 2 simply maximizes E[θ̂∗2] because Fund Manager 1 ig-
nores her signal and always earns θ̂1 = θ regardless of C
2(0). Therefore, the
proof for Lemma 10 follows the same arguments as the proof for Lemma 9.
Lemma 11. Under the assumptions in Case 5 and given Fund Manager 2
invests efficiently, Fund Manager 1 is willing to ignore her signal and always
choose C1(0) = Investment R20 or always choose C
1(0) = Investment RL20
in the first period if others assume Fund Manager 1 observed S1(0) = S1B0
if she deviates with C1(0) = Investment RL10 and Fund Manager 1 observed
S1(0) = S1G0 if she deviates with C
1(0) = Investment R10.
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Proof. First consider the case in which Fund Manager 1 always chooses C1(0) =
Investment R20. In order for Fund Manager 1 not to deviate from this strategy,
the following conditions must hold:
θ ≥ θ̂∗∗1 (S1B0 , S
2
G0

























θ ≥ θ̂∗∗1 (S1B0 , S
2
G0

























Condition (1.3.47) is associated with S1(0) = S1G0 and condition (1.3.48)
is associated with S1(0) = S1B0 . Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1 and Ap-
pendix A.3.2, it is found that condition (1.3.47) and condition (1.3.48) are
always satisfied15.
Although condition (1.3.47) is always satisfied, it is satisfied to a larger
degree with a larger θ and smaller p. On the other hand, condition (1.3.48)
does not depend on p and has a non-monotonic relationship with respect to θ.
15Conditions (1.3.47) and (1.3.48) were evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1)
using steps of .001.
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Now consider the case in which Fund Manager 1 always chooses C1(0) =
Investment RL20. In order for Fund Manager 1 not to deviate from this strat-
egy, the following conditions must hold:














Condition (1.3.49) is associated with S1(0) = S1G0 and condition (1.3.50)
is associated with S1(0) = S1B0 . Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1, it is
found that condition (1.3.49) and condition (1.3.50) are always satisfied16.
Condition (1.3.49) is independent of θ and p. Although condition
(1.3.50) is always satisfied, it is satisfied to a larger degree with a larger θ
and larger p.
Theorem 10. Under the assumptions in Case 5, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which the strategies in the first period are Fund Manager 1 ignor-
ing her signal and always chooses C1(0) = Investment R20 or always chooses
C1(0) = Investment RL20, and Fund Manager 2 investing efficiently. More
specifically, C2(0) = Investment R20 if S
2(0) = S2G0 and C
2(0) = Investment RL20
if S2(0) = S2B0. Theorem 1 shows the equilibrium strategies in the second period
and Section 1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
16Conditions (1.3.49) and (1.3.50) were evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1)
using steps of .001.
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Proof. Combining Lemma 10, Lemma 11, and Theorem 1 directly leads to
Theorem 10.
1.3.8 Case 6: Performance-Based Fee Structure and NFBm Growth
Depends Only on θ̂m
As shown in Section 1.2.2, a fund manager’s maximization problem
using a performance-based fee structure is:
max
{Cm(0),Cm(1)}
MFPm(1) +E0[PFm(1)] +β ·E0[MFPm(2) +PFm(2)], (1.3.51)
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the time discount factor commonly used by fund managers
m = 1, 2.
NFB growth depends only on θ̂m:
NFBm(1) = f(θ̂m), (1.3.52)
where f(θ) = nfb and f : (0, 1) → R is a linear function increasing in θ̂m,
m = 1, 2. f(·) is positive over the domain defined by θ̂m.
Unlike Case 5, a fund manager using a performance-based fee structure
does not have the sole objective of being considered talented when choosing an
investment in the first period if the NFB growth depends only on θ̂m. A fund
manager using a performance-based fee structure may forfeit some profit in
the second period if there is a large increase in expected PFm(1) by choosing
a different investment than the one that maximizes expected θ̂m.
Lemma 12. Under the assumptions in Case 6, Fund Manager 1 will invest
efficiently if Fund Manager 2 mimics Fund Manager 1’s investment choice
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in the first period. Specifically, C1(0) = Investment R10 if S
1(0) = S1G0, and
C1(0) = Investment RL10 if S
1(0) = S1B0.
Proof. Theorem 2 shows Fund Manager 1 maximizes her investment return
by choosing the investment that matches her signal. Lemma 9 shows Fund
Manager 1 maximizes her expected posterior probability of being talented
when Fund Manager 2 mimics her investment choice by also choosing the
investment that matches her signal. Therefore, there is not a conflict between
these two goals. Fund Manager 1 will choose C1(0) = Investment R10 if S
1(0) =
S1G0 , and C
1(0) = Investment RL10 if S
1(0) = S1B0 .
Define new variables for Theorem 11:






)] · (3 + θ̂†2D )
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Theorem 11. Under the assumptions in Case 6, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which the Fund Manager 1 invests efficiently in the first pe-
riod. Specifically, C1(0) = Investment R10 if S
1(0) = S1G0, and C
1(0) =
Investment RL10 if S
1(0) = S1B0. Conditioning on C
1(0), Fund Manager 2
always mimics Fund Manager 1’s investment choice in the first period regard-









. Theorem 1 shows the equilibrium strategies in the sec-
ond period and Section 1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent
beliefs.
Proof. Fund Manager 2 will deviate from the herding equilibrium described
in Theorem 9 if the increase in PF 2(1) by choosing a different investment
than the one that maximizes expected θ̂2 outweighs the expected forfeit of
profit in the second period. There is a conflict between E[θ̂2] and maximizing
E[X2(1)] when C1(0) = Investment RL10 and S2(0) = S2G0 . Condition (1.3.42)
shows Fund Manager 2 will herd when using a traditional fee structure because
θ ≥ θ
1+θ
is always satisfied. In contrast, Fund Manager 2 will deviate from the
herding equilibrium when using a performance-based fee structure if:
PFR ·
[





















The left-hand side of condition (1.3.53) is the expected increase in per-
formance fees gained by deviating from the herding equilibrium with C2(0) =
Investment R20. The right-hand side of condition (1.3.53) is the discounted
expected profit forfeited in the second period due to reducing the expected θ̂2.
55
Reducing E[θ̂2] from θ to θ1+θ reduces E[NFB
2(1)] by nfb − f( θ
1+θ
). Condi-
tion (1.3.53) uses ≥ rather than > because it is always assumed that a fund
manager will invest efficiently when indifferent. Refer to Appendix A.3.3 for
details on calculating E0[X2(2)|S1B0 , S
2
G0
]. If φ̃G + φ̃B − φ̃r ≤ 0, Fund Manager
2 will not deviate from the herding equilibrium. If φ̃G+ φ̃B− φ̃r > 0, condition







φ̃G + φ̃B − φ̃r
. (1.3.54)
Inequality (1.3.54) shows the decision for Fund Manager 2 to deviate
from the herding equilibrium relies on the ratio between the management fee
rate and the performance fee rate.
Lemma 12 shows Fund Manager 1 will invest efficiently if Fund Man-
ager 2 follows the herding equilibrium. Fund Manager 2 will possibly deviate
from the herding equilibrium only when there is a conflict between maxi-
mizing E[X2(1)] and maximizing E[θ̂2]. This occurs only when C1(0) =
Investment RL10 and S
1(0) = S1G0 . If φ̃G + φ̃B − φ̃r ≤ 0, Fund Manager 2
will not deviate from the herding equilibrium. If φ̃G + φ̃B − φ̃r > 0, condition








Theorem 1 completes the proof.
Lemma 13. Under the assumptions in Case 6, Fund Manager 1 invests ef-
ficiently in the first period if Fund Manager 2 invests efficiently. Specifically,
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C1(0) = Investment R10 if S
1(0) = S1G0, and C
1(0) = Investment RL10 if
S1(0) = S1B0.
Proof. assume Fund Manager 2 will follow the efficient strategy. Specifically,
Fund Manager 2 will choose C2(0) = Investment RL20 if C
1(0) = Investment RL10
and S2(0) = S2B0 , and C
2(0) = Investment R20 otherwise. In this strategy, there
is a one-to-one mapping from Fund Manager 2’s private signals to investment
choices when conditioning on C1(0) = Investment RL10. For Fund Manager 1




































The left-hand side of condition (1.3.55) is the expected posterior prob-
ability that Fund Manager 1 is talented if she invests efficiently. The right-
hand side of condition (1.3.55) is the expected posterior probability that Fund
Manager 1 is talented if she tries to trick others into thinking she received
a different signal. If Fund Manager 1 tries to trick others into thinking she
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observed S1(0) = S1G0 , Fund Manager 2 will no longer have a one-to-one map-
ping between private signals and investment choices. Therefore, C2(0) does
not provide any additional information when investors believe S1(0) = S1G0 .
Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1 and Appendix A.3.2, it is found that
condition (1.3.55) is always satisfied17.
For Fund Manager 1 not to deviate from investing efficiently when




, ωG1)P(ωG1|SG0) + θ̂∗1(S1G0 , ωB1)P(ωB1 |SG0)
≥ θ̂∗∗1 (S1B0 , S
2
G0

























The left-hand side of condition (1.3.56) is the expected posterior prob-
ability that Fund Manager 1 is talented if she invests efficiently. The right-
hand side of condition (1.3.56) is the expected posterior probability that Fund
Manager 1 is talented if she tries to trick others into thinking she observed
S1(0) = S1B0 . It is found that condition (1.3.56) is always satisfied
18.
17Condition (1.3.55) was evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1) using steps of
.001.
18Condition (1.3.56) was evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1) using steps of
.001.
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Define new variable for Theorem 12:
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Theorem 12. Under the assumptions in Case 6, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 1 invests efficiently in the first period.
Specifically, C1(0) = Investment R10 if S
1(0) = S1G0, and C
1(0) = Investment RL10
if S1(0) = S1B0. Conditioning on C
1(0), Fund Manager 2 will also invest ef-






Specifically, Fund Manager 2 will choose C2(0) = Investment RL20 if C
1(0) =
Investment RL10 and S
2(0) = S2B0, and C
2(0) = Investment R20 otherwise.
Theorem 1 shows the equilibrium strategies in the second period and Section
1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
Proof. Lemma 13 shows Fund Manager 1 will invest efficiently if Fund Manager
2 invests efficiently. Fund Manager 2 will possibly deviate from the efficient
herding equilibrium only when there is a conflict between maximizing E[X2(1)]
and maximizing E[θ̂2]. This occurs only when C1(0) = Investment RL10 and
S1(0) = S1G0 . Using calculations in Appendix A.3.2, condition (1.3.37) shows
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Fund Manager 2 will deviate from the efficient equilibrium when using a tradi-
tional fee structure because θ
1+θ
≥ ζ̌ is never satisfied. In contrast, Fund Man-

























The left-hand side of condition (1.3.57) is the expected increase in per-
formance fees gained by following the efficient equilibrium C2(0) = Investment R20.
The right-hand side of condition (1.3.57) is the discounted expected profit for-
feited in the second period due to reducing the expected θ̂2. Reducing E[θ̂2]
from ζ̌ to θ
1+θ
reduces E[NFB2(1)] by f(ζ̌) − f( θ
1+θ
). Refer to Appendix
A.3.3 for details on calculating E0[X2(2)|S1B0 , S
2
G0








φ̌G + φ̌B − φ̌r
. (1.3.58)
Inequality (1.3.58) shows the decision for Fund Manager 2 to follow the
efficient equilibrium relies on the ratio between the management fee rate and
the performance fee rate.
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Lemma 13 shows Fund Manager 1 will invest efficiently if Fund Man-
ager 2 invests efficiently. Fund Manager 2 will possibly deviate from the effi-
cient equilibrium only when there is a conflict between maximizing E[X2(1)]
and maximizing E[θ̂2]. This occurs only when C1(0) = Investment RL10 and
S1(0) = S1G0 . Condition (1.3.58) shows the efficient equilibrium will still hold






Theorem 1 completes the proof.
Lemma 14. Under the assumptions in Case 6 and given Fund Manager
1 ignores her signal and always chooses C1(0) = Investment R20 or always
chooses C1(0) = Investment RL20 in the first period, Fund Manager 2 will in-
vest efficiently. More specifically, C2(0) = Investment R20 if S
2(0) = S2G0 and
C2(0) = Investment RL20 if S
2(0) = S2B0.
Proof. When Fund Manager 1 ignores her signal, Fund Manager 2 is only
evaluated by E[θ̂∗2]. Lemma 9 shows the efficient strategy maximizes the
posterior probability of being talented for a fund manager when the other
fund manager ignores her signal. Therefore, there is not a conflict between
maximizing E[θ̂∗2] and maximizing E[PF 2(0)]. Fund Manager 2 will choose
C2(0) = Investment R20 if S
2(0) = S2G0 and C
2(0) = Investment RL20 if
S2(0) = S2B0 .
Define new variables for Theorem 13:
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Theorem 13. Under the assumptions in Case 6, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 2 invests efficiently and Fund Manager 1
is willing to ignore her signal in the first period and always choose C1(0) =
Investment R20 if others assume Fund Manager 1 observed S
1(0) = S1B0 if she





. There does not exist an equilibrium in the first pe-
riod such that Fund Manager 2 invests efficiently and Fund Manager 1 is
willing to ignore her signal and always choose C1(0) = Investment RL20 if
others assume Fund Manager 1 observed S1(0) = S1G0 if she deviates with
C1(0) = Investment R10. Theorem 1 shows the equilibrium strategies in the
second period and Section 1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent
beliefs.
Proof. Lemma 14 shows Fund Manager 2 will invest efficiently if Fund Manager
1 ignores her signal.
First consider the case in which Fund Manager 1 always chooses C1(0) =
Investment R20. Fund Manager 1 was willing to follow this strategy in Case 5
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because condition (1.3.47) and condition (1.3.48) were always satisfied. When
Fund Manager 1 uses performance fees, she may deviate from this strategy
to increase E[PF 1(0)] by choosing a different investment than the one that
maximizes expected θ̂1. When Fund Manager 1 always chooses C
1(0) =
Investment R20 regardless of S
1(0), there is a conflict between maximizing E[θ̂1]
and maximizing E[X1(1)] when S1(0) = S1B0 . Fund Manager 1 will deviate
from always choosing C1(0) = Investment R20 regardless of S
1(0) if:






MFRP + PFR · E0[X1(2)|S1B0 ]
]
. (1.3.59)
The left-hand side of condition (1.3.59) is the expected increase in per-
formance fees gained by deviating from always choosing C1(0) = Investment R20
regardless of S1(0). The right-hand side of condition (1.3.59) is the discounted
expected profit forfeited in the second period due to reducing E[θ̂1]. Refer to
Appendix A.3.4 for details on calculating E0[X1(2)|S1B0 ]. Fund Manager 1 is
willing to choose C1(0) = Investment R20 regardless of S
1(0) if φ̂r−φ̂G−φ̂B ≤ 0




Now consider the case in which Fund Manager 1 always chooses C1(0) =
Investment RL20. There is only a conflict of interest when S
1(0) = S1G0 . Con-
dition (1.3.49) can be reduced to 0 ≥ 0, therefore deviating with C1(0) =
Investment R20 has no effect on E[θ̂1]. Therefore, Fund Manager 1 will al-
ways deviate from the strategy of always choosing C1(0) = Investment RL20
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regardless of S1(0).
Theorem 1 completes the proof.
1.3.9 Case 7: Traditional Fee Structure and NFBm Growth De-
pends on the Relative Value of θ̂m Compared to θ̂−m
As shown in Section 1.2.2, a fund manager’s maximization problem
using a traditional fee structure is:
max
Cm(0)
MFTm(1) + β · E0[MFTm(2)], (1.3.60)
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the time discount factor commonly used by fund managers
m = 1, 2.
NFB growth depends on the relative value of θ̂m compared to θ̂−m:
NFBm(1) = f̃(θ̂m − θ̂−m), (1.3.61)
where f̃(0) = nfb and f̃ : R→ R is a linear function increasing in θ̂m − θ̂−m,
m = 1, 2. f̃(·) is positive over the domain defined by θ̂m − θ̂−m.
Fund managers use a traditional fee structure in Case 7, therefore each
fund manager’s sole objective is to maximize E[θ̂m − θ̂−m].
Lemma 15. Under the assumptions in Case 7 and given Fund Manager 1
invests efficiently, there exists an equilibrium in the first period in which Fund
Manager 2 also has a one-to-one mapping between S2(0) and C2(0).
Proof. Assume Fund Manager 1 will choose the investment that matches her
private signal in the first period. Specifically, C1(0) = Investment R10 if
S1(0) = S1G0 and C
1(0) = Investment RL10 if S
1(0) = S1B0 .
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Consider the case in which C1(0) = Investment RL10, therefore others
infer S1(0) = S1B0 . In order for Fund Manager 2 to follow a strategy that has a
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Condition (1.3.62) is associated with S2(0) = S2B0 and condition (1.3.63)
is associated with S2(0) = S2G0 . The left-hand side of condition (1.3.62) and
condition (1.3.63) is the expected posterior probability Fund Manager 2 ob-
tains by following a strategy that allows investors to infer correctly her private
signal. The right-hand side of condition (1.3.62) and condition (1.3.63) is
the expected posterior probability Fund Manager 2 obtains by trying to trick
others into thinking she observed a different signal.
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Using calculations in Appendix A.3.2, condition (1.3.62) reduces to:
0 ≥ 8θ
2[4p(1− p)− 8]
(1 + θ)[4θ + 2(1− θ)2]
. (1.3.64)
Using calculations in Appendix A.3.2, condition (1.3.63) reduces to:
0 ≥ 0. (1.3.65)
It is clear that 8θ
2[4p(1−p)−8]
(1+θ)[4θ+2(1−θ)2] < 0, therefore both condition (1.3.62)
and condition (1.3.63) are always satisfied.
Although condition (1.3.62) is always satisfied, the condition becomes
closer to being unsatisfied with smaller values of θ and p. For instance, if
θ = 0, then Fund Manager 2 would be indifferent about their investment choice
because both posterior probabilities of being smart would be zero regardless
of the investment choices.
Now suppose C1(0) = Investment R10, therefore others infer S
1(0) =
S1G0 . In order for Fund Manager 2 to follow a strategy that has a one-to-one
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Condition (1.3.66) is associated with S2(0) = S2B0 and condition (1.3.67)
is associated with S2(0) = S2G0 . Using calculations in Appendix A.3.2, condi-
tion (1.3.66) reduces to:
0 ≥ 0. (1.3.68)
Using calculations in Appendix A.3.2, condition (1.3.67) reduces to:
0 ≥ 8θ
2[4p(1− p)− 8]
(1 + θ)[4θ + 2(1− θ)2]
. (1.3.69)
It is clear that 8θ
2[4p(1−p)−8]
(1+θ)[4θ+2(1−θ)2] < 0, therefore both condition (1.3.66)
and condition (1.3.67) are always satisfied. Therefore, given Fund Manager 1
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invests efficiently, there does exist an equilibrium in which Fund Manager 2
has a one-to-one mapping between private signals and investment choice.
Lemma 16. Under the assumptions in Case 7 and given Fund Manager 1
invests efficiently, there exists an equilibrium in the first period in which Fund
Manager 2 always mimics Fund Manager 1 if others believe S2(0) = S2G0
when Fund Manager 2 deviates from the herding equilibrium with C2(0) =
Investment R20 and believe S
2(0) = S2B0 when Fund Manager 2 deviates from
the herding equilibrium with C2(0) = Investment RL20.
Proof. Assume Fund Manager 1 will choose the investment that matches her
private signal in the first period. Specifically, C1(0) = Investment R10 if
S1(0) = S1G0 and C
1(0) = Investment RL10 if S
1(0) = S1B0 .
Consider the case in which C1(0) = Investment R10, therefore others
infer S1(0) = S1G0 . In order for Fund Manager 2 to follow the herding equilib-
rium, the following two conditions must hold:
[θ − θ̂∗1(S1G0 , ωG1)]P(ωG1 |S
1
G0
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Condition (1.3.70) is associated with S2(0) = S2G0 and condition (1.3.71)
is associated with S2(0) = S2B0 . Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1 and Ap-
pendix A.3.2, it is found that condition (1.3.70) and condition (1.3.71) are
always satisfied19.
Now suppose C1(0) = Investment RL10. In order for Fund Manager 2
to follow the herding equilibrium, the following two conditions must hold:
[θ − θ̂∗1(S1B0 , ωG1)]P(ωG1|S
1
B0









≥ [θ̂∗∗2 (S1B0 , S
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, ωG1)− θ̂∗∗1 (S1B0 , S
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19Conditions (1.3.70) and (1.3.71) were evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1)
using steps of .001.
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Condition (1.3.72) is associated with S2(0) = S2G0 and condition (1.3.73)
is associated with S2(0) = S2B0 . Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1 and Ap-
pendix A.3.2, it is found that condition (1.3.72) and condition (1.3.73) are
always satisfied20.
Lemma 17. Under the assumptions in Case 7 and given Fund Manager 2 has
a one-to-one mapping between C2(0) and S2(0), there exists an equilibria in the
first period in which Fund Manager 1’s invests efficiently. Specifically, C1(0) =
Investment R10 if S
1(0) = S1G0, and C
1(0) = Investment RL10 if S
1(t) = S1B0.
Proof. Assume Fund Manager 2 has a one-to-one mapping between C2(0)
and S2(0). For Fund Manager 1 to invest efficiently when S1(0) = S1G0 , the
following must hold:
20Conditions (1.3.72) and (1.3.73) were evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1)
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The left-hand side of condition (1.3.74) is the expected relative posterior
probability that Fund Manager 1 is talented if she invests efficiently. The right-
hand side of condition (1.3.74) is the expected relative posterior probability
that Fund Manager 1 is talented if she tries to trick others into thinking
she observed a different signal. Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1 and
Appendix A.3.2, it is found that condition (1.3.74) is always satisfied21.
For Fund Manager 1 to invest efficiently when S1(0) = S1B0 , the follow-
ing must hold:
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The left-hand side of condition (1.3.75) is the expected relative posterior
probability that Fund Manager 1 is talented if she invests efficiently. The right-
hand side of condition (1.3.75) is the expected relative posterior probability
that Fund Manager 1 is talented if she tries to trick others into thinking
she observed a different signal. Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1 and
Appendix A.3.2, it is found that condition (1.3.75) is always satisfied22.
Lemma 18. Under the assumptions in Case 7 and given Fund Manager 2
mimics Fund Manager 1’s investment choice in the first period, Fund Man-
ager 1 is willing to invest efficiently in the first period. Specifically, C1(0) =
Investment R10 if S
1(0) = S1G0, and C
1(0) = Investment RL10 if S
1(t) = S1B0.
22Condition (1.3.75) was evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1) using steps of
.001.
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Proof. Lemma 9 shows that under the assumptions in Case 5, Fund Manager
1 will invest efficiently if Fund Manager 2 follows the herding strategy. Fund
Manager 2’s updated posterior probability of being talented is θ regardless
of C1(0) in Lemma 18. Therefore, Fund Manager 1 invests efficiently if Fund
Manager 2 mimics Fund Manager 1’s investment choice in the equilibrium.
Lemma 19. Under the assumptions in Case 7 and given that Fund Manager
2 will invest efficiently, Fund Manager 1 is willing to invest efficiently. Specif-
ically, C1(0) = Investment R10 if S
1(0) = S1G0, and C
1(0) = Investment RL10
if S1(t) = S1B0.
Proof. Assume Fund Manager 2 will invest efficiently. Specifically, Fund Man-
ager 2 will choose C2(0) = Investment RL20 if C
1(0) = Investment RL10 and
S2(0) = S2B0 , and C
2(0) = Investment R20 otherwise. In this strategy, there
is a one-to-one mapping from Fund Manager 2’s private signals to investment
choices when conditioning on C1(0) = Investment RL10. For Fund Manager 1





















































, ωG1)− θ]P(ωG1|SB0). (1.3.76)
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The left-hand side of condition (1.3.76) is the expected relative posterior
probability that Fund Manager 1 is talented if she invests efficiently. The right-
hand side of condition (1.3.76) is the expected relative posterior probability
that Fund Manager 1 is talented if she tries to trick others into thinking she
observed a different signal.
Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1 and Appendix A.3.2, it is found
that condition (1.3.76) is always satisfied23.
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The left-hand side of condition (1.3.77) is the expected relative posterior
probability that Fund Manager 1 is talented if she invests efficiently. The right-
hand side of condition (1.3.77) is the expected relative posterior probability
23Condition (1.3.76) was evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1) using steps of
.001.
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that Fund Manager 1 is talented if she tries to trick others into thinking
she observed a different signal. Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1 and
Appendix A.3.2, it is found that condition (1.3.77) is always satisfied24.
Theorem 14. Under the assumptions in Case 7, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 1 will invest efficiently in the first period.
Specifically, C1(0) = Investment R10 if S
1(0) = S1G0 and C
1(0) = Investment RL10
if S1(0) = S1B0. Conditioning on C
1(0), Fund Manager 2 will invest effi-
ciently by choosing C2(0) = Investment RL20 if C
1(0) = Investment RL10 and
S2(0) = S2B0, and C
2(0) = Investment R20 otherwise. Theorem 1 shows the
equilibrium strategies in the second period and Section 1.3.1 shows the fund
managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
Proof. Lemma 15 and Lemma 16 show Fund Manager 2 is willing to invest
efficiently if there is a one-to-one mapping between C1(0) and S1(0). Lemma
19 completes the proof for Theorem 14.
Theorem 1 completes the proof.
Theorem 15. Under the assumptions in Case 7, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 1 invests efficiently and Fund Manager 2
always mimics Fund Manager 1’s investment choice in the first period regard-
less of her private signal if others believe S2(0) = S2G0 when Fund Manager
24Condition (1.3.77) was evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1) using steps of
.001.
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2 deviates from the herding equilibrium with C2(0) = Investment R20 and be-
lieve S2(0) = S2B0 when Fund Manager 2 deviates from the herding equilibrium
with C2(0) = Investment RL20. Specifically, C
1(0) = Investment R10 = C
2(0)
if S1(0) = S1G0 and chooses C
1(0) = Investment RL10 = C
2(0) if she observes
S1(0) = S1B0. Theorem 1 shows the equilibrium strategies in the second period
and Section 1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
Proof. Combining Lemma 16, Lemma 18, and Theorem 1 leads to Theorem
15.
Theorem 16. Under the assumptions in Case 7, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which both fund managers have a one-to-one mapping between
private signals and investment choices in the first period. Theorem 1 shows
the equilibrium strategies in the second period and Section 1.3.1 shows the fund
managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
Proof. Combining Lemma 15, Lemma 17, and Theorem 1 leads to Theorem
16.
Although a one-to-one mapping between private-signals and investment
choices leads to the most private information exposed to the public, the in-
vestment choice for Fund Manager 2 must be inefficient in order to produce
the one-to-one mapping.
Lemma 20. Under the assumptions in Case 7 and given Fund Manager
1 ignores her signal and always chooses C1(0) = Investment R20 or always
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chooses C1(0) = Investment RL20 in the first period, Fund Manager 2 will in-
vest efficiently. More specifically, C2(0) = Investment R20 if S
2(0) = S2G0 and
C2(0) = Investment RL20 if S
2(0) = S2B0.
Proof. When Fund Manager 1 ignores her signal, she always earns θ̂1 = θ
regardless of C2(0). Therefore Fund Manager 2 simply maximizes E[θ̂∗2] in
order to maximize E[θ̂2 − θ̂1]. Therefore, the proof for Lemma 20 is the same
as the proof for Lemma 9.
Lemma 21. Under the assumptions in Case 7 and given Fund Manager 2
invests efficiently, Fund Manager 1 is willing to ignore her signal and always
choose C1(0) = Investment R20 or always choose C
1(0) = Investment RL20
in the first period if others assume Fund Manager 1 observed S1(0) = S1B0
if she deviates with C1(0) = Investment RL10 and Fund Manager 1 observed
S1(0) = S1G0 if she deviates with C
1(0) = Investment R10.
Proof. First consider the case in which Fund Manager 1 always chooses C1(0) =
Investment R20. In order for Fund Manager 1 not to deviate from this strategy,
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the following conditions must hold:
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Condition (1.3.78) is associated with S1(0) = S1G0 and condition (1.3.79)
is associated with S1(0) = S1B0 . Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1 and Ap-
pendix A.3.2, it is found that condition (1.3.78) and condition (1.3.79) are
always satisfied25.
25Conditions (1.3.78) and (1.3.79) were evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1)
using steps of .001.
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Now consider the case in which Fund Manager 1 always chooses C1(0) =
Investment RL20. In order for Fund Manager 1 not to deviate from this strat-
egy, the following conditions must hold:
[θ − θ̂∗2(S2G0 , ωG0)]P(S
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, ωB0)− θ]P(ωB0|S1G0), (1.3.80)
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, ωB0)− θ]P(ωB0|S1B0). (1.3.81)
Condition (1.3.80) is associated with S1(0) = S1G0 and condition (1.3.81)
is associated with S1(0) = S1B0 . Using calculations in Appendix A.3.1, it is
found that condition (1.3.80) and condition (1.3.81) are always satisfied26.
Theorem 17. Under the assumptions in Case 7, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 2 invests efficiently and Fund Manager 1
ignores her signal in the first period and always chooses C1(0) = Investment R20
or always chooses C1(0) = Investment RL20 if others assume Fund Manager 1
observed S1(0) = S1B0 if she deviates with C
1(0) = Investment RL10 and Fund
26Conditions (1.3.80) and (1.3.81) were evaluated over a grid for θ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (.5, 1)
using steps of .001.
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Manager 1 observed S1(0) = S1G0 if she deviates with C
1(0) = Investment R10.
Specifically, C2(0) = Investment R20 if S
2(0) = S2G0 and C
2(0) = Investment RL20
if S2(0) = S2B0. Theorem 1 shows the equilibrium strategies in the second period
and Section 1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
Proof. Combining Lemma 20, Lemma 21, and Theorem 1 leads to Theorem
17.
1.3.10 Case 8: Performance-Based Fee Structure and NFBm Growth
Depends on the Relative Value of θ̂m Compared to θ̂−m
As shown in Section 1.2.2, a fund manager’s maximization problem
using a performance-based fee structure is:
max
{Cm(0),Cm(1)}
MFPm(1) +E0[PFm(1)] +β ·E0[MFPm(2) +PFm(2)], (1.3.82)
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the time discount factor commonly used by fund managers
m = 1, 2.
NFB growth depends on the relative value of θ̂m compared to θ̂−m:
NFBm(1) = f̃(θ̂m − θ̂−m), (1.3.83)
where f̃(0) = nfb and f̃ : R→ R is a linear function increasing in θ̂m − θ̂−m,
m = 1, 2. f̃(·) is positive over the domain defined by θ̂m − θ̂−m.
Theorem 18. Under the assumptions in Case 8, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 1 will invest efficiently in the first period.
Specifically, C1(0) = Investment R10 if S
1(0) = S1G0 and C
1(0) = Investment RL10
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if S1(0) = S1B0. Conditioning on C
1(0), Fund Manager 2 will invest effi-
ciently by choosing C2(0) = Investment RL20 if C
1(0) = Investment RL10 and
S2(0) = S2B0, and C
2(0) = Investment R20 otherwise. Theorem 1 shows the
equilibrium strategies in the second period and Section 1.3.1 shows the fund
managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
Proof. Theorem 14 shows the efficient equilibrium was sustainable under the
assumptions of Case 7. Case 8 has the same assumptions as Case 7 with
the addition of performance fees which increase the desire to invest efficiently.
Therefore, both fund managers are still willing to follow the efficient equilib-
rium under the assumptions in Case 8.
Theorem 1 completes the proof.
Lemma 22. Under the assumptions in Case 8, Fund Manager 1 is willing to
invest efficiently in the first period if Fund Manager 2 mimics Fund Manager
1’s investment choice in the first period. Specifically, C1(0) = Investment R10 =
C2(0) if S1(0) = S1G0, and C
1(0) = Investment RL10 if S
1(t) = S1B0C
2(0).
Proof. Lemma 18 shows Fund Manager 1 is willing to invest efficiently in the
first period if Fund Manager 2 mimics Fund Manager 1’s investment choice
in the equilibrium under the assumptions in Case 7. Case 8 has the same
assumptions as Case 7 with the addition of performance fees which increase
the desire to invest efficiently. Therefore, Fund Manager 1 is willing to invest
efficiently in the first period if Fund Manager 2 mimics Fund Manager 1’s
investment choice in the equilibrium under the assumptions in Case 8.
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Define new variables for Theorem 19
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Theorem 19. Under the assumptions in Case 8, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 1 invests efficiently and Fund Manager
2 mimics Fund Manager 1 in the first period if others believe S2(0) = S2G0
when Fund Manager 2 deviates from the herding equilibrium with C2(0) =
Investment R20 and believe S
2(0) = S2B0 when Fund Manager 2 deviates with





. Theorem 1 shows the equilibrium strategies in the second
period and Section 1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
Proof. Lemma 22 shows Fund Manager 1 is willing to invest efficiently if Fund
Manager 2 mimics Fund Manager 1’s investment choice. Lemma 16 shows
that under the assumptions in Case 7, there exists an equilibrium in the first
period in which Fund Manager 2 always mimics Fund Manager 1 if Fund
Manager 1 invests efficiently. The assumptions in Case 8 only differ from the
assumptions in Case 7 by the addition of performance fees, which increase the
desire to invest efficiently. The only scenario where Fund Manager 2 might
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deviate from mimicking Fund Manager 1 is when C1(0) = Investment RL10
and S2(0) = S2G0 . Given C
1(0) = Investment RL10 and S
2(0) = S2G0 , Fund
Manager 2 will deviate from the herding equilibria if:
PFR ·
[
(rG − r)P(ωG1|S1B0 , S
2
G0














The left-hand side of condition (1.3.84) is the expected increase in per-
formance fees gained by deviating from the herding strategy with C2(0) =
Investment R20. The right-hand side of condition (1.3.84) is the discounted
expected profit forfeited in the second period due to reducing E[θ̂2 − θ̂1] by
deviating from the herding strategy. Using condition (1.3.72), deviating from
the herding strategy reduces E[NFB2(1)] by f̃(ζ) − nfb. Refer to Appendix
A.3.3 for details on calculating E0[X2(2)|S1B0 , S
2
G0
]. If φG + φB − φr ≤ 0, Fund





Theorem 1 completes the proof.
Lemma 23. Under the assumptions in Case 8 and given Fund Manager 1 ig-
nores her signal and always chooses C1(0) = Investment R20 or always chooses
C1(0) = Investment RL20 in the first period, Fund Manager 2 is willing to in-
vest efficiently. More specifically, C2(0) = Investment R20 if S
2(0) = S2G0 and
C2(0) = Investment RL20 if S
2(0) = S2B0.
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Proof. Lemma 20 shows Fund Manager 2 is willing to invest efficiently if Fund
Manager 1 ignores her signal under the assumptions in Case 7. Case 8 has
the same assumptions as Case 7 with the addition of performance fees which
increase the desire to invest efficiently. Therefore, Fund Manager 2 is willing to
invest efficiently if Fund Manager 1 ignores her signal under the assumptions
in Case 8.
Define new variables for Theorem 20:
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Theorem 20. Under the assumptions in Case 8, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 2 invests efficiently and Fund Manager 1
is willing to ignore her signal in the first period and always chooses C1(0) =
Investment R10 if others assume Fund Manager 1 observed S
1(0) = S1B0 if she




Theorem 1 shows the equilibrium strategies in the second period and Section
1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
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Proof. Lemma 23 shows Fund Manager 2 is willing to invest efficiently if Fund
Manager 1 ignores her signal.
When Fund Manager 1 always chooses C1(0) = Investment R10 regard-
less of her private signal, she does not have an incentive to deviate when
S1(0) = S1G0 . If S
1(0) = S1B0 , Fund Manager 1 will deviate from always choos-
ing C1(0) = Investment R10 if:






MFRP + PFR · E0[X1(2)|S1B0 ]
]
. (1.3.85)
The left-hand side of condition (1.3.85) is the expected increase in
performance fees gained by deviating from the strategy of always choosing
C1(0) = Investment R10 regardless of her signal. The right-hand side of con-
dition (1.3.85) is the discounted expected profit forfeited in the second period
due to reducing E[θ̂1 − θ̂2] by deviating from the strategy of always choosing
C1(0) = Investment R10. Using condition (1.3.79), deviating from the strat-
egy in which Fund Manager 1 always chooses C1(0) = Investment R10 reduces
E[NFB1(1)] by f̃(ζ́)−nfb. Refer to Appendix A.3.4 for details on calculating
E0[X1(2)|S1B0 ]. If φ́r− φ́G− φ́B ≤ 0, Fund Manager 1 will not deviate from the
strategy in which Fund Manager 1 always chooses C1(0) = Investment R10. If
φ́r− φ́G− φ́B > 0, Fund Manager 1 will not deviate from the strategy in which






Theorem 1 completes the proof.
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Define new variables for Theorem 21:
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Theorem 21. Under the assumptions in Case 8, there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which Fund Manager 2 invests efficiently and Fund Manager 1
is willing to ignore her signal in the first period and always chooses C1(0) =
Investment RL10 if others assume Fund Manager 1 observed S
1(0) = S1G0 if she




Theorem 1 shows the equilibrium strategies in the second period and Section
1.3.1 shows the fund managers’ Bayesian consistent beliefs.
Proof. Lemma 23 shows Fund Manager 2 is willing to invest efficiently if Fund
Manager 1 ignores her signal.
When Fund Manager 1 always chooses C1(0) = Investment RL10, she
does not have an incentive to deviate when S1(0) = S1B0 . If S
1(0) = S1G0 , Fund
Manager 1 will deviate from always choosing C1(0) = Investment RL10 if:
86






MFRP + PFR · E0[X1(2)|S1B0 ]
]
. (1.3.86)
The left-hand side of condition (1.3.86) is the expected increase in
performance fees gained by deviating from the strategy of always choosing
C1(0) = Investment RL10 regardless of her signal. The right-hand side of con-
dition (1.3.86) is the discounted expected profit forfeited in the second period
due to reducing E[θ̂1 − θ̂2] by deviating from the strategy of always choos-
ing C1(0) = Investment RL10. Using condition (1.3.80), deviating from the
strategy in which Fund Manager 1 always chooses C1(0) = Investment RL10
reduces E[NFB1(1)] by f̃(ζ̈a) − f̃(ζ̈b). Refer to Appendix A.3.4 for details
on calculating E0[X1(2)|S1B0 ]. If φ̈G + φ̈B − φ̈r ≤ 0, Fund Manager 1 will not
deviate from the strategy in which Fund Manager 1 always chooses C1(0) =
Investment RL10. If φ̈G+φ̈B−φ̈r > 0, Fund Manager 1 will not deviate from the






Theorem 1 completes the proof.
1.4 Discussion
1.4.1 Dependence on Fee Structure
Performance fees deter herding under all four NFB growth assump-
tions. Under the assumptions in Case 5 and Case 7, there exists two inefficient
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equilibria. In one equilibrium, Fund Manager 1 invests efficiently and Fund
Manager 2 mimics Fund Manager 1’s investment choice. In another equilib-
rium, Fund Manager 1 chooses the same investment regardless of her private
signal and Fund Manager 2 invests efficiently. Case 6 and Case 8 show perfor-
mance fees remove these equilibria if the ratio of the performance fee rate to
management fee rate is larger than calculated thresholds.
In some circumstances, the inclusion of performance fees provide an
efficient equilibrium in which there was none before. Under the assumptions in
Case 3, it is shown that no pure equilibrium exists if π 1−θ
θ
< r−rG(1−p)−rBp,
but Case 4 shows that both fund managers will invest efficiently when π 1−θ
θ
<
r− rG(1− p)− rBp if the ratio of the performance fee rate to management fee
rate is larger than a calculated threshold. Under the assumptions in Case 5, an
equilibrium does not exist in which both fund managers invest efficiently, but
Case 6 again shows that both fund managers will invest efficiently if the ratio
of the performance fee rate to management fee rate is larger than a calculated
threshold.
1.4.2 Dependence on Fund Manager Valuation Metric
A fund manager’s desire to herd is induced by being evaluated on her
posterior probability of ability rather than her fund return. The assumption
driving herding equilibria is talented fund managers receive correlated signals
that provide information about future market returns, whereas untalented fund
managers receive uncorrelated noisy signals. By choosing the same investment
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as Fund Manager 1, Fund Manager 2 suggests that the fund managers received
the same signals and therefore have a higher probability of being talented.
The effect on equilibria of fund managers being evaluated with relative
metrics depends on whether the net fund balance growth depends on fund
return or posterior probability of being talented. Case 3 and Case 1 show
the efficient equilibrium is removed when fund managers are evaluated on
their relative fund return and fund managers use a traditional fee structure.
Comparing Case 4 to Case 2, the efficient equilibrium is removed if the ratio
of the performance fee rate to management fee rate is low enough when fund
managers are evaluated on their relative fund return and fund managers use
a performance-based fee structure.
On the other hand, Case 7 and Case 5 show an efficient equilibrium is
possible when fund managers are evaluated on their relative posterior prob-
ability of being talented when fund managers use a traditional fee structure.
Case 8 and Case 6 show an efficient equilibrium is possible when fund man-
agers are evaluated on their relative posterior probability of being talented
when fund managers use a performance-based fee structure.
The addition of an efficient equilibrium in Case 7 and Case 8 is driven
by the fact that Fund Manager 2’s investment decision has a large effect on
Fund Manager 1’s posterior probability of being talented. The assumption is
appropriate when reviewing competition between two fund managers, but not
when a fund manager competes with a large group. In a scenario where many
fund managers compete, a single fund manager’s investment choice would im-
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pact their personal posterior probability of being talented greatly, but would
have minimal influence on the posterior probability of being talented for the
other fund managers.
1.4.3 Dependence on Market Efficiency and Density of Talented
Fund Managers
The most compelling case to review the effect market efficienty has on
reputational herding is Case 5. Conditions (1.3.37) and (1.3.38) show Fund
Manager 2 will always herd, but the desire to herd is stronger when p is smaller.
When reviewing conditions for a herding equilibrium to exist, the effect of p
is the opposite. Conditions (1.3.40) and (1.3.43) show a larger p allows the
herding equilibrium to hold easier and conditions (1.3.41) and (1.3.44) don’t
depend on the value of p. Conditions supporting Fund Manager 1 ignoring
her signal are not consistently dependent on p. Although the way conditions
depend on p is not consistent, it is reasonable to give special attention to the
conditions in which Fund Manager 2 deviates from the efficient equilibrium to
herd. It is unlikely that a herding equilibrium would exist in the real world
because investors would not hire a fund manager that publically ignores their
private information and simply follows prior investment decisions. On the
other hand, it is realistic to assume fund managers deviate from investing
efficiently and herd secretly. Market efficiency is decreasing with respect to
p. Therefore, one may conclude that market efficiency increases the desire to
herd based on reputation concerns in cases when there are no performance
fees.
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In an IMF report, Eichengreen and Mathieson (1999) state,
“... [governments] can take steps to improve the functioning of
financial markets by providing them with more complete informa-
tion about national financial and economic policies, intentions, and
conditions. Such transparency encourages all investors, including
hedge funds, to trade on fundamentals rather than to run with the
herd.” Eichengreen and Mathieson (1999)
Eichengreen and Mathieson (1999) suggest that better information in the stock
market reduces herding. Usually people view markets with more information
to be more efficient, therefore Eichengreen and Mathieson (1999) predict less
herding in more efficient markets. Therefore the results in this chapter differ
from the opinion in Eichengreen and Mathieson (1999).
Parameter θ is the density of talented fund managers in the stock mar-
ket. Similarly to p, the effects of θ on herding differ across assumptions and
conditions. The most compelling case to review the effect the density of tal-
ented fund managers has on reputational herding is Case 5. In the violated
efficient equilibrium conditions (1.3.37) and (1.3.38), Fund Manager 2 has a
stronger desire to herd when θ is larger. Unlike the results for p, herding condi-
tions are also easier to satisfy when θ is larger. Conditions (1.3.36) and (1.3.39)
show Fund Manager 2 is more willing to invest efficiently when Fund Manager
1 ignores her private signal with larger values of θ. Conditions supporting
Fund Manager 1 ignoring her signal are not consistently dependent on θ, but
this equilibrium is not likely found in the real world. Therefore, it is concluded
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that the tendency to herd is stronger when θ is larger in cases where there are
no performance fees. Stein (2009) shows that an increasing number of sophis-
ticated investors in the stock market may not necessarily move prices closer
to fundamental values because of negative externalities. This chapter adds
support to the assertion that an increasing amount of sophisticated investors
in the stock market may not necessarily move prices closer to fundamental
values because of the increasing desire to herd based on reputation concerns.
The dependence on p and θ in herding equilibria with performance fees
depend on other parameter values. In Case 6 it is intuitive that larger values
of p and θ increase the expected profit from performance fees by investing
efficiently, but will also increase the expected profit from management fees by
herding. Therefore, the result will depend on the distribution of investment
returns.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined how reputational herding between fund man-
agers depends on the fee structure, fund manager evaluation metric, market
efficiency, and density of talented fund managers. It adds to existing literature
by analyzing different fee structures and fund manager evaluation metrics in
the framework developed in Scharfstein and Stein (1990). Results show there
are more equilibria involving herding between fund managers when net fund
balance growth depends on reputation of talent rather than fund return. These
inefficient equilibria are removed when the ratio of the performance fee rate
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to management fee rate is larger than calculated thresholds that depend on
market efficiency and the density of talented fund managers. In the absence
of performance fees, lower predictability of investment returns and a higher
density of talented fund managers increase the desire for fund managers to
deviate from efficient equilibria. The model also shows having fund managers
compete against each other induces herding when net fund balance growth de-
pends on fund returns, but removes herding equilibria when net fund balance
growth depends on reputation of talent.
Although hedge funds are blamed for causing financial crises, performance-
based fee structures were shown to deter herding under all four fund manager
evaluation metrics. Fund manager herding has the potential to destabilize
stock prices and form asset bubbles. Therefore, policy makers may want to
encourage performance-based fee structures to deter fund manager herding
and avoid future crises.
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Chapter 2
A Study of Institutional Investor Herding by
Geographic Location and Institution Type
2.1 Introduction
A group of investors trading a security in the same direction can gen-
erate upward or downward pressure on the security’s price. Understanding
which investors trade together and when they trade together can provide in-
sight on stock market efficiency and whether herding destabilizes asset prices.
This chapter determines what herding networks exist between institutional in-
vestors and how herding depends on stock market volatility, degree of portfolio
changes, and stock size.
There are many different reasons why investors may herd. Banerjee
(1992) suggests investors herd due to information cascades; investors rely heav-
ily on the investment decisions made before them by inferring information
from those decisions. Another reason investors may herd is they follow a sim-
ilar investment strategy, such as the positive feedback strategy documented
in Grinblatt et al. (1995). A third reason investors may herd is because of
reputational considerations; fund managers may trade with the crowd to not
risk failing alone and looking incompetent (see Scharfstein and Stein (1990);
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Wilson (2012)).
Lakonishok et al. (1992) examine herding between money managers
and find more herding within small cap stocks than large cap stocks, but in
general find minimal support for herding within individual stocks. Grinblatt
et al. (1995) find a higher level of herding in their dataset using the same
herding measure as Lakonishok et al. (1992). Grinblatt et al. (1995) attribute
most of the herding in their sample to mutual funds simultaneously using
positive-feedback investment strategies.
Unlike Grinblatt et al. (1995), Sias (2004) finds little evidence of herding
being caused by positive-feedback investment strategies. Sias (2004) examines
herding across quarters and finds that investors’ demand for a security in a
given quarter is positively correlated with other investors’ demand for the
security in the previous quarter. Choi and Sias (2009) find the correlation
between the fraction of institutional traders buying an industry this quarter
and the fraction buying last quarter averages 40 percent. Choi and Sias (2009)
suggest that correlated signals primarily drive institutional industry herding.
Herding by institutional investors is important to study because it can
impact stock prices. Sias and Starks (2006) find institutional trading has
temporary price effects attributed to liquidity effects and permanent price
effects attributed to information effects. Wermers (1999) shows stocks that
herds buy outperform stocks they sell by four percent during the following six
months.
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The purpose of this chapter is to determine what herding networks ex-
ist between institutional investors and how herding depends on stock market
volatility, degree of portfolio changes, and stock size. Using quarterly holding
data from 2000-2010, I find stronger herding networks between similar types of
institutions compared to institutions in the same metropolitan area. Further-
more, the herding network between similar types of institutions exists across
metropolitan areas. Results show institutions herd more when making major
portfolio changes than when making minor portfolio changes. The difference
in herding between the two types of portfolio changes is greatest for small cap
stocks which exhibit the highest levels of herding under both types of portfolio
changes. The relationship between market volatility and herding by institu-
tions is also examined and do not have a strong correlation using quarterly
holdings data.
Hong et al. (2005) show that mutual fund managers spread information
to one another by word of mouth and are likely to herd with other mutual
funds in the same city. Furthermore, the geographic location of the stocks
that investors herd in is independent of the investors’ geographic location.
However, the results in this chapter suggest networks between institutions of
the same type are stronger than networks between institutions in the same
metropolitan area.
Lakonishok et al. (1992) attempt to create different investor types by
sorting by assets under management. Wermers (1999) and Grinblatt et al.
(1995) create subgroups of mutual funds by sorting on fund category. This
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chapter is the first to analyze and compare the herding of multiple types of
institutions within the same study. This chapter is also the first to examine
the difference in herding between major and minor portfolio changes and how
herding levels are related to market volatility.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
data used. Section 2.3 explains the herding measure used and how testable
herding networks are formed. Section 2.4 presents the results and Section 2.5
concludes the chapter.
2.2 Data
The data used are institutional quarterly long position holdings from
2000 through 2010 in the FactSet LionShares Ownership Database. The data
was obtained through a custom data request by The University of Texas at
Austin and includes data for non-surviving institutions that are not available
using a FactSet Terminal. FactSet’s primary data source are 13F filings which
are mandated by the SEC for any investment management institution manag-
ing $100 million or more in U.S. traded securities. If an institution consists of
multiple individual funds, the individual holdings are aggregated.
This chapter only analyzes equity holdings because reporting of non-
equity holdings is limited and does not include the majority of an institution’s
fixed income portfolio. Non-equity holdings are dropped from the sample by
using the Issue Number of their CUSIP Number. An Issue Number is the
7th and 8th position of a CUSIP Number. Issue Numbers for equity securities
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contain only numeric values, whereas Issue Numbers for fixed income securities
involve at least one alphabetic character.
Security data used are also from the FactSet LionShares Ownership
Database. I use the CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) database
when possible for securities data that is missing in the FactSet LionShares
Ownership Database. I drop stocks from the sample during quarters in which
they had a change in outstanding shares greater than 5 percent in magnitude
because herding levels can be inflated when companies issue or repurchase
stock. I also drop any stocks from the sample during quarters in which they
had a price change greater than or equal to 40 percent in magnitude in order
to reduce bad data and remove any stock-splits that were not adjusted for by
FactSet.
Institutions in the data are only included in the analysis during quarters
in which their equity portfolio value is greater than or equal to $25 million at
the end of the quarter. The lower limit decreases the risk of poorly reported
holdings. I also provide additional results that do not include institutions in
the analysis during quarters in which their equity portfolio value is greater
than or equal to $50 billion at the end of the quarter. I drop any institutions
from the sample during quarters in which the change in their equity portfolio
value is greater than 35 percent in magnitude to decrease the risk of poorly
reported holdings.
Data include institutions’ geographic locations and institution types.
This chapter analyzes institutions that were located in the top 15 metropoli-
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tan areas ranked by institution count and were one of the top 5 institution
types ranked by institution count. Table 2.1 shows the count of institutions
by metropolitan area and institution type that are included in the analysis
over the entire sample period. Roughly 40 percent of the institutions are
located in the New York City metropolitan area, whereas the remaining 14
metropolitan areas individually make up less than 10 percent of the institu-
tions in the sample. Roughly half of the 2,516 institutions are classified as
Investment Advisers. Hedge Fund Companies account for almost 40 percent
of institutions. The remaining institution types are Bank Management Divi-
sions, Mutual Fund Managers, and Insurance Management Divisions. Hedge
Fund Companies are largely concentrated in the New York City metropolitan
area, whereas the other institution types are more evenly distributed between
the metropolitan areas. Table B.5 in Appendix B.1 show similar counts for
the data sample that excludes institutions in the analysis during quarters in
which their equity portfolio value is greater than or equal to $50 billion at the






























































































































































































































































































































































Table B.1 and Table B.2 in Appendix B.1 show a snapshot count of
institutions by metropolitan area and institution type respectively over time
from 2000-2010. The number of institutions in the sample increased from
810 at the end of 2000 to 1,457 at the end of 2010. Larger metropolitan
areas observed a bigger increase in institution count due to large growths
in Investment Advisers and Hedge Fund Companies. Table B.3 and Table
B.4 in Appendix B.1 show similar counts for the data sample that excludes
institutions in the analysis during quarters in which their equity portfolio value
is greater than or equal to $50 billion at the end of the quarter.
Table 2.2 shows a snapshot of the mean equity portfolio size by in-
stitution type over time from 2000-2010. The mean Hedge Fund Company
portfolio is the smallest, whereas the mean Mutual Fund Manager portfolio
is the largest. The weighted mean portfolio of all institutions included in the
analysis increased by roughly $500 million during 2000-2005, but decreased
slightly during 2005-2010. The total equity market cap held by all institu-
tions included in the analysis is $5.1 trillion at the end of 2000, $5.6 trillion
at the end of 2005, and $5.4 trillion at the end of 2010. Table B.6 in Ap-
pendix B.1 shows a snapshot of the mean equity portfolio size by institution
type over time from 2000-2010 for the data sample that excludes institutions
in the analysis during quarters in which their equity portfolio value is greater
than or equal to $50 billion at the end of the quarter. The weighted mean
portfolio of all institutions included in the analysis increased by roughly $500
million during 2000-2005, but stayed level during 2005-2010. The total equity
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market cap held by all institutions included in the analysis is $1.9 trillion at
the end of 2000, $2.4 trillion at the end of 2005, and $2.4 trillion at the end
of 2010. Comparing Table 2.2 and Table B.6 shows that the Mutual Fund
Manager type is the most affected by excluding institutions in the analysis
during quarters in which their equity portfolio value is greater than or equal
to $50 billion at the end of the quarter.
Table B.7 in Appendix B.1 shows a snapshot of the mean number of
equity holdings by institution type over time from 2000-2010. There is an
increase in the mean number of stocks held by every institution type during
2000-2005, whereas the mean number of stocks held slightly decreased for
each institution type during 2005-2010. Table B.8 in Appendix B.1 shows a
snapshot of the mean number of equity holdings by institution type over time
from 2000-2010 for the data sample that excludes institutions in the analysis
during quarters in which their equity portfolio value is greater than or equal to
$50 billion at the end of the quarter. There is an increase in the mean number
of stocks held by every institution type during 2000-2005, whereas the mean
number of stocks held was relatively constant for each all institution types
except Insurance Management Divisions during 2005-2010.
Table 2.3 shows a snapshot of the mean quarterly turnover rate for
each institution type over time from 2000-2010. The quarterly turnover rate
is calculated by dividing an institution’s trading volume by their total equity
portfolio value during the quarter. To calculate trading volume, I multiply the
change in shares of each stock by the average of the stock’s beginning and end
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Institution Type 2000Q4 2005Q4 2010Q4
Investment Adviser 3,078 4,236 3,795
Hedge Fund Company 490 1,015 1,061
Bank Management Division 9,053 10,212 10,208
Mutual Fund Manager 38,444 42,902 41,273
Insurance Management Division 3,781 4,089 7,038
All 5,089 5,598 5,384
Table 2.2: Mean Market Cap ($ Millions) By Institution Type
of quarter price and sum across all stocks in an institution’s portfolio. The
total equity portfolio values used to calculate quarterly turnover rates are the
average of the beginning and end of quarter equity portfolio values. Table
2.3 shows Hedge Fund Companies have a much higher turnover rate than the
other institution types. The mean quarterly turnover rate for any institution
type does not change much overtime, except for a decrease in mean quarterly
turnover rates by Hedge Fund Companies during 2000-2005. This decrease is
most likely due to the mean Hedge Fund Company size more than doubling
during the same time period as reflected in Table 2.2. Table B.9 in Appendix
B.1 shows similar results for the data sample that excludes institutions in the
analysis during quarters in which their equity portfolio value is greater than
or equal to $50 billion at the end of the quarter.
Part of the analysis in this chapter examines herding between institu-
103
Institution Type 2000Q4 2005Q4 2010Q4
Investment Adviser 7.08 6.10 6.26
Hedge Fund Company 17.62 13.55 13.02
Bank Management Division 5.53 4.14 5.53
Mutual Fund Manager 6.26 6.45 5.27
Insurance Management Division 6.38 5.32 5.59
All 8.61 8.00 8.05
Table 2.3: Mean Quarterly Turnover Rate By Institution Type
tions when they make major portfolio changes. Major portfolio changes are
defined as an institution buying a stock they did not own in the previous
quarter or selling all of their holdings of a stock they did own in the previous
quarter. Table B.10 in Appendix B.1 shows the mean quarterly turnover rate
for each institution type over time only using major portfolio changes when
calculating an institution’s trading volume. Table 2.3 and Table B.10 show
that the portion of trades considered major portfolio changes differ across in-
stitution type. The majority of Hedge Fund Companies’ trades are considered
major portfolio changes, while a small portion of Bank Management Divisions’
trades are considered major portfolio changes. Table B.11 in Appendix B.1
shows similar results for the data sample that excludes institutions in the
analysis during quarters in which their equity portfolio value is greater than
or equal to $50 billion at the end of the quarter.
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2.3 Methodology
The herding measure used in this chapter is from Lakonishok et al.
(1992) and is referred to as the “LSV Herding Statistic”. The LSV Herding
Statistic is the most widely used herding measure and allows a comparison
between my results and other results. Advantages of using the LSV Herding
Statistic also include robustness to poor data because it does not depend on
stock prices or the total value of an institution’s portfolio.
Define ni,k,t as the number of stock i’s shares held by institution k at
the end of quarter t. The change in stock i’s shares held by institution k during
quarter t is:
∆ni,k,t = ni,k,t − ni,k,t−1. (2.3.1)
Let bi,k,t and si,k,t be dummy variables that indicate whether institution k was
a net buyer or net seller of stock i’s shares during quarter t:
bi,k,t = {




1, if ∆ni,k,t < 0
0, otherwise
. (2.3.3)
Let Bi,t be the number of institutions that increase their holdings of stock
i during quarter t and Si,t be the number of institutions that decrease their
















− pt| − AFi,t
]
× 100%, (2.3.7)
where pt is the expected proportion of all institutions trading stock i during










Si,t). An adjustment factor is needed
because the expected value of | Bi,t
Bi,t+Si,t
− pt| is greater than zero. Therefore,









where B is a random variable that follows a binomial distribution with prob-
ability pt of success and Ni,t trials, Ni,t is the number of institutions changing
their number of stock i’s shares held during quarter t, and S = Ni,t − B.
It is appropriate to examine herding within stocks that several institutions
are trading rather than stocks with only a few active trades, therefore I only
calculate (2.3.7) for stock-quarters with at least five active trades.
Herding cannot exist between the entire investing population when the
total outstanding shares of stocks are fixed because there must be a buyer for
every seller and vice versa. The data sample used is large and is considered
a good representation of the entire investing population, therefore the LSV
Herding Statistic is calculated for subgroups of institutions representing herd-
ing networks. The first way networks are formed is by grouping institutions by
institution type, the second way is by grouping institutions by metropolitan
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area, and the third way is by grouping institutions by institution type and
metropolitan area. For brevity, the following naming convention is used:
1. “Type networks” = 5 subgroups of institutions formed by institution
type,
2. “Metro networks” = 15 subgroups of institutions formed by metropolitan
area,
3. “TypeMetro networks” = 75 subgroups of institutions formed by insti-
tution type and metropolitan area.
The 5 institution types chosen are the top 5 institution types ranked by count.
The 15 metropolitan areas chosen are the top 15 metropolitan areas ranked
by count. In all three network formations, only institutions that are in the
top 5 institution types and top 15 metropolitan areas are used in the analysis.
Other institutions are dropped from the sample.
The mean LSV Herding Statistic for a subgroup of institutions is cal-
culated by averaging the LSV Herding Statistic over all stock-quarters using
only trades by that subgroup.
2.3.1 LSV Herding Statistic Interpretation
Consider a hypothetical scenario where on average 60% of all trades
are buys and 40% of all trades are sells by a subgroup of institutions. A mean
LSV Herding Statistic of 5.00% can be interpreted as 65% of institutions are
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changing their holdings of an average stock in one direction and 35% in the
opposite direction.
Fund managers within an institution communicate and often use the
same research when making investment decisions. Thus, fund managers from
the same institution buy and sell the same stocks on average more than two
unrelated funds. Therefore, mean LSV Herding Statistics are lower when us-
ing aggregated institutional holdings than when using fund level data. Many
empirical herding papers use fund level data, thus a conversion factor should
be used in order to compare the results in this chapter with results that use
fund level data. Wermers (1999) compares the mean LSV Herding Statistic
calculated using individual mutual funds and the mean LSV Herding Statis-
tic calculated by aggregating holdings of the same individual funds within
their fund family. Wermers (1999) finds aggregating individual fund holdings
decreases herding statistics: “Roughly two percent more fund families, on av-
erage, are on the same side of trading than expected, while approximately
three to four percent more individual funds . . . are on the same side than ex-
pected.” Mean LSV Herding Statistics calculated using fund level data are
between 1.5 to 2.0 times larger than mean LSV Herding Statistics calculated
using aggregated holdings of the same funds. A conservative conversion factor





Table 2.4 presents the main results in this chapter. The first column
displays the weighted mean LSV Herding Statistic for each network formation
methodology. The weighted mean LSV Herding Statistic is determined by
averaging the mean LSV Herding Statistic for each network within a network
formation methodology, weighting by number of stock-quarters. The second
column displays the weighted mean LSV Herding Statistic for each network
formation methodology using only major portfolio changes.
Weighted Mean LSV
Network Formation Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistic
Methodology Herding Statistic (Major Portfolio Changes)
5 Type Networks 1.668** 3.887**
15 Metro Networks 0.944** 3.056**
75 TypeMetro Networks 0.944** 3.705**
Table 2.4: Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistic By Network Formation
Methodology: † Statistically significant at the 10% level, * Statistically signif-
icant at the 5% level, ** Statistically significant at the 1% level
The 5 Type networks’ mean LSV Herding Statistic is 1.668% which is
almost twice as much as the 15 Metro networks’ mean LSV Herding Statistic
of 0.944%. Hong et al. (2005) show that mutual fund managers spread infor-
mation to one another by word of mouth and are likely to herd with other
mutual funds in the same city. The results suggest networks between insti-
tutions of the same type are stronger than networks between institutions in
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the same metropolitan area. Furthermore, the 75 TypeMetro networks’ mean
LSV Herding Statistic of 0.944% suggests the networks between institutions
of the same type exist across metropolitan areas because truncating networks
by metropolitan area substantially decreases the level of herding.
The results suggest that institutional herding is more likely due to
similar risk appetites or similar investment strategies rather than information
cascades because herding is stronger between networks formed by institution
type rather than by metropolitan area. However, reputation herding is also
a possibility because it can exist in networks formed by institution type or
metropolitan area.
The second column in Table 2.4 shows higher levels of herding for all
three network formations when calculating the LSV Herding Statistic only
using major portfolio changes. The fact that herding is stronger when in-
stitutions make major portfolio changes suggests institutions herd based on
reputation concerns. It is reasonable to conclude that an institution’s rep-
utation is affected much more by liquidating a 1 percent holding in a given
security than changing a holding of a security from 1 to 2 percent. Whereas,
fund returns are a linear function with respect to the amount of a security an
institution holds. Again, networks formed by institution type herd more than
networks formed by metropolitan area when making major portfolio changes.
Lakonishok et al. (1992) describe their overall mean LSV Herding Statis-
tic of 2.7% as relatively little herding, but their mean LSV Herding Statistic of
6.1% conditioning on the smallest quintile stocks as evidence of herding. Using
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a conversion factor of 1.5, the 5 Type networks’ mean LSV Herding Statistic
is 1.668% × 1.5 = 2.502%. Therefore, the magnitude of the herding detected
in my data when considering all types of trades is not considerably large.
Only considering major portfolio changes, the mean LSV Herding Statistic for
the 5 Type networks formed is 3.887% × 1.5 = 5.831% which is considered
economically significant.
2.4.2 Detailed Results by Network
Appendix B.2 contains details of the LSV Herding Statistic by network
for each network formation methodology. In addition to mean LSV Herding
Statistics, a signed herding measure is also presented. The mean “Buy” LSV




> pt and the mean “Sell” LSV Herding Statistic
is calculated by averaging the LSV Herding Statistic over stock-quarters where
Bi,t
Bi,t+Si,t
< pt. The mean LSV Herding Statistic shown for “All” is calculated
by averaging mean LSV Herding Statistics for each network, weighting by
number of stock-quarters.
Table B.12 in Appendix B.2 shows mean LSV Herding Statistics for the
5 Type networks. Table B.12 shows Hedge Fund Companies herd more than
any other institution type when considering all portfolio changes, but herd
the least when making major portfolio changes. Therefore, herding by hedge
funds is more likely due to similar risk appetite or investment strategies rather
than reputational considerations. Table B.13 in Appendix B.2 shows similar
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results for the data sample that excludes institutions in the analysis during
quarters in which their equity portfolio value is greater than or equal to $50
billion at the end of the quarter. Hedge funds use performance fees more than
other institutions, therefore the results in this chapter support the conclusion
in Wilson (2012) that performance fees deter reputation herding.
Table B.14, Table B.15, and Table B.16 in Appendix B.2 show mean
LSV Herding Statistics for the 15 Metro networks. The differences in herding
levels between networks formed by metropolitan area are not as great as by
institution type. Institutions in the New York City metropolitan area herd
more together than any other metropolitan area when considering all types
of portfolio changes, reflecting the number of hedge funds in the metropolitan
area. As expected, the herding level in the New York City metropolitan area
does not increase as much as most metropolitan areas when only considering
major portfolio changes because New York City metropolitan area consists
mostly of Hedge Funds. Table B.17, Table B.18, and Table B.19 in Appendix
B.2 show similar results for the data sample that excludes institutions in the
analysis during quarters in which their equity portfolio value is greater than
or equal to $50 billion at the end of the quarter.
Table B.20, Table B.21, Table B.22, and Table B.23 in Appendix B.2
show mean LSV Herding Statistics for the 75 TypeMetro networks using all
portfolio changes and Table B.28, Table B.29, Table B.30, and Table B.31 show
mean LSV Herding Statistics for the 75 TypeMetro networks using only major
portfolio changes. The New York City metropolitan area and Hedge Fund
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Companies still have the highest level of herding when considering all portfolio
changes and some of the lowest levels of herding when only considering major
portfolio changes. Similar results are shown in Table B.24, Table B.25, Table
B.26, Table B.27, Table B.32, Table B.33, Table B.34, and Table B.35 for the
data sample that excludes institutions in the analysis during quarters in which
their equity portfolio value is greater than or equal to $50 billion at the end
of the quarter.
The results in Section 2.4.1, showing institutional investors’ stronger
tendency to herd when making major portfolio changes, is not due to a few
network outliers. The tables in Appendix B.2 show that every network in
every network formation methodology has a stronger tendency to herd when
making major portfolio changes. In addition, the tables in Appendix B.2 show
institutional investors herd more when buying stocks than when selling stocks
on average.
2.4.3 Detailed Results by Market Capitalization and VIX Quintiles
Appendix B.3 contains details of the LSV Herding Statistic by mar-
ket capitalization and VIX quintiles for each network formation methodology.
Cut-off points for market capitalization quintiles are formed each quarter by
grouping every stock in the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX stock exchanges
from the CRSP database into market capitalization quintiles. VIX is the
Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index that measures the
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options over the following 30 day period.
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This chapter classifies each quarter in the sample time period by VIX quin-
tiles based on the average daily VIX value for the quarter. Although previous
empirical herding papers review market capitalization, this chapter is the first
to examine the relationship between herding and market volatility.
Table B.36, Table B.40, and Table B.44 in Appendix B.3 show the
weighted mean LSV Herding Statistic by market capitalization and VIX quin-
tiles for the 5 Type, 15 Metro, and 75 TypeMetro networks respectively using
all portfolio changes. The smallest market capitalization quintile exhibits the
most herding all network formations. The herding difference between VIX
quintiles is not large for any network formation using all portfolio changes.
Table B.37, Table B.41, and Table B.45 in Appendix B.3 show the weighted
mean LSV Herding Statistic by market capitalization and VIX quintiles for the
5 Type, 15 Metro, and 75 TypeMetro networks respectively using all portfolio
changes for the data sample that excludes institutions in the analysis during
quarters in which their equity portfolio value is greater than or equal to $50
billion at the end of the quarter. Excluding institutions in the analysis during
quarters in which their equity portfolio value is greater than or equal to $50
billion at the end of the quarter decreases herding in small cap stocks. Thus,
the herding in small cap stocks is done mostly by larger institutions.
Table B.38, Table B.42, and Table B.46 in Appendix B.3 show the
weighted mean LSV Herding Statistic by market capitalization and VIX quin-
tiles for the 5 Type, 15 Metro, and 75 TypeMetro networks respectively using
only major portfolio changes. In all network formation methodologies, herd-
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ing is monotonically decreasing with respect to market capitalization quintile.
Using a conversion factor of 1.5, the smallest market capitalization quintile
has a weighted mean LSV Herding Statistic of 13.334% × 1.5 = 20.001%,
11.093% × 1.5 = 16.640%, and 10.594% × 1.5 = 15.891% for the 5 Type, 15
Metro, and 75 TypeMetro networks respectively. Therefore, the herding in
small cap stocks using major portfolio changes is economically significant for
all three network formation methodologies. Again, the herding difference be-
tween VIX quintiles is not large for any network formation using all portfolio
changes. Similar results are shown in Table B.39, Table B.43, and Table B.47
in Appendix B.3 for the data sample that excludes institutions in the analysis
during quarters in which their equity portfolio value is greater than or equal
to $50 billion at the end of the quarter.
The herding results in this chapter for the smallest market capitaliza-
tion quintile are consistent with Lakonishok et al. (1992), Wermers (1999),
and other previous empirical studies. Lakonishok et al. (1992) found their
herding results in small market cap stocks disappeared when conditioning on
stocks that had very little change in outstanding shares. This chapter shows
the stronger herding in small market cap stocks still persists when only consid-
ering stocks during quarters with trivial changes in outstanding shares. This
chapter adds to the existing literature by showing the difference in herding be-
tween small cap stocks and large cap stocks is increased when only considering
major portfolio changes.
Herding within small cap stocks is typically attributed to information
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cascades because there is less information about these stocks readily available
to the investing public than there is in large cap stocks. However the increase
in herding is the largest for small cap stocks when using only major portfolio
changes. This suggests herding in small cap stocks is due to reputational
herding.
This chapter is the first to examine the relationship between market
volatility and institutional herding. Information cascades may occur more
frequently during volatile quarters than quarters without much uncertainty.
Herding and volatility may also be related by a feedback loop due to institu-
tions using the same investment strategy associated with volatility and hence
causing more volatility. The results in this chapter show no relationship be-
tween volatility and institutional herding when analyzing quarterly holdings.
It is possible that institutional herding and market volatility are correlated,
but the relationship cannot be seen without using higher frequency data.
2.5 Conclusion
Using quarterly holding data from 2000-2010, I found stronger herding
networks between similar types of institutions compared to institutions in the
same metropolitan area. Furthermore, the herding network between similar
types of institutions exists across metropolitan areas. Results showed insti-
tutions herd more when making major portfolio changes than when making
minor portfolio changes. The difference in herding between the two types of
portfolio changes is greatest for small cap stocks which exhibit the highest lev-
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els of herding under both types of portfolio changes. The relationship between
market volatility and herding by institutions were also examined and found
not to have a strong correlation using quarterly holdings data.
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Chapter 3
Production Tax Credits and Wind Energy
Investments: A Real Options Approach with
Regime Shifts and Jumps
3.1 Introduction
Wind energy is a crucial component of the world’s energy solution as
our natural resources become increasingly depleted and emerging economies
become progressively energy hungry. The European Union estimates that by
2020, wind energy could satisfy 10 to 15 percent of the total EU electricity
demand (see Blanco (2009)). In 2008, the United States relied on coal and
natural gas for 70 percent of their electricity production1. Conversely, hydro-
electricity encompassed roughly 6 percent of the U.S. electricity production,
and other renewable sources, such as wind and solar, made up only 3 percent of
the total electricity supply in 2008. In order for the U.S. to succeed in encour-
aging renewable energy investments, they need to determine the dependency
of government policies for renewable energy investments and understand the
factors that influence investment decisions made by potential renewable energy
1Electricity generation by energy source data can be found at the
Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration website:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/table1 1.html.
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plants. This chapter provides a real options approach to evaluate Production
Tax Credits (PTCs), cost reductions, and efficiency improvements regarding
wind energy investments.
As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the
United States federal government extended PTCs that provide a 2.2 cent per
kilowatt hour (kWh) subsidy for plants producing renewable wind energy dur-
ing their first ten years of operation. Vestas Wind Systems, a firm specializing
in wind energy production, claims PTCs play a large role in their $1 billion
plan to build six energy factories in Colorado and a research center in Hous-
ton (see Glader (2009)). Understanding the necessity of PTCs in Vestas Wind
Systems’ investment decision, and similar investment decisions, is necessary
to competently encourage renewable energy investments.
Welch and Venkateswaran (2009) analyze the dependence of wind en-
ergy investments on PTCs and suggest that PTCs can be lowered to 0.1 cent
per kWh at current cost levels and PTCs are no longer needed with reasonable
cost and/or technology improvements. Welch and Venkateswaran (2009) use
the naive NPV rule that indicates to invest in a project if the present value of
the future profit stream exceeds the investment cost. The NPV rule assumes
that either the investment is reversible, or the investment decision must be
made in the current period if it is irreversible (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)).
This methodology does not include the interaction between uncertainty, the
irreversibility of the investment, and the possibility of deferring the project
(see Bellamy and Sahut (2007)). In the case of wind energy investment, the
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initial investment can be more than 80 percent of the plant’s costs over its
lifespan (see Blanco (2009)). Therefore, the irreversibility characteristic of the
investment opportunity plays a large role in the investment decision and the
option to defer the investment decision is a critical factor to model. Although
an investment’s NPV may be positive, the benefit of waiting for new informa-
tion can exceed foregone cash flows. According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
the benefit of delaying investment to gather additional information is often
large and using the NPV rule can result in drastic calculation errors.
This chapter is the first to specifically address the differences between
a NPV rule model and a real options model when analyzing wind energy
investments and PTCs. The real options model developed in this chapter
builds on the framework discussed in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and uses
mathematical tools found in Boyarchenko and Levedorskǐi (2007) to solve the
investment problem.
Gollier et al. (2005) use real options to evaluate investments in nuclear
power assuming the price of electricity follows a geometric Brownian motion.
The basic geometric Brownian motion assumption describes normal idiosyn-
cratic risk well, but some recent papers in real options use regime shifts and
jumps in addition to geometric Brownian motion to incorporate broader risks.
Hackbarth et al. (2006) and Boyarchenko (2009) consider regime shifts and
jumps in real options models in the area of credit risk. Guo et al. (2005)
consider regime shifts in the case of capital investments. Bellamy and Sahut
(2007) incorporate the possibility of a one-time sudden drop in future wind
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energy cash flows caused by the discovery of new oil reserves or alternative en-
ergy sources in their real options model that assumes electricity prices follow
geometric Brownian motion. This chapter improves upon Bellamy and Sahut
(2007) by being the first to analyze wind energy investments using a model
regime shifts and jumps.
In contrast to Welch and Venkateswaran (2009), who argue PTCs can
be lowered to $0.01/kWh, my results show that wind energy plants will most
likely not invest even at current PTCs levels of $0.022/kWh. Although the
net present value of the investment is positive using my baseline assumptions,
potential wind energy plants will wait to resolve uncertainty. The basic model
in this chapter predicts a PTCs level of $0.0235/kWh is needed to induce
immediate investment in wind energy.
In addition to a basic model using geometric Brownian motion, this
chapter analyzes two scenarios using a stochastic price process with regime
shifts and jumps. The first scenario assumes the current electricity market
is regulated, but there is a possibility of it becoming deregulated in the fu-
ture. The second scenario assumes the GBM drift of the electricity price shifts
back and forth between two regimes due to booms and busts of oil prices. In
both scenarios, the current level of PTCs is not large enough for immediate
investment in wind energy.
Welch and Venkateswaran (2009) state that PTCs may be removed
with reasonable cost and efficiency improvements, but my results using a real
options model provide different results. I analyze multiple cost and efficiency
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scenarios under the different models. In all models, the improvements in cost
and efficiency are greater than what would be deemed reasonable.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The basic model without
regime shifts and jumps or government policy is described and solved in closed
form in Section 3.2. Section 3.2.3 incorporates PTCs in the basic model.
Section 3.2.4 gives a background on regime shifts and jumps and develops a
model using them to analyze wind energy investments. Section 3.3 discusses
calibration of the parameters. Section 3.4 presents results and Section 3.5
concludes the chapter.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Wind Energy Output
All costs and revenues are proportional to the size of a wind energy
plant, therefore this chapter looks at the investment decision of one kWh
capacity in wind energy. Due to engineering limitations and the inability
to control nature, wind energy plants do not produce at their full capacity
(see Welch and Venkateswaran (2009)). Let the utilization rate, UR, be the
percentage of the plant’s capacity that plants are able to produce. Let Hrs
be the number of hours in a time period. The output level, Q, of one unit of
energy capacity is:
Q = UR ·Hrs kWh. (3.2.1)
Currently, there is not a good storage device for energy produced by
wind turbines (see Blanco (2009)). In my model, the probability that the price
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of electricity falls below the wind energy plant’s low operating costs is very
small and the wind energy plant is able to sell all electricity produced at the
market price, therefore it is always profitable for the wind energy plant to
produce as much electricity as possible.
3.2.2 Basic Model
3.2.2.1 Operating Cash Flows and Profit Function without PTCs
Wind energy plants are price takers because they produce a small por-
tion of the United States’ electricity. The wind energy plant’s selling price
of electricity is exogenous and modeled by pt = Ge
Xt , where G is a positive
constant and X is a Brownian motion under the equivalent martingale measure








where x is the spot value of X, W is the standard Wiener process, and µ ∈ R
and σ > 0. The equivalent martingale measure is unique.
Geometric Brownian motion (GBM) is a better assumption than stan-
dard Brownian motion because it is bounded below by zero and the drift and
volatility of the process is proportional to the current price level. A conse-
quence of using a random walk process without mean reversion is the price
can diverge over time and firms can earn infinite profits. Realistically, new
firms would enter the market when a price increase occurs and the shift in the
supply curve would lead to a decrease in price if demand curves are downward
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sloping. Therefore, some critics argue that GBM with mean reversion is a
more plausible assumption than GBM.
Hassett and Metcalf (1995) compare GBM and mean reversion process
models and find cumulative investment is generally the same under both as-
sumptions. Prices that follow GBM have a larger long-run variance than prices
that follow mean reversion. The inverse relationship between uncertainty and
investment implies investors are more willing to invest under a mean reversion
process assumption. On the other hand, the higher volatility of GBM implies
higher price levels are achievable. This effect will cause investors to be more
willing to invest under a GBM assumption. These two opposing effects are
shown to offset each other so that expected cumulative investment over time
is roughly the same under either price process assumption. Therefore, this
chapter assumes GBM because it is analytically less complex.
Let AV E be the average variable expenses measured in $/kWh. Let
O&M be the operating and maintenance cost measured in $:
O&M = AV E ·Q. (3.2.3)
Wind energy plants typically apply their capital depreciation for tax
purposes over a 5 year schedule described in Welch and Venkateswaran (2009).
This chapter makes the simplifying assumption that capital depreciation is
spread out over the entire lifespan of the plant for tax purposes. The plant
faces a tax rate τ . Let δ be the capital depreciation the plant is able to subtract
124
from their taxable income each period. The tax the plant pays each period is:
tax = (Q · pt −O&M − δ)τ ∀t. (3.2.4)
Using the substitution pt = Ge
Xt , the profit function for the wind energy plant
can be written as:
Π(pt) = Q ·GeXt(1− τ)−O&M(1− τ) + δ · τ ∀t. (3.2.5)
For ease of notation, let α = Q ·G(1− τ) and γ = O&M(1− τ)− δ · τ .
(3.2.5) can be rewritten as:
Π(pt) = αe
Xt − γ ∀t. (3.2.6)
3.2.2.2 Calculation of Investment Threshold and Investment Op-
tion Value without PTCs
The potential wind energy plant will make the decision to invest when
the price of electricity becomes sufficiently high. As noted by Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), the price of electricity that triggers investment will be higher
than the price that makes the NPV positive. This reflects the irreversibility of
the investment decision and the benefit of waiting for new information. The
plant will invest when X reaches, or crosses for the first time, the investment
threshold denoted by h. The stopping time, τh, is a random variable that
denotes the first time X reaches or crosses h:
τh = inf{t ≥ 0;Xt ≥ h}. (3.2.7)
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The wind energy plant faces a one-time investment cost I and discounts
future cash flows with interest rate r. Using the normalized investment cost
rI, the value of the option to invest in wind energy is:
V (x;h) = Ex[
∫ ∞
τh
e−rt(αeXt − γ − rI)dt]. (3.2.8)
The expectation in (3.2.8) is conditional on the spot price x of the Brownian
motion X. The lower bound of the integral shows the plant will incur the
investment cost and start receiving profit flows at time τh.





Let Ψ(z) = µz + σ2 z
2
2
be the Lévy exponent of Brownian motion X. The
no-bubble condition is satisfied by:
r −Ψ(1) > 0. (3.2.10)
This chapter uses the Wiener-Hopf factorization method described in
Boyarchenko and Levedorskǐi (2007) to calculate (3.2.8). Let the supremum
and infimum processes of X be defined by X t = sup0≤s≤tXs and X t =
inf0≤s≤tXs respectively. The normalized expected present value (EPV) op-














Eg(x) = E−E+g(x) = E+E−g(x). (3.2.14)
Let β± be the positive and negative roots of the characteristic equation:
r −Ψ(β) = 0. (3.2.15)










The value of the option to invest in wind energy shown in (3.2.8) can
be rewritten as:
V (x;h) = Ex[
∫ ∞
0
e−rt(αeXt − γ − rI)dt] +W (x;h)
= r−1Eg(x) +W (x;h), (3.2.18)
where g(Xt) = αe
Xt − γ − rI and:




(3.2.19) is an exit problem, where the plant exits when X reaches or crosses h
from below for the first time. Using the infinitesimal generator L, Appendix
C.1.1 shows (3.2.19) can be rewritten as,
(r − L)W (x;h) = −g(x), x < h. (3.2.20)
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The firm’s value is zero after exiting,
W (x;h) = 0, x ≥ h. (3.2.21)
Boyarchenko and Levedorskǐi (2007) prove that W (x, h) can be written in
terms of EPV-operators:
W (x;h) = r−1E+1(−∞,h)E
−(−g)(x). (3.2.22)
Using (3.2.14) and substituting (3.2.22) into (3.2.18), the value of the option
to invest in wind energy is:
V (x;h) = r−1E+E−g(x)− r−1E+1(−∞,h)E−g(x)




Using the optimal investment threshold h∗, the value of the option to invest
in wind energy is:
V (x) = r−1E+1[h∗,+∞)E
−g(x). (3.2.24)
This chapter uses the general formulas for κ±(z) and a property found








Two important properties of the EPV-operators when is g(Xt) is in the form
g(Xt) = Ge
zXt are:






To calculate h∗, find where E−g(h) = 0. h∗ solves:
E−(αeh − γ − rI) = 0. (3.2.29)
Using (3.2.27), h∗ solves:
ακ−(1)eh − γ − rI = 0. (3.2.30)
⇒ h∗ = ln[ γ + rI
ακ−(1)
], (3.2.31)
where the condition γ + rI > 0 is needed. Using (3.2.16), (3.2.24) can be
written for any x < h∗ as:




+y[ακ−(1)ex+y − γ − rI]dy. (3.2.32)
Calculating the integral and using properties (3.2.25) and (3.2.26), (3.2.32)









For any x ≥ h∗, the plant invests immediately. Using properties (3.2.13) and








3.2.3 Basic Model with Production Tax Credits
3.2.3.1 Operation Cash Flows and Profit Function with PTCs
A policy to encourage investment in renewable energy is to offer Pro-
duction Tax Credits (PTCs), denoted in the model as PTC. PTCs are a price
subsidy measured in $/kWh and are not taxable. Under the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, PTCs are currently provided for the first
10 years of operation, but I model PTCs being provided for the lifespan of the
plant. An adjustment is made during calibration of the model to reflect the
difference.
The profit function for the wind energy plant with PTCs is written as:
Π(pt) = Q ·GeXt(1− τ)−O&M(1− τ) + δ · τ + PTC ·Q ∀t. (3.2.35)
Using previous notation, α = Q · G(1 − τ) and γ = O&M(1 − τ) − δ · τ , the
profit function shown in (3.2.35) can be rewritten as:
Π(pt) = αe
Xt − γ + PTC ·Q ∀t. (3.2.36)
3.2.3.2 Calculation of Investment Threshold and Investment Op-
tion Value with PTCs
With the addition of PTCs, the value of the option to invest in wind
energy can be written as:
V (x;h) = Ex[
∫ ∞
τh
e−rt(αeXt − γ + PTC ·Q− rI)dt], (3.2.37)
where τh is the stopping time described in Section 3.2.2.2.
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The same no-bubble condition used before is imposed on the wind en-
ergy plant’s profit flow:
r −Ψ(1) > 0. (3.2.38)
The value function can again be written in the form of:
V (x;h) = r−1E+1[h,+∞)E
−g(x), (3.2.39)
where g(Xt) = αe
Xt−γ+PTC ·Q−rI. Using the optimal investment threshold
h∗, the value function is written as:
V (x) = r−1E+1[h∗,+∞)E
−g(x). (3.2.40)
To calculate h∗, find where E−g(h) = 0. h∗ solves:
E−(αeh − γ + PTC ·Q− rI) = 0. (3.2.41)
Using (3.2.27), h∗ solves:
ακ−(1)eh − γ + PTC ·Q− rI = 0. (3.2.42)
⇒ h∗ = ln[γ − PTC ·Q+ rI
ακ−(1)
], (3.2.43)
where the condition γ − PTC ·Q+ rI > 0 is needed.
Using (3.2.16), (3.2.40) can be written for any x < h∗ as:




+y[ακ−(1)ex+y − γ + PTC ·Q− rI]dy. (3.2.44)
Calculating the integral and using the properties (3.2.25) and (3.2.26), (3.2.44)










For any x ≥ h∗ the plant invests immediately. Using properties (3.2.13) and










3.2.4 Model with Regime Shifts and Jumps
3.2.4.1 Regime Shifts and Jumps Background
There is an extensive literature showing oil prices follow a stochas-
tic process with regime shifts and jumps (see Hamilton (2009) literature re-
view). Hamilton (2009) shows a strong interaction between high oil prices and
macroeconomic booms and recessions. Although oil is a small part of elec-
tricity production, oil prices have a strong correlation with electricity prices
because other fossil fuels compete with both forms of energy2. Investments
for renewable clean energy rise and fall with the price of oil (see Ball (2009)).
James Dehlsen started Clipper Windpower in 1980 when oil prices were rising,
but by 1985 oil prices dropped resulting in the loss of private financing for
wind energy (see Ball (2009)). More recent renewable energy projects are also
making their decisions based on the price of oil. Oilman T. Boone Pickens
made plans for a $10 billion wind farm in Texas when the price of crude oil
was high, but delayed investment in 2009 due to low oil prices hovering around
$50 per barrel (see Glader (2009)). The unpredictability of OPEC furthers the
2Using average annual prices from 1973-2010, a correlation value of 0.753 using nominal
prices and a correlation value of 0.450 using detrended prices between oil and electricity
is found. Data are from the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration
website: http://www.eia.doe.gov.
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uncertainty of oil, and therefore electricity prices. Ball (2009) states that fossil
fuels follow boom-and-bust periods that interrupt the development and adop-
tion of alternative energy. These boom-and-bust periods are appropriately
modeled by regime shifts and jumps.
Government policies affecting the price path of electricity is also largely
correlated with oil prices. According to IHS Global Insight, hybrid cars cur-
rently represent only 2 percent of the light-vehicle market (see Vranica (2009)).
In order to decrease the United States’ dependence on oil, the Obama admin-
istration recently accelerated the mandate for auto makers to increase the fuel
economy of cars sold in the U.S. to 35.5 miles per gallon by 2016 (see Power
and Conkey (2009)). This is the largest government-mandated transformation
of vehicles since the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Power and Conkey (2009)).
President Obama and other politicians have also proposed to cap the emissions
of greenhouse gases, and force polluters to purchase emission permits that can
be traded on the free market (see Weisman and Hughes (2009)). In addition,
the Environmental Protection Agency is allowed to use the Clean Air Act to
increase fuel-efficiency standards for automobiles (see Weisman and Hughes
(2009)). These policies could have substantial effects on the price of electric-
ity that would not be captured through geometric Brownian motion without
regime shifts and jumps.
Deregulation of electricity markets is also aptly modeled with regime
shifts and jumps. The three distinct electricity market sectors are genera-
tion, transmission, and distribution (see Fiorenzani (2006)). The transmission
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and distribution markets are usually regulated by government because they
are natural monopolies and regulation ensures generating plants can compete
fairly by having equal access to electrical grids. The purpose of deregulat-
ing the generation of electricity is to decrease the price of electricity through
competition (see Rothwell and Gomez (2003)). While microeconomic studies
forecasted deregulation would decrease prices 3 to 13 percent due to compe-
tition, no price reductions have been observed due to restructuring electricity
markets in the United States as of 2005 (see Blumsack et al. (2005)). In ad-
dition, deregulation can cause the volatility of prices to increase see(Rothwell
and Gomez (2003)). Approximately 40 percent of all electricity sold in the
United States in 2005 is sold in deregulated states, therefore many electricity
markets still face the possibility of becoming deregulated in the future (see
Blumsack et al. (2005)). The uncertainty of future deregulation and the pos-
sible change in levels and volatility of electricity prices due to deregulation is
modeled appropriately with regime shifts and jumps.
Section 3.2.4.2 and Section 3.2.4.3 develop a general real options model
for wind energy investments that incorporates regime shifts and jumps. Section
3.4 presents results for two scenarios using this model. The first scenario
assumes the current electricity market is regulated, but there is a possibility
of it becoming deregulated in the future. The second scenario assumes the
drift of the stochastic process shifts back and forth between two states due to
booms and busts of oil prices.
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3.2.4.2 Operating Cash Flows and Profit Function with Regime
Shifts and Jumps
Regime shifts and jumps are modeled with a two-state Markov chain
similarly used in Guo et al. (2005). The Markov chain Z = (Zt) with two





, where λjk is the probability of
jumping from state j to state k.
When the price of electricity follows a geometric Brownian motion with
regime shifts and jumps under the equivalent martingale measure for no ar-
bitrage pricing, pt = Gjte









where x is the spot value of X and W is the standard Wiener process. µ(j) :=
µj ∈ R and σ(j) := σj > 0 are the drift and volatility of X in state j. The
equivalent martingale measure is unique.
The profit function for each state can be written as:
Πj(pt) = αje
Xjt − γ + PTC ·Q ∀t, j = 1, 2, (3.2.48)
where:
dXjt = µjdt+ σjdWt, j = 1, 2, (3.2.49)
and αj = Q ·Gj(1− τ).
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3.2.4.3 Calculation of Investment Threshold and Investment Op-
tion Value with Regime Shifts and Jumps
A sufficient condition for the no-bubble condition in the model with






be the Lévy exponent of Brownian motion Xj. The no-bubble
condition is satisfied by:
r −Ψj(1) > 0 j = 1, 2. (3.2.50)
Let gj(X
j
t ) = αje
Xjt − γ + PTC · Q − rI. The option value of wind
energy investment with regime shifts can be written as:
Vj(x;hj) = vj(x) +Wj(x;hj), j = 1, 2, (3.2.51)






t ) + λjkvk(X
j
t ))dt], (3.2.52)
Wj(x, hj) = Ex[
∫ τhj
0
e−(r+λjk)t(−gj(Xjt ) + λjkWk(X
j
t ;hk))dt],(3.2.53)
j = 1, 2, j 6= k.
Using the state specific infinitesimal generator Lj, Appendix C.1.2
shows (3.2.52) can be rewritten as:
(r + λjk − Lj)vj(x) = gj(x) + λjkvk(x) j = 1, 2, j 6= k. (3.2.54)
For Brownian motion Xj and an arbitrary exponential function u(x) =
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To solve the system of equations described in (3.2.54), define matrices:
A = [
r + λ12 −Ψ1(1) −λ12
−λ21 r + λ21 −Ψ2(1)
], (3.2.56)
B = [
r + λ12 −λ12
−λ21 r + λ21
]. (3.2.57)
Define vectors:
C = A−1 · [ α1
α2
], (3.2.58)
D = B−1 · [ γ + rI − PTC ·Q






r + λ21 −Ψ2(1) λ12






r + λ21 λ12
λ21 r + λ12
]. (3.2.61)




] = Cex −D. (3.2.62)
The remaining part of the option value of wind energy investment
shown in (3.2.51) that needs to be solved is the exit problem Wj(x;hj). De-
note Wj(x) = sup
hj
Wj(x, hj) for j = 1, 2. The optimal stopping time is
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h∗j = arg sup
hj
Wj(x, hj) for j = 1, 2. Similarly to what is shown in Appendix
C.1.2:
(r + λjk − Lj)Wj(x) = −gj(x) + λjkWk(x), x < hj, (3.2.63)
Wj(x) = 0, x ≥ hj, (3.2.64)
j = 1, 2 j 6= k.
The boundary value problems (3.2.63) and (3.2.64) are solved numerically by
using a grid described in Appendix C.1.3 and an iteration procedure found in
Boyarchenko and Levedorskǐi (2008).
Denote h∗ij and W
i
j (x) as the optimal investment threshold and value
function in state j = 1, 2 during iteration step i = 0, 1, 2, . . . Suppose that




1 (x) that solve:
(r − L1)W 01 (x) = −g1(x), x < h∗01 , (3.2.65)
W 01 (x) = 0, x ≥ h∗01 . (3.2.66)
Then find h∗02 and W
0
2 (x) that solve:
(r + λ21 − L2)W 02 (x) = −g2(x) + λ21W 01 (x), x < h∗02 , (3.2.67)
W 02 (x) = 0, x ≥ h∗02 . (3.2.68)
For i = 1, 2, . . ., find h∗i1 and W
i
1(x) that solve:
(r + λ12 − L1)W i1(x) = −g1(x) + λ12W i−12 (x), x < hi1, (3.2.69)
W i1(x) = 0, x ≥ hi1, (3.2.70)
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and h∗i2 and W
i
2(x) that solve:
(r + λ21 − L2)W i2(x) = −g2(x) + λ21W i1(x), x < h∗i2 , (3.2.71)
W i2(x) = 0, x ≥ h∗i2 . (3.2.72)
Continue iteration until max{|W i1(x) − W i−11 (x)|, |W i2(x) − W i−12 (x)|} < ε,
where ε is the desired error magnitude. Boyarchenko and Levedorskǐi (2008)
prove the iteration procedure converges to true values.
3.3 Calibration
3.3.1 Wind Energy Output Calibration
This chapter considers the investment decision of one kWh capacity.
A normal utilization rate UR of 40% is used (see Welch and Venkateswaran
(2009)). A period in this model is one year, therefore Hrs = 8, 760. Q can
now be calculated as:
Q = UR ·Hrs
= 40% · 8, 760
= 3, 504 kWh. (3.3.1)
3.3.2 Wind Energy Investment Calibration
According to Blanco (2009), the lifespan of a wind turbine is longer
than 15-25 years, but at this time major maintenance costs are incurred and
many parts are replaced. This chapter makes the simplifying assumption that
the wind energy plant will make these repairs and never end operation. Welch
139
and Venkateswaran (2009) estimate the investment cost per total turbine kWh
capacity, denoted CapitalCost, of building a wind energy plant is $1,600. This
chapter assumes the total investment cost of a wind energy plant is the present
value of making the initial investment, CapitalCost, every 25 years.
This chapter uses a discount rate of r = 8% from Welch and Venkateswaran
(2009) and Gollier et al. (2005). The stochastic price process in this chapter is
measured in nominal prices; furthermore, the discount rate is a nominal rate.
Therefore, it is appropriate to adjust future costs by inflation. Let π = .025
be the inflation rate the plant uses to adjust future costs. The investment cost




= $2, 141.44 (3.3.2)
3.3.3 Operating Cash Flows and Profit Function Calibration
Welch and Venkateswaran (2009) use an average variable expense of
$0.005/kWh. To adjust for inflation, I use:




⇒ O&M = AV E ·Q = $25.58. (3.3.4)
Wind energy plants apply the depreciation of their investment cost I
over a 5 year depreciation schedule for tax purposes described in Welch and
Venkateswaran (2009). This chapter makes the simplifying assumption that
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the wind energy plant smooths their depreciation cost of investment I over all
future time periods for tax purposes. Therefore, the capital depreciation the
plant is able to subtract from their taxable income each year is:
δ = rI = $171.32. (3.3.5)
Following Welch and Venkateswaran (2009), the tax rate the plant faces is:
τ = 40%. (3.3.6)
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Section 1101)
extended Production Tax Credits until December 31, 2012. Currently, PTCs
are provided for the first ten years of operation at the level of $0.022/kWh
for renewable wind energy plants. This chapter models PTCs being provided







e−rt0.022·Qdt, the baseline PTCs assumption
is:
PTC = 0.022 · (1− e−10r) = $0.0121/kWh. (3.3.7)
3.3.4 Stochastic Price Process Calibration
In the basic model without regime shifts and jumps, the price of elec-
tricity is modeled as pt = Ge
Xt , where G is a positive constant and X is a
Brownian motion with drift µ and volatility σ under the unique equivalent
martingale measure for no arbitrage pricing. Using Ito’s Lemma, the GBM











is the GBM drift.
Gollier et al. (2005) and Bellamy and Sahut (2007) are two papers that
model electricity prices as GBM. Gollier et al. (2005) analyze volatility levels
of σ = 10% and σ = 20% and Bellamy and Sahut (2007) use a volatility level of
σ = 20%. The baseline volatility assumption used in the basic model without
regime shifts and jumps is σ = 10% in order to present a conservative estimate
of the errors using a NPV rule model. Multiple volatility values ranging from
5% to 25% are considered in Section 3.4.
Gollier et al. (2005) set the GBM drift to zero and Bellamy and Sahut
(2007) use set the GBM drift to µ + σ
2
2
= .05 ⇒ µ = .03. The baseline
Brownian motion drift assumption used in the basic model without regime
shifts and jumps is µ = 0.02. Therefore, the baseline GBM drift assumption






= 0.025. This chapter also considers multiple values of the GBM drift
assumption in Section 3.4. The GBM drift is discussed in Section 3.4 rather
than µ because E[pt+h|h] = pte(µ+
σ2
2
)h for h > 0. When the level of volatility
is varied, the GBM drift is held constant in order to preserve the same NPV
of the investment in order to isolate the effect of risk on investment decisions.
A wholesale price spot value of x = 0 and G = $0.04/kWh is used from
Welch and Venkateswaran (2009) for the basic model without regime shifts
and jumps: p0 = Ge
x = $0.04/kWh.
Two scenarios are analyzed in Section 3.4 using the model with regime
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shifts and jumps. The first scenario assumes the current electricity market is
regulated, but there is a possibility of it becoming deregulated in the future.
This is modeled by assuming the price of electricity starts in state 1, where
x = 0, G1 = $0.04/kWh, µ1 = .020, and σ1 = 10%. Deregulation is expected
to occur in 1
λ12
years causing a jump in the electricity price of size ζ ·100% ≤ 0
and an increase in volatility: G2 = (1 + ζ) ·G1 and σ2 = 20%. In order to keep






⇒ µ2 = .005.
Although prices theoretically should decrease after deregulation, Blumsack
et al. (2005) find no price reductions have been observed due to deregulation.
Thus, the baseline value for the jump is ζ = 0⇒ G2 = $0.04/kWh. Multiple




used for λ12 implying an expected 6 years before deregulation occurs. Multi-
ple values of λ12 are also considered in Section 3.4. It is assumed that once
the electricity market becomes deregulated, it will stay deregulated, therefore
λ21 = 0.
The second scenario analyzed using the model with regime shifts and
jumps is the GBM drift of the electricity price shifting back and forth between
two regimes due to booms and busts of oil prices. The correlation between
future oil and electricity prices can be caused by direct market interactions
or government policies encouraging electricity energy in order to become oil
independent. Figure 3.1 shows that electricity prices increase sharply when oil
prices increase sharply, but stay relatively level when oil prices drop.
Let state 1 represent electricity prices staying level and state 2 represent
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Figure 3.1: Historical Annual Oil and Retail Electricity Prices: 1973-2010
electricity prices sharply increasing. To determine baseline values for λ12 and
λ21, yearly electricity prices from 1973-2008 obtained from the Department
of Energy’s Energy Information Center are used. Although the data does
not extend earlier than 1973, Pindyck (1999) states there was a structural
change in oil prices in the year 1973. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect
there was also a structural change in the price of electricity in 1973. Looking
at historical prices of electricity, other structural changes occur in 1982, 2000,




= 0.0556 and the length of time during 1973-1981 is
used to calculate the baseline assumption λ21 =
1
9 years
= 0.1111. The sharp
increase in prices for 9 years during 2000-2008 adds support for the baseline
assumption of λ21. Multiple levels of λ12 and λ21 are considered in Section
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3.4. The volatility is assumed to be the same in each state, σ1 = σ2 = 10%,
and there are no jumps in the price process, x = 0 and ζ = 0 ⇒ G2 = G2 =
$0.04/kWh. µ1 = 0 is used for state 1 and µ2 = 0.05 is used for state 2.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Basic Model with and without Production Tax Credits Re-
sults
Table 3.1 presents the investment threshold price p∗ = Gh
∗
, the option
value, and the NPV of investing in one unit of electricity for different GBM
drift and volatility assumptions when PTCs are $0.022/kWh3. The NPV of
the investment does not depend on the volatility of electricity prices, but the
option value increases with respect to the volatility assumption to reflect higher
price levels are achievable with more volatility. The investment threshold
price increases with volatility because the benefit of waiting for uncertainty
to resolve is greater with higher levels of volatility. Thus, more volatility in
electricity prices will delay wind energy investment, but will increase the value
of the option to invest in wind energy.
The current PTCs level of $0.022/kWh is not large enough to encourage
investors to invest in wind energy immediately even though the NPV of the
investment is $584 when using baseline parameter values of σ = 20% and µ+
σ2
2
= 0.025 ⇒ µ = 0.02. Figure C.1 in Appendix C.2.1 shows the investment
3The GBM drift, µ+ σ
2
2 , depends on the volatility; therefore µ changes as you move from
left to right in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 in order to keep the GBM drift constant.
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GBM Volatility
Drift 5% 10% 15% 20%
0.0000 Threshold Price 0.0408 0.0462 0.0522 0.0590
Option Value 107 140 181 224
NPV 106 106 106 106
0.0125 Threshold Price 0.0386 0.0434 0.0492 0.0557
Option Value 301 310 342 382
NPV 301 301 301 301
0.0250 Threshold Price 0.0376 0.0415 0.0467 0.0529
Option Value 584 585 604 637
NPV 584 584 584 584
0.0375 Threshold Price 0.0371 0.0403 0.0448 0.0504
Option Value 1,033 1,033 1,043 1,067
NPV 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033
0.0500 Threshold Price 0.0369 0.0394 0.0433 0.0484
Option Value 1,858 1,858 1,862 1,878
NPV 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,858
Table 3.1: Investment Threshold Price, Option Value, Net Present Value;
0.022/kWh PTCs
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threshold and investment option value under different levels of PTCs using
baseline assumptions for other parameters in the basic model without regime
shifts and jumps. The lowest level of PTCs that induce immediate investment
in wind energy is $.0235/kWh, which is 7 percent higher than the current
level. Table 3.1 shows the price volatility would need to decrease to σ = 5%
when the GBM drift is 0.025 in order for the investment threshold price to be
below the current spot price. If the GBM drift assumption increased to 0.05,
immediate investment would occur if the volatility was less than or equal to
10%.
Welch and Venkateswaran (2009) conclude that PTCs could be lowered
to $0.01/kWh and plants would still immediately invest using the naive NPV
rule. Results in Table 3.1 show that even when the NPV of an investment is
positive, potential wind energy plants may delay investment to resolve uncer-
tainty. In fact, the NPV of the investment is positive for all values of GBM
drift and volatility considered in Table 3.1 even though only 5 out of the 20
parameter combinations would result in immediate investment when PTCs are
$0.022/kWh.
Table 3.2 presents the investment threshold price, the option value,
and the NPV of investing in one unit of electricity for different GBM drift
and volatility assumptions in the absence of PTCs. Under baseline values of
GBM drift and volatility, the NPV of the investment in the absence of PTCs
is $53 > 0, but the investment threshold price is $0.0648/kWh. The expected
time of investment, known as the stopping time, is greater than 24 years
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away when the investment threshold price is $0.0648/kWh. The fact that
Welch and Venkateswaran (2009) calculate a negative NPV for wind energy
investment in the absence of PTCs implies that the difference between Welch
and Venkateswaran (2009) concluding PTCs could be lowered to $0.01/kWh
and my results concluding that PTCs need to be raised to $0.0235/kWh is due
to Welch and Venkateswaran (2009) ignoring the option to delay investment
and not due to my model using less favorable parameters. Not only do baseline
assumptions not cause immediate investment in the absence of PTCs, but no
GBM drift and volatility combination considered in Table 3.2 would cause
immediate investment in the absence of PTCs.
Future technology improvements can reduce capital costs and improve
utilization rates, therefore it is important to understand how these improve-
ments affect the necessity for PTCs (see Blanco (2009)). My results also
differ greatly from Welch and Venkateswaran (2009) when considering the
ability to remove PTCs if there are significant cost or efficiency improvements.
Welch and Venkateswaran (2009) state that PTCs can be completely removed
if CapitalCost ≤ $1, 200. Figure C.5 in Appendix C.2.2 shows the invest-
ment threshold and investment option value under different CapitalCost as-
sumptions using baseline assumptions for other parameters in the basic model
without regime shifts and jumps and setting PTC = 0. Some level of PTCs is
needed for immediate investment even when CapitalCost = $1, 000/kWh. In
fact, capital costs need to be reduced to CapitalCost = $895/kWh in order
to induce immediate investments without PTCs. This is a 44 percent decrease
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GBM Volatility
Drift 5% 10% 15% 20%
0.0000 Threshold Price 0.0636 0.0721 0.0815 0.0921
Option Value 4 29 68 112
NPV -425 -425 -425 -425
0.0125 Threshold Price 0.0603 0.0678 0.0768 0.0870
Option Value 59 110 167 224
NPV -230 -230 -230 -230
0.0250 Threshold Price 0.0587 0.0648 0.0729 0.0825
Option Value 251 304 366 431
NPV 53 53 53 53
0.0375 Threshold Price 0.0580 0.0628 0.0699 0.0788
Option Value 648 691 749 813
NPV 503 503 503 503
0.0500 Threshold Price 0.0575 0.0615 0.0676 0.0756
Option Value 1,441 1,473 1,522 1,582
NPV 1,327 1,327 1,327 1,327
Table 3.2: Investment Threshold Price, Option Value, Net Present Value; No
PTCs
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from the current cost level, therefore it is unrealistic that cost improvements
alone can induce immediate investment without PTCs.
Similarly, reasonable efficiency improvements will not induce immedi-
ate investment without the assistance of PTCs. Welch and Venkateswaran
(2009) state that PTCs can be completely removed if UR ≥ 53%. Figure
C.9 in Appendix C.2.3 shows the investment threshold and investment option
value under different UR assumptions using baseline assumptions for other
parameters in the basic model without regime shifts and jumps and setting
PTC = 0. Some level of PTCs is needed for immediate investment even when
UR = 60%. In fact, utilization rates need to increase to UR = 71% in order to
induce immediate investments without PTCs. This is a 77.5 percent increase
from the current utilization rate. A large portion of utilization rates depend
on the weather, therefore it is unrealistic that efficiency improvements alone
can induce immediate investment without PTCs.
Different cost improvement and turbine efficiency combinations are
analyzed. Improving the efficiency to UR = 45% requires CapitalCost ≤
$1, 008/kWh to induce investment in the current period without PTCs. Im-
proving the efficiency to UR = 50% requires CapitalCost ≤ $1, 120/kWh
and UR = 55% requires CapitalCost ≤ $1, 230/kWh when PTC = 0. It
is unlikely that utilization rates would increase by 37.5 percent and capital
costs would decrease by 23 percent such that UR = 55% and CapitalCost =
$1, 230/kWh. Therefore, PTCs are still needed to induce immediate invest-
ment under reasonable cost and efficiency improvements.
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3.4.2 Model with Regime Shifts and Jumps Results
The first scenario analyzed using the model with regime shifts and
jumps is a possibility of the electricity market becoming deregulated in the
future. Table 3.3 shows the investment threshold price, option value, and
NPV for the investment of one unit of electricity using different values of λ12
and various jump levels in the price process when PTCs are $0.022/kWh.
Baseline assumptions are G1 = $0.04/kWh, ζ = 0 ⇒ G2 = $0.04/kWh,






= .025, and λ21 = 0.
Under no level of ζ and λ12 is the current PTCs level large enough for
immediate investment. Intuitively, the investment threshold is inversely re-
lated to ζ, whereas the option value and NPV of the investment are increasing
with respect to ζ. The NPV of the investment is not affected by the increase
in volatility in state 2, therefore the NPV of the investment is non-increasing
with respect to λ12. The relationship between the option value and λ12 de-
pends on the size of the jump. The negative jump in the price in the state
2 decreases the value of the investment option, but the increase in volatility
increases the investment option. For smaller jumps in magnitude, the effect
of a higher volatility in state 2 outweighs the effect of a negative jump in the
electricity prices and the option value is increasing with respect to λ12. For
more negative jumps, the relationship between λ12 and the option value is non-
monotonic. As λ12 initially decreases, the option value decreases reflecting the
volatility effect. But at a certain level of λ12, the option value increases as λ12













0.0% Investment Threshold 0.0468 0.0454 0.0447 0.0442 0.0438
Option Value 614 604 599 596 594
NPV 584 584 584 584 584
-2.5% Investment Threshold 0.0475 0.0460 0.0451 0.0446 0.0442
Option Value 585 577 573 572 571
NPV 549 552 555 557 559
-5.00% Investment Threshold 0.0482 0.0465 0.0456 0.0450 0.0445
Option Value 557 550 547 547 548
NPV 515 521 526 531 534
-7.50% Investment Threshold 0.0490 0.0471 0.0461 0.0454 0.0448
Option Value 530 523 522 524 526
NPV 480 490 497 504 510
-10.00% Investment Threshold 0.0498 0.0477 0.0466 0.0458 0.0452
Option Value 503 497 498 500 504
NPV 446 458 469 477 485
-12.50% Investment Threshold 0.0507 0.0484 0.0471 0.0462 0.0456
Option Value 477 472 473 477 482
NPV 411 427 440 451 460
Table 3.3: Investment Threshold Price, Option Value, Net Present Value;
Deregulation
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Figure C.2 in Appendix C.2.1 shows the investment threshold and
investment option value under different levels of PTCs using baseline as-
sumptions for other parameters in the model representing deregulation. The
lowest level of PTCs that induce immediate investment in wind energy is
$.0261/kWh, which is 18.6 percent higher than the current level.
Figure C.6 in Appendix C.2.2 shows the investment threshold and in-
vestment option value under different CapitalCost assumptions using baseline
assumptions for other parameters in the model representing deregulation and
setting PTC = 0. As shown, when CapitalCost = $1, 000/kWh, PTCs are
still needed for immediate investment. In fact, capital costs need to be reduced
to CapitalCost = $818/kWh in order to induce immediate investments with-
out PTCs. This is a 49 percent decrease from the current cost level, therefore
it is unrealistic that cost improvements alone can induce immediate investment
without PTCs.
Figure C.10 in Appendix C.2.3 shows the investment threshold and
investment option value under different UR assumptions using baseline as-
sumptions for other parameters in the model representing deregulation and
setting PTC = 0. As shown, when UR = 60%, PTCs are still needed for im-
mediate investment. In fact, utilization rates need to increase to UR = 78% in
order to induce immediate investments without PTCs. This is a 95 percent in-
crease from the current utilization rate, therefore it is unrealistic that efficiency
improvements alone can induce immediate investment without PTCs.
Different cost improvement and turbine efficiency combinations are
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analyzed. Improving the efficiency to UR = 45% requires CapitalCost ≤
$918/kWh to induce investment in the current period without PTCs. Im-
proving the efficiency to UR = 50% requires CapitalCost ≤ $1, 020/kWh and
UR = 55% requires CapitalCost ≤ $1, 123/kWh when PTC = 0. Therefore,
PTCs are still needed to induce immediate investment under reasonable cost
and efficiency improvements.
The second scenario analyzed using the model with regime shifts and
jumps is the GBM drift of the electricity price shifting back and forth between
two regimes due to booms and busts of oil prices. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5
show the investment threshold price, option value, and NPV for the investment
of one unit of electricity in state 1 and state 2 respectively when PTCs are
0.022/kWh. Both Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 use baseline assumptions G1 =













. Multiple values of λ12 and λ21
are considered.
Because the two states only differ by a more favorable GBM drift in
state 2, the investment threshold is lower in state 2 and the option value and
NPV is higher in state 2. As expected, the investment threshold is decreasing
with respect to λ12 and increasing with respect to λ21 in both states. Further-
more, the option value and NPV of the investment are increasing with respect
to λ12 and decreasing with respect to λ21 in both states.
Under no assumption of λ21 and λ12 is the current PTCs level large
















Investment Threshold 0.0447 0.0444 0.0442 0.0441 0.0440
Option Value 264 362 438 498 547
NPV 245 346 423 485 534
1
15
Investment Threshold 0.0450 0.0447 0.0445 0.0444 0.0443
Option Value 240 322 386 438 481
NPV 219 303 370 422 466
1
18
Investment Threshold 0.0451 0.0448 0.0447 0.0446 0.0446
Option Value 224 294 350 396 434
NPV 201 274 331 378 416
1
21
Investment Threshold 0.0453 0.0450 0.0449 0.0448 0.0447
Option Value 212 273 323 364 398
NPV 188 252 303 344 379
1
24
Investment Threshold 0.0454 0.0451 0.0450 0.0449 0.0449
Option Value 203 257 302 339 370
NPV 178 235 280 318 350
Table 3.4: Investment Threshold Price, Option Value, Net Present Value;
















Investment Threshold 0.0426 0.0415 0.0410 0.0406 0.0404
Option Value 382 578 729 848 945
NPV 378 577 728 848 945
1
15
Investment Threshold 0.0427 0.0416 0.0411 0.0408 0.0405
Option Value 359 542 687 803 898
NPV 354 541 686 802 898
1
18
Investment Threshold 0.0429 0.0418 0.0412 0.0408 0.0406
Option Value 343 517 657 770 864
NPV 338 515 656 770 864
1
21
Investment Threshold 0.0429 0.0418 0.0413 0.0409 0.0407
Option Value 332 499 634 745 838
NPV 326 497 633 745 838
1
24
Investment Threshold 0.0430 0.0419 0.0413 0.0410 0.0407
Option Value 323 485 617 726 818
NPV 317 482 616 726 818
Table 3.5: Investment Threshold Price, Option Value, Net Present Value;
Booms and Busts in Oil Prices State 2
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in Appendix C.2.1 show the investment threshold and investment option value
under different levels of PTCs using baseline assumptions for other param-
eters in the model representing boom and busts of oil prices. The lowest
level of PTCs that induce immediate investment in wind energy in state 1 is
$.0258/kWh, which is 17.3 percent higher than the current level. The lowest
level of PTCs that induce immediate investment in wind energy in state 2 is
$.0230/kWh, which is 4.5 percent higher than the current level.
Figure C.7 and Figure C.8 in Appendix C.2.2 show the investment
threshold and investment option value under different CapitalCost assump-
tions using baseline assumptions for other parameters in the model represent-
ing boom and busts of oil prices and setting PTC = 0. PTCs are needed for
immediate investment in either state when CapitalCost = $1, 000/kWh. In
fact, capital costs need to be reduced to CapitalCost = $824/kWh in state
1 and CapitalCost = $911/kWh in state 2 in order to induce immediate
investments without PTCs. This is a 48.5 percent and 43 percent decrease
respectively from the current cost level, therefore it is unrealistic that cost
improvements alone can induce immediate investment without PTCs.
Figure C.11 and Figure C.12 in Appendix C.2.3 show the investment
threshold and investment option value under different UR assumptions using
baseline assumptions for other parameters in the model representing boom
and busts of oil prices and setting PTC = 0. PTCs are needed for immediate
investment in either state when UR = 60%. In fact, utilization rates need to
increase to UR = 78% in state 1 and UR = 70% in state 2 in order to induce
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immediate investments without PTCs. This is a 95 percent and 75 percent
increase respectively from the current utilization rate, therefore it is unrealistic
that efficiency improvements alone can induce immediate investment without
PTCs.
Different cost improvement and turbine efficiency combinations are
analyzed. Improving the efficiency to UR = 45% requires CapitalCost ≤
$929/kWh in state 1 and CapitalCost ≤ $1, 025/kWh in state 2 to in-
duce investment in the current period without PTCs. Improving the effi-
ciency to UR = 50% requires CapitalCost ≤ $1, 031/kWh in state 1 and
CapitalCost ≤ $1, 139/kWh in state 2. Improving the efficiency to UR = 55%
requires CapitalCost ≤ $1, 136/kWh in state 1 CapitalCost ≤ $1, 253/kWh
in state 2. The current regime is state 1, therefore, PTCs are still needed to
induce immediate investment under reasonable cost and efficiency improve-
ments. If the current environment were to switch to a boom in oil prices, the
improvements in utilization rate and capital cost are still greater than what
can likely occur.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyzed the investment decision of a wind energy plant
based on investment cost, production efficiency, government policy, current
price of electricity, and beliefs on future electricity prices. In contrast to Welch
and Venkateswaran (2009), who argue PTCs can be lowered to $0.01/kWh,
my results showed that potential wind energy plants will most likely not invest
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even at current PTCs levels of $0.022/kWh. Although the NPV of the invest-
ment is positive using baseline assumptions, potential wind energy plants will
defer their decision in order to resolve uncertainty. The basic model in this
chapter predicted a PTCs level of $0.0235/kWh is needed to induce immediate
investment in wind energy.
In addition to a basic model using geometric Brownian motion, this
chapter analyzed two scenarios using a stochastic price process with regime
shifts and jumps. The first scenario assumed the current electricity market is
regulated, but there is a possibility of it becoming deregulated in the future.
The second scenario assumed the GBM drift of the electricity price shifts
back and forth between two regimes due to booms and busts of oil prices. In
both scenarios, the current level of PTCs is not great enough for immediate
investment in wind energy.
Welch and Venkateswaran (2009) state that PTCs may be removed
with reasonable cost and efficiency improvements, but my results using a real
options model showed otherwise. Multiple cost and efficiency scenarios were
analyzed under the different models. In all cases, the improvements in cost
and efficiency are greater than what is reasonable.
In addition to providing useful results for policy makers encouraging
renewable energy, this chapter clearly shows a real options model is necessary
to analyze the need for PTCs in wind energy. Furthermore, it shows the
errors obtained using the NPV rule to analyze an irreversible investment under





A.1 Summary of Eight Cases Examined
1. Traditional Fee Structure; NFBm growth depends on Xm(1)
2. Performance-Based Fee Structure; NFBm growth depends on Xm(1)
3. Traditional Fee Structure; NFBm growth depends on relative value of
Xm(1) compared to X−m(1)
4. Performance-Based Fee Structure; NFBm growth depends on relative
value of Xm(1) compared to X−m(1)
5. Traditional Fee Structure; NFBm growth depends on θ̂m
6. Performance-Based Fee Structure; NFBm growth depends on θ̂m
7. Traditional Fee Structure; NFBm growth depends on relative value of
θ̂m compared to θ̂−m
8. Performance-Based Fee Structure; NFBm growth depends on relative








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.3.1 Calculations Involving One Private Signal and State of the
World
This section shows calculations for the posterior probabilities of being
the talented type and conditional state probabilities involving only one private
signal and state of the world in the information set.
Given that a fund manager does not know what type she is, using
Bayes’ Law she calculates the following probabilities for state ωG1 occurring











































, ωG1) denote the posterior probability that Fund Manager



















The numerator represents the probability of Fund Manager m being talented,
observing SmG0 and state ωG1 occurring. The prior probability of Fund Man-
ager m being talented is simply θ. Given that Fund Manager m is talented,






nominator also includes the probability of Fund Manager m being untalented,
observing SmG0 , and state ωG1 occuring. The prior probability of Fund Man-
ager m being untalented is 1− θ. Given that Fund Manager m is untalented,





































2θ(1− p) + (1− θ)
. (A.3.7)
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A.3.2 Calculations Involving Both Private Signals and State of the
World
This section shows calculations for the posterior probabilities of being
the talented type and conditional state probabilities involving both private
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, SmG0 , ωG1) denote the posterior probability that Fund Man-
ager m is talented given S−m(0) = S−mB0 , S
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To understand (A.3.14), there are three possible combinations of fund
manager ability: (U−m, Tm), (T−m, Um), and (U−m, Um). Note that (T−m, Tm)
is not a possibility, because by assumption the fund managers would have re-
ceived the same signal with certainty. Therefore, θ̂∗∗m (S
−m
B0
, SmG0 , ωG1) represents
the probability of (U−m, Tm) conditioning on the event (S
−m
B0
, SmG0 , ωG1). The




) is observed in state ωG1 with probability
1
2
p. This reasoning ex-
plains the numerator and the first term of the denominator in (A.3.14). The
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A.3.3 Calculations Involving Both Private Signals, but No Realized
State of the World
This section shows calculations for the posterior probabilities of be-
ing the talented type and conditional state probabilities involving only both
private signals in the information set.
Without conditioning on the realized state, both fund managers earn
the same updated probability of being talented when their private signals in
the first period are the equal. Similarly, both fund managers earn the same
updated probability of being talented when their private signals in the first
period are not equal. Denote θ̂†j , j = E,D, as the posterior probability that a
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fund manager is talented when the private signals are equal and when private
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Using θ̂†E and θ̂
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, j = E,D, (A.3.22)
⇒ P(ωB2|S1B1 , S
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), j = E,D, (A.3.25)
P(ωG2|SB1 , θ̂
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− p), j = E,D, (A.3.26)








− p), j = E,D. (A.3.27)
It is also helpful to calculate the probabilities for certain private signal

























































(1− θ̂†2j ), j = E,D. (A.3.29)
E0[X2(2)|S1(0), S2(0)] can be rewritten as E0[X2(2)|θ̂†j ]. There is an
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equal probability that Fund Manager 2 will be the first fund manager to invest
in the second period or the second fund manager in the second period to
invest. Refer to the chosen fund manager to move first as Fund Manager l. As
mentioned in Section 1.2.3, regardless of θ̂1 and θ̂2, Fund Manager 2 maximizes
E1[X2(2)|S1(1), S2(1), θ̂1, θ̂2, l = 2] by choosing:
• C2(1) = Investment R21 when S1(1) = S1G1 ,
• C2(1) = Investment S21 when S1(1) = S1B1 .
Fund Manager 2 maximizes E1[X2(2)|S1(1), S2(1), θ̂1, θ̂2, l = 1] by choosing:
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r(1 + θ̂†2j ), j = E,D. (A.3.30)
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E0[X2(2)|θ̂†j , l = 2] = rG · P(ωG2|SG1 , θ̂
†
j) · P(SG1 |θ̂
†
j)
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r(3 + θ̂†2j ), j = E,D. (A.3.32)
A.3.4 Calculations Involving One Private Signal, but No Realized
State of the World
This section calculates E0[X l(2)|S1(0)], which is the expected return in
the second period by Fund Manager 1 who can only condition on the signal
she received in the first period. As shown in 1.2.13, a fund manager does not
learn anything about her type when conditioning only on her private signal.
Therefore, E0[X l(2)|S1(0)] = E0[X l(2)|θ]. The calculation is the same that is





E0[X2(2)|θ, l = 1] +
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Metropolitan Area 2000Q4 2005Q4 2010Q4
New York City 267 481 505
San Francisco 87 120 133
Boston 89 122 151
Chicago 73 108 126
Los Angeles 61 83 91
Philadelphia 46 71 70
Baltimore/Washington DC 40 55 59
London 13 34 62
Dallas/Fort Worth 17 37 42
Minneapolis 22 28 34
Toronto 5 21 41
Houston 22 32 30
Milwaukee 28 32 42
Atlanta 22 30 38
Richmond 18 21 33
Total 810 1,275 1,457
Table B.1: Institution Count By Metropolitan Area
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Institution Type 2000Q4 2005Q4 2010Q4
Investment Adviser 539 743 867
Hedge Fund Company 132 356 409
Bank Management Division 66 82 77
Mutual Fund Manager 44 62 76
Insurance Management Division 29 32 28
Total 810 1,275 1,457
Table B.2: Institution Count By Institution Type
Metropolitan Area 2000Q4 2005Q4 2010Q4
New York City 260 472 498
San Francisco 85 117 130
Boston 83 115 144
Chicago 72 106 125
Los Angeles 60 81 88
Philadelphia 45 70 69
Baltimore/Washington DC 39 54 58
London 13 34 61
Dallas/Fort Worth 17 37 42
Minneapolis 22 28 34
Toronto 5 21 40
Houston 22 32 30
Milwaukee 28 32 42
Atlanta 21 29 37
Richmond 18 21 33
Total 790 1,249 1,431
Table B.3: Institution Count By Metropolitan Area (Exclude Over $50 Billion
Equity)
176
Institution Type 2000Q4 2005Q4 2010Q4
Investment Adviser 534 735 856
Hedge Fund Company 132 356 409
Bank Management Division 61 76 73
Mutual Fund Manager 34 50 65
Insurance Management Division 29 32 28
Total 790 1,249 1,431





















































































































































































































































































































































































Institution Type 2000Q4 2005Q4 2010Q4
Investment Adviser 1,691 2,412 2,166
Hedge Fund Company 490 1,015 1,061
Bank Management Division 3,713 4,390 5,303
Mutual Fund Manager 5,507 8,154 7,832
Insurance Management Division 3,781 4,089 7,038
All 1,888 2,407 2,363
Table B.6: Mean Market Cap ($ Millions) By Institution Type (Exclude Over
$50 Billion Equity)
Institution Type 2000Q4 2005Q4 2010Q4
Investment Adviser 141 205 200
Hedge Fund Company 65 112 108
Bank Management Division 442 607 579
Mutual Fund Manager 581 692 572
Insurance Management Division 323 407 573
All 183 233 221
Table B.7: Mean Number of Equity Holdings By Institution Type
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Institution Type 2000Q4 2005Q4 2010Q4
Investment Adviser 131 190 184
Hedge Fund Company 65 112 108
Bank Management Division 324 444 471
Mutual Fund Manager 300 348 322
Insurance Management Division 323 407 573
All 149 195 190
Table B.8: Mean Number of Equity Holdings By Institution Type (Exclude
Over $50 Billion Equity)
Institution Type 2000Q4 2005Q4 2010Q4
Investment Adviser 7.12 6.14 6.31
Hedge Fund Company 17.62 13.55 13.02
Bank Management Division 5.52 4.23 5.69
Mutual Fund Manager 6.94 6.19 5.70
Insurance Management Division 6.38 5.32 5.59
All 8.72 8.12 8.15
Table B.9: Mean Quarterly Turnover Rate By Institution Type (Exclude Over
$50 Billion Equity)
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Institution Type 2000Q4 2005Q4 2010Q4
Investment Adviser 3.43 2.83 3.24
Hedge Fund Company 13.47 10.58 9.82
Bank Management Division 1.33 1.97 1.55
Mutual Fund Manager 2.41 2.65 2.20
Insurance Management Division 3.45 1.63 1.80
All 4.83 4.94 4.91
Table B.10: Mean Quarterly Turnover Rate By Institution Type (Major Port-
folio Changes)
Institution Type 2000Q4 2005Q4 2010Q4
Investment Adviser 3.46 2.86 3.28
Hedge Fund Company 13.47 10.58 9.82
Bank Management Division 1.43 2.12 1.64
Mutual Fund Manager 2.88 3.25 2.54
Insurance Management Division 3.45 1.63 1.80
All 4.95 5.04 5.00
Table B.11: Mean Quarterly Turnover Rate By Institution Type (Exclude
Over $50 Billion Equity; Major Portfolio Changes)
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B.2 Results by Network
LSV Herding Statistic
Institution Type LSV Herding Statistic (Major Portfolio Changes)
























Table B.12: Mean LSV Herding Statistics By 5 Type Networks: † Statistically
significant at the 10% level, * Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** Statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level
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LSV Herding Statistic
Institution Type LSV Herding Statistic (Major Portfolio Changes)
























Table B.13: Mean LSV Herding Statistics By 5 Type Networks (Exclude Over
$50 Billion Equity): † Statistically significant at the 10% level, * Statistically significant
at the 5% level, ** Statistically significant at the 1% level
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LSV Herding Statistic
Metropolitan Area LSV Herding Statistic (Major Portfolio Changes)




















Table B.14: Mean LSV Herding Statistics By 15 Metro Networks (1 of 3):
† Statistically significant at the 10% level, * Statistically significant at the 5% level, **
Statistically significant at the 1% level
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LSV Herding Statistic





















Table B.15: Mean LSV Herding Statistics By 15 Metro Networks (2 of 3):
† Statistically significant at the 10% level, * Statistically significant at the 5% level, **
Statistically significant at the 1% level
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LSV Herding Statistic

























Table B.16: Mean LSV Herding Statistics By 15 Metro Networks (3 of 3):
† Statistically significant at the 10% level, * Statistically significant at the 5% level, **
Statistically significant at the 1% level
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LSV Herding Statistic
Metropolitan Area LSV Herding Statistic (Major Portfolio Changes)




















Table B.17: Mean LSV Herding Statistics By 15 Metro Networks (Exclude
Over $50 Billion Equity) (1 of 3): † Statistically significant at the 10% level, *
Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** Statistically significant at the 1% level
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LSV Herding Statistic





















Table B.18: Mean LSV Herding Statistics By 15 Metro Networks (Exclude
Over $50 Billion Equity) (2 of 3): † Statistically significant at the 10% level, *
Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** Statistically significant at the 1% level
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LSV Herding Statistic

























Table B.19: Mean LSV Herding Statistics By 15 Metro Networks (Exclude
Over $50 Billion Equity) (3 of 3): † Statistically significant at the 10% level, *


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.3 Results by Market Capitalization and VIX Quin-
tiles
Market Cap VIX Quintile
Quintile 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) All
1 (smallest) 1.551** 3.155** 2.742** 2.444** 6.150** 3.105**
Buy 0.557 2.706* 0.120 -2.222† -0.699 0.376
Sell 2.379** 3.533** 4.619** 5.470** 9.447** 5.034**
(Stock-Quarters) (392) (271) (350) (183) (277) (1,473)
2 1.688** 2.886** 2.150** 0.707** 3.177** 2.189**
Buy 1.427** 2.602** 2.269** 0.237 3.018** 1.986**
Sell 1.950** 3.131** 2.036** 1.177** 3.330** 2.382**
(Stock-Quarters) (5,375) (4,042) (4,257) (2,187) (3,321) (19,182)
3 1.674** 2.066** 1.575** 0.994** 1.799** 1.684**
Buy 2.729** 3.565** 2.633** 1.714** 2.716** 2.776**
Sell 0.007 -0.048 0.180† -0.026 0.518** 0.117*
(Stock-Quarters) (18,219) (14,568) (12,732) (7,643) (11,209) (64,371)
4 1.660** 1.520** 1.454** 1.159** 1.531** 1.494**
Buy 2.385** 2.564** 2.267** 1.938** 2.177** 2.298**
Sell 0.677** 0.127† 0.380** 0.061 0.671** 0.410**
(Stock-Quarters) (29,253) (24,471) (21,151) (16,059) (20,627) (111,561)
5 (largest) 2.134** 1.829** 1.659** 1.354** 1.346** 1.698**
Buy 2.200** 2.026** 1.841** 1.342** 1.263** 1.772**
Sell 2.072** 1.649** 1.488** 1.366** 1.425** 1.629**
(Stock-Quarters) (47,793) (43,827) (38,952) (32,055) (39,830) (202,457)
All 1.888** 1.835** 1.621** 1.232** 1.563** 1.668**
Buy 2.323** 2.506** 2.125** 1.532** 1.844** 2.119**
Sell 1.385** 1.104** 1.071** 0.899** 1.252** 1.165**
(Stock-Quarters) (101,032) (87,179) (77,442) (58,127) (75,264) (399,044)
Table B.36: 5 Type Networks Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistics By Mar-
ket Cap and VIX Quintiles: † Statistically significant at the 10% level, * Statistically
significant at the 5% level, ** Statistically significant at the 1% level
206
Market Cap VIX Quintile
Quintile 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) All
1 (smallest) 1.403* 2.705** 0.742 0.826 2.420** 1.593**
Buy 1.516† 3.747** -1.154 -2.962* -1.727† 0.207
Sell 1.305† 1.780† 2.111* 3.633** 5.037** 2.659**
(Stock-Quarters) (279) (187) (248) (141) (199) (1,054)
2 1.290** 2.111** 1.465** 0.936** 1.736** 1.536**
Buy 2.053** 2.620** 1.228** 0.534 1.192** 1.695**
Sell 0.435† 1.573** 1.674** 1.327** 2.251** 1.376**
(Stock-Quarters) (3,566) (2,511) (2,615) (1,351) (2,137) (12,180)
3 1.764** 1.741** 1.394** 0.962** 1.431** 1.523**
Buy 3.113** 2.766** 1.862** 1.476** 1.509** 2.302**
Sell -0.157 0.457** 0.835** 0.330† 1.342** 0.543**
(Stock-Quarters) (10,429) (8,255) (7,772) (4,720) (7,328) (38,504)
4 1.685** 1.430** 1.343** 1.097** 1.142** 1.428**
Buy 2.623** 2.185** 1.791** 1.863** 1.744** 2.090**
Sell 0.560** 0.447** 0.814** 0.131 1.017** 0.617**
(Stock-Quarters) (21,905) (19,053) (16,732) (12,009) (16,711) (86,410)
5 (largest) 2.023** 1.696** 1.549** 1.205** 1.273** 1.583**
Buy 2.835** 2.048** 1.928** 1.444** 1.419** 1.883**
Sell 1.664** 1.349** 1.161** 0.969** 1.124** 1.283**
(Stock-Quarters) (44,688) (41,383) (37,001) (29,940) (37,867) (190,879)
All 1.863** 1.647** 1.470** 1.146** 1.346** 1.533**
Buy 2.540** 2.200** 1.847** 1.525** 1.504** 1.982**
Sell 1.121** 1.043** 1.065** 0.739** 1.177** 1.048**
(Stock-Quarters) (80,867) (71,389) (64,368) (48,161) (64,242) (329,027)
Table B.37: 5 Type Networks Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistics By Mar-
ket Cap and VIX Quintiles (Exclude Over $50 Billion Equity): † Statistically
significant at the 10% level, * Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** Statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level
207
Market Cap VIX Quintile
Quintile 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) All
1 (smallest) 11.955** 13.181** 12.430** 20.784** 12.757** 13.334**
Buy 10.331† 15.050** 9.252* -5.885 6.207 9.001**
Sell 12.806** 11.992* 14.902** 25.229** 14.758** 15.338**
(Stock-Quarters) (32) (18) (32) (14) (47) (143)
2 4.435** 7.677** 7.854** 7.455** 6.698** 6.578**
Buy 3.651** 4.666** 6.814** 4.021* 8.102** 5.564**
Sell 4.961** 9.397** 8.612** 9.669** 5.409** 7.285**
(Stock-Quarters) (844) (685) (641) (199) (539) (2,908)
3 3.829** 4.934** 4.746** 5.044** 5.041** 4.567**
Buy 4.818** 4.877** 5.231** 5.233** 6.473** 5.235**
Sell 2.803** 4.990** 4.229** 4.871** 3.379** 3.876**
(Stock-Quarters) (4,705) (3,261) (2,952) (1,291) (2,377) (14,586)
4 3.687** 3.819** 4.222** 4.072** 3.959** 3.910**
Buy 4.195** 3.718** 4.297** 4.406** 4.422** 4.173**
Sell 3.195** 3.921** 4.151** 3.760** 3.485** 3.654**
(Stock-Quarters) (10,657) (7,678) (6,873) (3,944) (6,118) (35,270)
5 (largest) 3.536** 3.682** 3.742** 3.569** 3.608** 3.627**
Buy 3.695** 3.637** 3.700** 3.742** 3.322** 3.619**
Sell 3.378** 3.730** 3.786** 3.397** 3.884** 3.636**
(Stock-Quarters) (19,412) (16,450) (15,205) (10,639) (14,813) (76,519)
All 3.649** 3.969** 4.099** 3.874** 3.928** 3.887**
Buy 4.263** 4.231** 3.792** 4.210** 4.111** 3.995**
Sell 3.655** 3.860** 4.469** 3.734** 3.882** 3.781**
(Stock-Quarters) (35,650) (28,092) (25,703) (16,087) (23,894) (129,426)
Table B.38: 5 Type Networks Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistics By Mar-
ket Cap and VIX Quintiles (Major Portfolio Changes): † Statistically significant
at the 10% level, * Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** Statistically significant at the
1% level
208
Market Cap VIX Quintile
Quintile 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) All
1 (smallest) 10.089** 13.251** 10.226** 17.332** 10.975** 11,613**
Buy 14.972* 14.789* 4.110 -5.792 0.380 6.723*
Sell 6.709† 12.397* 14.930** 21.957** 14.393** 13.929**
(Stock-Quarters) (22) (14) (23) (12) (41) (112)
2 3.712** 6.210** 7.153** 6.633** 5.687** 5.639**
Buy 3.645** 3.740** 6.224** 3.605* 5.902** 4.722**
Sell 3.758** 7.815** 7.760** 8.642** 5.479** 6.289**
(Stock-Quarters) (701) (561) (552) (173) (464) (2,451)
3 3.472** 4.615** 4.264** 4.873** 4.685** 4.211**
Buy 4.448** 4.424** 4.249** 4.755** 5.676** 4.649**
Sell 2.489** 4.794** 4.280** 4.976** 3.499** 3.768**
(Stock-Quarters) (4,255) (2,894) (2,669) (1,202) (2,195) (13,215)
4 3.556** 3.639** 4.031** 4.155** 3.980** 3.808**
Buy 4.095** 3.474** 3.963** 4.492** 4.162** 3.989**
Sell 3.039** 3.805** 4.096** 3.847** 3.796** 3.633**
(Stock-Quarters) (10,033) (7,183) (6,504) (3,738) (5,841) (33,299)
5 (largest) 3.522** 3.649** 3.669** 3.553** 3.559** 3.590**
Buy 3.654** 3.698** 3.538** 3.777** 3.313** 3.592**
Sell 3.389** 3.601** 3.809** 3.331** 3.840** 3.597**
(Stock-Quarters) (18,887) (16,003) (14,766) (10,394) (14,487) (74,537)
All 3.534** 3.810** 3.915** 3.845** 3.829** 3.763**
Buy 3.889** 3.719** 3.773** 4.013** 3.824** 3.832**
Sell 3.184** 3.903** 4.059** 3.685** 3.862** 3.700**
(Stock-Quarters) (33,898) (26,655) (24,514) (15,519) (23,028) (123,614)
Table B.39: 5 Type Networks Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistics By Mar-
ket Cap and VIX Quintiles (Exclude Over $50 Billion Equity; Major Portfolio
Changes): † Statistically significant at the 10% level, * Statistically significant at the 5%
level, ** Statistically significant at the 1% level
209
Market Cap VIX Quintile
Quintile 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) All
1 (smallest) 2.133* 0.055 1.980* 2.026 5.785** 2.294**
Buy 1.169 0.414 0.787 0.752 -0.452 0.638
Sell 2.818* -0.328 3.619** 3.059 8.762** 3.741**
(Stock-Quarters) (195) (153) (197) (67) (130) (742)
2 1.228** 2.327** 1.626** 1.061** 2.031** 1.674**
Buy 1.302** 1.980** 1.626** 0.194 1.956** 1.522**
Sell 1.167** 2.666** 1.626** 1.895** 2.106** 1.820**
(Stock-Quarters) (3,144) (2,411) (2,615) (1,229) (1,968) (11,367)
3 1.557** 1.576** 1.310** 0.866** 1.235** 1.373**
Buy 3.162** 2.876** 2.243** 1.495** 2.254** 2.568**
Sell -0.779** -0.413** 0.023 0.097 -0.235† 1.955**
(Stock-Quarters) (13,246) (9,979) (9,524) (5,351) (8,381) (46,481)
4 1.076** 1.027** 0.959** 0.887** 0.853** 0.974**
Buy 2.206** 2.128** 1.803** 1.794** 1.687** 1.955**
Sell -0.457** -0.488** -0.157* -0.319** -0.281** -0.351**
(Stock-Quarters) (27,705) (22,115) (20,971) (14,468) (20,012) (105,271)
5 (largest) 0.941** 0.882** 0.860** 0.769** 0.717** 0.842**
Buy 1.023** 0.894** 0.930** 0.896** 0.621** 0.877**
Sell 0.863** 0.871** 0.791** 0.645** 0.812** 0.807**
(Stock-Quarters) (76,041) (66,656) (62,952) (49,121) (63,518) (318,288)
All 1.050** 1.015** 0.949** 0.807** 0.827** 0.944**
Buy 1.600** 1.442** 1.300** 1.138** 1.062** 1.335**
Sell 0.454** 0.548** 0.566** 0.456** 0.570** 0.519**
(Stock-Quarters) (120,331) (101,314) (96,259) (70,236) (94,009) (482,149)
Table B.40: 15 Metro Networks Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistics By
Market Cap and VIX Quintiles: † Statistically significant at the 10% level, * Statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level, ** Statistically significant at the 1% level
210
Market Cap VIX Quintile
Quintile 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) All
1 (smallest) 0.264 0.440 0.391 1.852 2.695* 1.019*
Buy 0.790 0.171 -0.832 -1.026 -2.025 -0.421
Sell -0.174 0.729 1.234 5.253† 5.292** 2.169**
(Stock-Quarters) (110) (83) (103) (48) (93) (437)
2 1.014** 1.394** 0.859** 1.815** 0.942** 1.127**
Buy 1.510** 2.072** 0.722* 2.382** 0.361 1.363**
Sell 0.476 0.609† 1.001** 1.221* 1.422** 0.884**
(Stock-Quarters) (1,811) (1,261) (1,394) (653) (1,115) (6,234)
3 1.446** 1.274** 1.070** 1.239** 0.755** 1.173**
Buy 2.394** 2.489** 1.802** 1.900** 0.891** 1.959**
Sell 0.282 -0.237* 0.256 0.612* 0.143** 0.136†
(Stock-Quarters) (7,336) (5,733) (5,601) (3,302) (5,360) (27,332)
4 1.049** 1.010** 0.936** 1.128** 0.823** 0.984**
Buy 0.879** 0.941** 0.967** 0.954** 0.816** 1.608**
Sell 0.850** 0.866* 0.661* 0.603** 0.648 0.189**
(Stock-Quarters) (19,779) (15,888) (15,580) (10,547) (15,581) (77,375)
5 (largest) 0.864** 0.904** 0.815** 0.778** 0.732** 0.823**
Buy 1.024** 0.975** 0.858** 0.870** 0.885** 0.908**
Sell 0.679** 0.738** 0.717** 0.585** 0.579** 0.737**
(Stock-Quarters) (69,697) (60,886) (58,368) (45,155) (59,264) (293,370)
All 0.947** 0.956** 0.856** 0.878** 0.756** 0.882**
Buy 1.180** 1.288** 1.133** 1.137** 0.929** 1.137**
Sell 0.688** 0.597** 0.564** 0.609** 0.575** 0.609**
(Stock-Quarters) (98,733) (83,851) (81,046) (59,705) (81,413) (404,748)
Table B.41: 15 Metro Networks Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistics By
Market Cap and VIX Quintiles (Exclude Over $50 Billion Equity): † Statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level, * Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** Statistically
significant at the 1% level
211
Market Cap VIX Quintile
Quintile 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) All
1 (smallest) 10.165** 9.294** 8.950* 23.978** 10.661** 11.093**
Buy 5.402 4.967 4.278 19.186 3.638 5.427*
Sell 13.908* 12.659** 15.623* 25.575** 12.482** 14.420**
(Stock-Quarters) (25) (16) (17) (8) (34) (100)
2 5.246** 4.276** 7.334** 5.560** 6.187** 5.613**
Buy 3.431** 0.997 8.036** 4.156* 4.696** 4.031**
Sell 6.081** 6.172** 6.953** 6.963** 7.163** 6.506**
(Stock-Quarters) (536) (423) (344) (106) (306) (1,715)
3 3.997** 4.556** 3.792** 4.029** 4.464** 4.166**
Buy 5.007** 5.255** 5.642** 3.848** 5.896** 5.248**
Sell 2.982** 3.766** 1.936** 4.249** 2.790** 3.005**
(Stock-Quarters) (2,766) (2,004) (1,666) (593) (1,301) (8,330)
4 3.230** 3.577** 3.515** 3.551** 2.829** 3.326**
Buy 3.772** 4.094** 4.536** 3.925** 3.606** 3.974**
Sell 2.727** 3.051** 2.607** 3.167** 2.076** 2.709**
(Stock-Quarters) (6,379) (4,470) (3,953) (2,097) (3,463) (20,362)
5 (largest) 2.690** 2.530** 2.875** 2.971** 2.613** 2.718**
Buy 3.035** 2.562** 2.995** 3.516** 2.389** 2.866**
Sell 2.368** 2.518** 2.771** 2.491** 2.922** 2.612**
(Stock-Quarters) (14,599) (12,216) (12,084) (8,255) (11,971) (59,125)
All 3.044** 3.031** 3.190** 3.178** 2.878** 3.056**
Buy 3.465** 3.213** 3.649** 3.629** 2.977** 3.375**
Sell 2.654** 2.870** 2.769** 2.764** 2.868** 2.777**
(Stock-Quarters) (24,305) (19,129) (18,064) (11,059) (17,075) (89,632)
Table B.42: 15 Metro Networks Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistics By
Market Cap and VIX Quintiles (Major Portfolio Changes): † Statistically signif-
icant at the 10% level, * Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** Statistically significant
at the 1% level
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Market Cap VIX Quintile
Quintile 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) All
1 (smallest) 5.756 11.464** 4.701 30.708** 10.577* 9.748**
Buy 7.611 10.705* 2.405 35.061 -1.089 5.710*
Sell 3.901 12.224* 6.997 29.258** 18.744** 13.155**
(Stock-Quarters) (12) (12) (14) (4) (17) (59)
2 3.245** 2.329** 6.253** 4.940** 4.424** 3.977**
Buy 2.011* -0.519 4.465** 7.183* 1.978† 2.180**
Sell 3.959** 4.243** 7.218** 2.885† 6.122** 5.105**
(Stock-Quarters) (371) (316) (274) (69) (227) (1,257)
3 3.239** 3.434** 2.798** 3.584** 3.416** 3.251**
Buy 3.993** 4.247** 3.095** 3.281** 4.413** 3.897**
Sell 2.514** 2.572** 2.505** 3.955** 2.312** 2.586**
(Stock-Quarters) (2,326) (1,665) (1,384) (489) (1,146) (7,010)
4 2.981** 3.367** 3.205** 3.231** 2.606** 3.069**
Buy 3.519** 3.969** 3.507** 3.478** 3.406** 3.593**
Sell 2.514** 2.766** 2.926** 2.986** 1.785** 2.573**
(Stock-Quarters) (5,750) (4,051) (3,568) (1,806) (3,201) (18,376)
5 (largest) 2.654** 2.465** 2.688** 2.876** 2.524** 2.626**
Buy 2.980** 2.776** 2.794** 3.239** 2.360** 2.810**
Sell 2.411** 2.198** 2.593** 2.555** 2.683** 2.479**
(Stock-Quarters) (13,873) (11,666) (11,545) (7,823) (11,550) (56,457)
All 2.811** 2.766** 2.867** 2.998** 2.639** 2.802**
Buy 3.214** 3.160** 2.987** 3.317** 2.725** 3.074**
Sell 2.481** 2.407** 2.758** 2.707** 2.562** 2.564**
(Stock-Quarters) (22,332) (17,710) (16,785) (10,191) (16,141) (83,159)
Table B.43: 15 Metro Networks Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistics By
Market Cap and VIX Quintiles (Exclude Over $50 Billion Equity; Major Port-
folio Changes): † Statistically significant at the 10% level, * Statistically significant at
the 5% level, ** Statistically significant at the 1% level
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Market Cap VIX Quintile
Quintile 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) All
1 (smallest) 1.873 0.848 1.966 6.577 1.704 1.943*
Buy 1.916 -0.974 1.409 6.307 -1.059 0.954
Sell 1.829 3.091 2.621 6.913 3.595 2.946*
(Stock-Quarters) (44) (29) (37) (9) (32) (151)
2 1.561** 1.555** 1.873** 3.125** 1.640** 1.743**
Buy 2.336** 1.688** 0.500 2.287* 1.121† 1.563**
Sell 0.831* 1.429** 3.402** 3.964** 2.190** 1.924**
(Stock-Quarters) (1,187) (799) (801) (232) (568) (3,587)
3 1.595** 1.832** 1.585** 1.456** 1.317** 1.587**
Buy 3.021** 3.056** 1.855** 1.939** 1.554** 2.450**
Sell -0.411* 0.292 1.217** 0.290** 1.010** 0.453**
(Stock-Quarters) (7,111) (5,124) (4,763) (2,019) (3,813) (22,830)
4 1.538** 1.421** 1.458** 1.032** 1.197** 1.375**
Buy 2.631** 2.303** 1.744** 1.536** 1.638** 2.070**
Sell 0.194* 0.284* 1.089** 0.414** 0.608** 0.490**
(Stock-Quarters) (19,099) (14,444) (13,366) (7,872) (12,173) (66,954)
5 (largest) 0.960** 0.869** 0.769** 0.605** 0.708** 0.796**
Buy 1.074** 0.836** 0.676** 0.556** 0.665** 0.779**
Sell 0.854** 0.907** 0.871** 0.659** 0.759** 0.819**
(Stock-Quarters) (73,405) (65,855) (62,073) (49,041) (65,033) (316,007)
All 1.122** 1.025** 0.941** 0.702** 0.816** 0.944**
Buy 1.567** 1.258** 0.942** 0.753** 0.875** 1.121**
Sell 0.665** 0.786** 0.946** 0.652** 0.761** 0.763**
(Stock-Quarters) (100,846) (86,251) (81,640) (59,173) (81,619) (409,529)
Table B.44: 75 TypeMetro Networks Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistics
By Market Cap and VIX Quintiles: † Statistically significant at the 10% level, *
Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** Statistically significant at the 1% level
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Market Cap VIX Quintile
Quintile 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) All
1 (smallest) 0.010 0.399 1.644 5.271 1.861 1.272
Buy 0.911 1.345 3.317 4.922 -1.026 1.519
Sell -0.844 -0.461 -0.416 5.707 3.946 1.036
(Stock-Quarters) (37) (27) (29) (9) (31) (127)
2 1.340** 1.375** 1.523** 3.723** 1.549** 1.577**
Buy 2.083** 2.321** 0.467 2.993* 1.414* 1.721**
Sell 0.564 0.441 2.610** 4.469** 1.692* 1.429**
(Stock-Quarters) (948) (588) (623) (182) (452) (2,793)
3 1.598** 1.696** 1.362** 1.507** 1.306** 1.510**
Buy 2.669** 2.627** 1.649** 1.700** 1.422** 2.156**
Sell 0.099 0.522* 1.029** 1.293** 1.167** 0.702**
(Stock-Quarters) (5,332) (3,804) (3,586) (1,568) (3,118) (17,408)
4 1.529** 1.460** 1.478** 1.270** 1.248** 1.421**
Buy 2.519** 2.245** 1.962** 1.660** 1.757** 2.109**
Sell 0.302** 0.472** 0.910** 0.794** 0.605** 0.574**
(Stock-Quarters) (15,451) (11,444) (10,635) (6,178) (10,117) (53,825)
5 (largest) 1.124** 0.968** 0.858** 0.723** 0.815** 0.910**
Buy 1.229** 1.033** 1.004** 0.735** 0.907** 0.997**
Sell 1.026** 0.907** 0.758** 0.716** 0.725** 0.836**
(Stock-Quarters) (57,768) (52,945) (51,527) (40,582) (54,897) (257,719)
All 1.237** 1.093** 0.991** 0.830** 0.906** 1.030**
Buy 1.620** 1.361** 1.201** 0.904** 1.072** 1.265**
Sell 0.838** 0.818** 0.812** 0.758** 0.735** 0.796**
(Stock-Quarters) (79,536) (68,802) (66,400) (48,519) (68,615) (331,872)
Table B.45: 75 TypeMetro Networks Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistics
By Market Cap and VIX Quintiles (Exclude Over $50 Billion Equity): † Statis-
tically significant at the 10% level, * Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** Statistically
significant at the 1% level
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Market Cap VIX Quintile
Quintile 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) All
1 (smallest) 20.807* 6.262 7.415 18.398† -13.798 10.594**
Buy 7.076 1.298 10.121 - - 7.990†
Sell 34.538** 8.744 2.004 - -13.798 12.619*
(Stock-Quarters) (4) (3) (6) (2) (1) (16)
2 5.875** 4.469** 8.797** 11.654† 7.446** 6.356**
Buy 5.772** 2.650 6.101* 9.462 7.903* 5.032**
Sell 5.945** 6.829** 10.556** 16.036† 7.147* 7.450**
(Stock-Quarters) (147) (108) (76) (9) (38) (378)
3 3.755** 5.029** 4.793** 5.340** 6.620** 4.656**
Buy 5.550** 4.963** 5.436** 4.741** 8.850** 5.665**
Sell 2.095** 5.101** 4.144** 6.489** 4.554** 3.635**
(Stock-Quarters) (1,076) (690) (547) (105) (287) (2,705)
4 4.383** 4.154** 4.351** 4.510** 4.884** 4.386**
Buy 5.578** 4.319** 5.042** 3.726** 6.390** 5.127**
Sell 3.335** 3.994** 3.688** 5.677** 3.406** 3.684**
(Stock-Quarters) (3,356) (2,187) (1,695) (498) (1,036) (8,772)
5 (largest) 3.602** 3.372** 3.238** 3.711** 3.394** 3.451**
Buy 4.067** 3.327** 3.315** 3.382** 3.412** 3.543**
Sell 3.385** 3.456** 3.195** 4.103** 3.431** 3.454**
(Stock-Quarters) (10,268) (8,549) (7,788) (4,497) (6,948) (38,050)
All 3.817** 3.630** 3.553** 3.842** 3.708** 3.705**
Buy 4.535** 3.618** 3.751** 3.471** 4.001** 3.960**
Sell 3.317** 3.677** 3.391** 4.294** 3.483** 3.539**
(Stock-Quarters) (14,851) (11,537) (10,112) (5,111) (8,310) (49,921)
Table B.46: 75 TypeMetro Networks Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistics
By Market Cap and VIX Quintiles For (Major Portfolio Changes): † Statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level, * Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** Statistically
significant at the 1% level
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Market Cap VIX Quintile
Quintile 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) All
1 (smallest) 15.401† 6.262 6.127 17.212† -13.798 8.304*
Buy 6.894 1.298 6.127 - - 5.715
Sell 32.416 8.744 - 17.212† -13.798 11.755†
(Stock-Quarters) (3) (3) (5) (2) (1) (14)
2 5.342** 3.202* 5.847** 11.662† 7.008** 5.155**
Buy 6.300** 2.533 3.167 9.482 7.696* 4.671**
Sell 4.697** 4.205* 7.610** 16.021† 6.512† 5.578**
(Stock-Quarters) (139) (95) (63) (9) (31) (337)
3 3.531** 4.876** 4.648** 5.475** 6.219** 4.458**
Buy 5.345** 4.695** 4.903** 4.932** 8.145** 5.353**
Sell 1.854** 5.067** 4.415** 6.502** 4.530** 3.575**
(Stock-Quarters) (1,022) (630) (503) (1040) (274) (2,533)
4 4.412** 4.076** 4.464** 4.515** 4.743** 4.384**
Buy 5.515** 4.110** 5.198** 4.054** 6.226** 5.081**
Sell 3.385** 4.040** 3.761** 5.252** 3.298** 3.694**
(Stock-Quarters) (3,219) (2,080) (1,601) (480) (1,001) (8,381)
5 (largest) 3.501** 3.388** 3.162** 3.663** 3.341** 3.396**
Buy 3.714** 3.295** 3.173** 3.171** 3.382** 3.382**
Sell 3.358** 3.513** 3.175** 4.208** 3.353** 3.453**
(Stock-Quarters) (9,984) (8,397) (7,650) (4,431) (6,876) (37,338)
All 3.727** 3.599** 3.469** 3.802** 3.621** 3.635**
Buy 4.257** 3.527** 3.597** 3.329** 3.909** 3.796**
Sell 3.275** 3.697** 3.366** 4.351** 3.397** 3.518**
(Stock-Quarters) (14,367) (11,205) (9,822) (5,026) (8,183) (48,603)
Table B.47: 75 TypeMetro Networks Weighted Mean LSV Herding Statistics
By Market Cap and VIX Quintiles For (Exclude Over $50 Billion Equity;
Major Portfolio Changes): † Statistically significant at the 10% level, * Statistically




C.1.1 Calculation of (3.2.20)






Define the normalized value function as W(x;h) = rW (x;h). Write (3.2.19)
in discrete bellman equation form and pass to the limit:
W(x;h) = r∆t(−g(x)) + e−r∆tEx[W(X∆t;h)], x < h, (C.1.2)
⇒ W(x;h)− e−r∆tW(x;h)
= r∆t(−g(x)) + e−r∆tEx[W(X∆t;h)−W(x;h)], x < h. (C.1.3)
For small ∆t, e−r∆t = 1− r∆t+ o(∆t).
⇒ r∆tW(x;h) + o(∆t)
= r∆t(−g(x)) + (1− r∆t)Ex[W(X∆t;h)−W(x;h)] + o(∆t),
x < h. (C.1.4)
Divide (C.1.4) by ∆t and let ∆t→ 0:
⇒ rW(x;h) = r(−g(x)) + LW(x;h), x < h,
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⇒ (r − L)W(x;h) = r(−g(x)), x < h,
⇒ (r − L)W (x;h) = −g(x), x < h. (C.1.5)
C.1.2 Calculation of (3.2.54)






Denote the state specific infinitesimal generator as Lj, and the normalized
value function as vj(x) = (r + λjk)vj(x) for j = 1, 2, j 6= k. We can write
(3.2.52) in discrete bellman equation form and pass to the limit.
vj(x) = (r + λjk)∆tgj(x) + (1− λjk∆t)e−(r+λjk)∆tEx[vj(Xj∆t)]
+λjk∆te
−(r+λjk)∆tEx[vk(Xj∆t)], j = 1, 2, j 6= k. (C.1.7)
Subtracting (1− λjk∆t)e−(r+λjk)∆tvj(x) from both sides of (C.1.7) yields:
vj(x)− (1− λjk∆t)e−(r+λjk)∆tvj(x)
= (r + λjk)∆tgj(x) + (1− λjk∆t)e−(r+λjk)∆tEx[vj(Xj∆t)− vj(x)]
+λjk∆te
−(r+λjk)∆tEx[vk(Xj∆t)], j = 1, 2, j 6= k. (C.1.8)
For small ∆t, e−(r+λjk)∆t = 1− (r+λjk)∆t+ o(∆t). Therefore, (C.1.8) can be
rewritten as:
(r + λjk)∆tv(x) + o(∆t)
= (r + λjk)∆tgj(x) + (1− (r + λjk)∆t)Ex[v(Xj∆t)− v(x)]
+λjk∆tEx[vk(Xj∆t)] + o(∆t), j = 1, 2, j 6= k. (C.1.9)
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Dividing both sides of (C.1.9) by ∆t and letting ∆t→ 0 yields:
(r + λjk)vj(x) = (r + λjk)g(x) + Ljvj(x) + λjkvk(x),(C.1.10)
⇒ (r + λjk − Lj)vj(x) = (r + λjk)g(x) + λjkvk(x), (C.1.11)
⇒ (r + λjk − Lj)vj(x) = g(x) + λjkvk(x), (C.1.12)
j = 1, 2, j 6= k.
C.1.3 Description of Grid Used to Calculate (3.2.63) and (3.2.64)
For some function u(x) and characteristic equation root β+ > 0, we






Create a grid for the spot value, x, of the price process. Denote xk as the value




















































= (1− e−β+∆)uk−1 − e−β




where uk denotes u(xk). Now,
E+u(xk−1) = e
−β+∆E+u(xk)+







(C.1.17) provides a recursive formula for calculating the expected present value
operator on the supremum process. You can either estimate the last value in
the grid, or set it to zero if the grid is large enough.
Using the characteristic root β− < 0, a similar derivation provides the












C.2 Investment Thresholds and Option Values
C.2.1 Production Tax Credits
Figure C.1: Investment Threshold and Option Value by PTC: Basic Model
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Figure C.2: Investment Threshold and Option Value by PTC: Deregulation
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Figure C.3: Investment Threshold and Option Value by PTC: Booms and Busts
in Oil Prices State 1
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Figure C.4: Investment Threshold and Option Value by PTC: Booms and Busts
in Oil Prices State 2
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C.2.2 Capital Costs
Figure C.5: Investment Threshold and Option Value by Capital Cost: Basic
Model
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Figure C.6: Investment Threshold and Option Value by Capital Cost: Deregu-
lation
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Figure C.7: Investment Threshold and Option Value by Capital Cost: Booms
and Busts in Oil Prices State 1
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Figure C.8: Investment Threshold and Option Value by Capital Cost: Booms
and Busts in Oil Prices State 2
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C.2.3 Utilization Rate
Figure C.9: Investment Threshold and Option Value by Utilization Rate: Basic
Model
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Figure C.10: Investment Threshold and Option Value by Utilization Rate:
Deregulation
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Figure C.11: Investment Threshold and Option Value by Utilization Rate:
Booms and Busts in Oil Prices State 1
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Figure C.12: Investment Threshold and Option Value by Utilization Rate:
Booms and Busts in Oil Prices State 2
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